Liverpool City Council v Pleroma Distribution Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Maurice Kay,MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY |
| Judgment Date | 21 November 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | [2002] EWHC 2467 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/3153/2002 |
| Date | 21 November 2002 |
[2002] EWHC 2467 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
the Honourable Mr Justice Maurice Kay
Case No: CO/3153/2002
Norman A Wright (instructed by Legal Services, Liverpool City Council) for the Appellant
James Findlay (instructed by Linder Myers) for the Respondent
This is an appeal by Case Stated in respect of a decision of a Magistrates Court sitting in Liverpool on 15 March 2002. The Appellant (LCC) preferred a complaint on 28 November 2001 alleging that the Respondent (Pleroma) was liable to pay non-domestic rates in the sums of £55,461.61 on account number 9001287522 and £131,650.00 on account number 9001356828 in accordance with Regulation 12 of the Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 (the Regulations). The sum alleged to be due on account number 9001287522 related to a period of years up until 31 March 2001, whereas account number 9001356828 was concerned with the demand for the year ending 31 March 2001. I shall refer to them respectively as "the old demand" and "the current demand".
As a result of LCC's complaint, a hearing was to take place on 21 December 2001. The form of the listing was that LCC's applications for liability orders against Pleroma and a large number of other respondents were listed to be heard. Hundreds of such cases were so listed. On 17 December Goldbeck King, a firm of rating consultants, wrote to the Clerk to the Justices and to the City Treasurer requesting an adjournment of all proceedings against Pleroma "on the basis that the demands made are unlawful with respect to the years to 31 March 2001 and that the amounts have been paid with respect to the current year as a result of overpayment in prior years". It is not at all uncommon for credibly disputed cases to be adjourned to dates when an appropriate amount of time is available. The consultants' letter contended that the case was a complex one which would last at least three hours and which would be suitable for a District Judge rather than a bench of lay justices.
Although it has not been easy to reconstruct what transpired at Court on 21 December, the Case Stated accepts the account put forward on behalf of LCC. It is as follows:
"On arriving at court the [LCC] representative, Mrs Robinson, showed to the court clerk…..a letter they had received from [Pleroma's] representative requesting an adjournment of all proceedings. The court clerk read the letter and handed it back to Mrs Robinson. This letter, at this stage, had not been brought into court. There then followed a conversation between Mrs Robinson and the court clerk as to the request by [Pleroma]. Mrs Robinson agreed to adjourn [the application in relation to the old demand], where the contention being made was that these were unlawful. With regard to the [current demand], she indicated that she was not prepared to agree an adjournment because the fact that there had been overpayments in earlier years is not a defence to a liability order application……..
Subsequently the justices came into court and Mrs Robinson addressed them….This involved her asking for liability orders in every case on the …..list…..unless it was one that was indicated to be withdrawn or adjourned to a future date….When the Justices came to [Pleroma's] accounts, Mrs. Robinson stated that [the old demand] was to be adjourned sine die…..when asked by the court clerk about [the current demand], Mrs Robinson replied that it was only the first one that was to be adjourned…..
At this stage the Justices pronounced that the liability orders sought were granted."
It seems that some time later the letter of 17 December from Goldbeck King to the Clerk to the Justices was brought into court and the court clerk showed it to Mrs. Robinson but the Justices
"categorically state that at no stage did we have sight of either letter [i.e. the one to the Clerk to the Justices or the copy to the City Treasurer]……or were ever made aware of the contents of the letters."
In due course a liability order was issued in relation to the old demand.
When Goldbeck King discovered what had occurred, they sought to have the application in relation to the old demand relisted and on 4 January 2002 the Principal Legal Advisor to the Justices wrote to Goldbeck King informing them of a hearing date and adding that
"the Court is using its common law powers to relist the matter as it appears that a mistake was made in that the Court was not informed of the contents of your letter of 17 December which requested an adjournment of both matters listed that day."
The same Justices presided over a hearing on 18 January and again on 15 March when they made the decision which is described in the Case Stated in the following terms:
"We…..were of the opinion that the liability order had been issued without us having the opportunity to fully consider [Pleroma's] application to adjourn. The fact remains we never had sight of or knew of the contents of the….letter….requesting an adjournment of all the accounts. The….application to adjourn was never put before us and we were therefore unable to make a proper and informed decision in the circumstances.
As a result of this we feel that the court on 21 December…..made an inequitable decision…..we feel it would be unjust for the liability order to stand. In the circumstances we used our inherent jurisdiction to set aside the liability order…..
Whilst we could find no statutory authority to allow us to reconsider the original court hearing we were satisfied that we had common law jurisdiction to do so. We were satisfied that if we did not do this then it would lead to an inequitable position."
In the present appeal LCC contends that the Justices thereby acted without jurisdiction. In a nutshell, its case is that the Justices had no power, either statutory or at common law, to revisit a decision in respect of which they were functus officio and that Pleroma's remedy (if any) lies elsewhere.
On behalf of LCC, Mr. Wright's...
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