Managing collaboration in public security networks in the fight against terrorism and organized crime
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852316681859 |
| Author | Naim Kapucu,Cihan Demirhan |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Review of
Administrative
Article
Sciences
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2019, Vol. 85(1) 154–172
Managing collaboration in
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public security networks in
DOI: 10.1177/0020852316681859
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the fight against terrorism
and organized crime
Naim Kapucu
University of Central Florida, USA
Cihan Demirhan
Ministry of Interior, Turkey
Abstract
The fight against terrorism and organized crime requires collaboration between public
security organizations. Due to a lack of strong hierarchical structure, managing net-
works is not similar to managing a single government agency. This study examines the
factors influencing network effectiveness in the public security sector. The study high-
lighted the importance of inter-organizational trust, network leadership style, goal con-
vergence, and organizational culture on network effectiveness. In order to find these
relations between study variables, a self-reported survey was conducted with 305 cur-
rent and previous public network leaders. The study found that inter-organizational
trust and goal convergence have a positive relationship with network effectiveness, with
co-producer network leadership being the most convenient leadership style for
effectiveness.
Points for practitioners
Government and network managers should focus on establishing relationships to pro-
mote trust and decrease the goal divergence between partner agencies, with increased
open communication in the network. Governors should ensure an accountable system
of public security, identify the boundaries of member organizations, network principles,
and values, and appropriately coordinate joint actions. In order to promote governors
to implement behaviors in co-producer leadership styles, the government should
strengthen the governor’s authority and financial power over military units and intelli-
gence departments.
Corresponding author:
Naim Kapucu, School of Public Administration, University of Central Florida, 4364 Scorpius Street, Orlando,
FL 32816-1395, USA.
Email: kapucu@ucf.edu
Kapucu and Demirhan
155
Keywords
Inter-organizational trust, network effectiveness, network leadership, public security
networks
Introduction
Terrorism and organized crime are challenging problems for governments around
the world. The rise of globalization, ongoing increase in information sharing and
communication opportunities, and more open borders provide better opportunities
for crime organizations to perform illegal activities easily (Cronin, 2002). The net-
works have benefited from weaker government and ethnic and regional conflicts. In
order to overcome increasing difficulties related to terrorism and organized crime,
governments are trying to find alternative solutions. Numerous agencies are tasked
with fighting against these complex problems in different countries. It is crucial to
set a mutual goal among responsible agencies, to make a precise evaluation of risk,
to establish a technical infrastructure, and to create organizational policies and
processes that provide flexibility and conformity to continuous incidents. It is also
important to establish ‘‘a culture that accepts inquiry and information sharing’’ for
better coordination, and to develop ‘‘a systematic program to increase adaptiveness
and capacity for learning between governmental agencies’’ (Comfort, 2002: 100).
Effective collaboration in the public security sector may help the effective utiliza-
tion of limited resources.
One of the main challenges in a network is specifying the necessary conditions to
get better results from the collaboration, with leadership facilitation (Mau, 2015;
Orazi et al., 2013). Consensus among partners on deciding about performance
criteria may not always be possible. Some partners may not be eager to be eval-
uated since they have doubts about their performance and their capacity. Partners
may be reluctant towards performance evaluation since they think that circum-
stances beyond their control may negatively affect their performance. Focusing on
some specific points may lead to neglecting some other significant goals that are
more difficult to evaluate.
When the outcomes are contingent on the coordinated activities of various dif-
ferent organizations, effectiveness should be evaluated at the network level (Provan
and Milward, 1995). Each network has special performance evaluation measures
that are more suitable to the field in which a network operates, and according to
the purpose of the network (Provan et al., 2007). Network literature discusses
specific factors that contribute to network effectiveness. Inter-organizational
trust, network leadership, goal convergence, and organizational culture are identi-
fied as the key factors of network effectiveness in this study. The following research
questions are examined in the study: which factors are important for effectiveness
in public security networks? What is the role of inter-organizational trust among
partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the highest perform-
ance in public security networks? What is the relative importance of goal
156
International Review of Administrative Sciences 85(1)
convergence and organizational culture in network effectiveness? How does the
relationship between inter-organizational trust, leadership style, goal convergence,
and organizational culture impact network effectiveness?
Although earlier studies have examined network effectiveness in public service
delivery networks, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of networks in
the public security sector. The study uses network theory and inter-organizational
social capital perspectives as theoretical constructs. Turkish local public security
networks are selected as the case study of the research in order to analyze relations
between the variables.1
Context of the study
Terrorism and organized crime are important threats in Turkey (Hemansson, 2016;
Unlu et al., 2010). Turkey has a critical position in terms of drug trafficking, illicit
arms, and human trafficking. There are three main public organizations that con-
stitute law enforcement in Turkey: the police forces, the Gendarmerie, and the Coast
Guard. The Turkish Police Force, with around 200,000 officers, is responsible for
urban areas and organized under the Ministry of Interior. In provinces and districts,
police forces operate under the authority of governors/district governors.
The Turkish Constitution divides the country into provinces and other lower
administrative units based on geographical location, economic conditions, and the
requirements of public service. Turkey has 81 provinces and 919 districts under these
provinces (Kapucu and Palabiyik, 2008). The ‘‘devolution of wider power’’ principle
provides legitimacy for the use of power to governors and district governors under
the central government. The governors are the highest civil service officials in a
province and they can make decisions and execute policies for the central govern-
ment. The provinces are subdivided into districts headed by a district governor. In
the Turkish administrative and crisis management system, the province and district
governors are the principal responsible public administrators empowered to manage
any type of crisis that occurs in their jurisdiction (Kapucu and Palabiyik, 2008).
The Gendarmerie operates in rural regions of the provinces and districts, and the
Coast Guard works under a more complicated system compared to the police
forces. They theoretically operate under the Ministry of Interior for their law
enforcement duties, but, in practice, they operate under the directives of the
Armed Forces General Staff. While governors and district governors are author-
ized to impose disciplinary sanctions on police forces that violate administrative
rules, they have limited direct authority over the Gendarmerie and the Coast
Guard. Civil authorities have limited powers of appointment, promotion, and
relocation of Gendarmerie and Coast Guard officers.
The National Intelligence Service (MIT) is the governmental intelligence organ-
ization in Turkey and is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. MIT is different
from many other countries’ intelligence services, such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) or Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6), since it is not only respon-
sible for external intelligence gathering, but also deals with domestic intelligence.
Kapucu and Demirhan
157
The MIT has local offices in the provinces and in some big districts. Under the
current structure, governors have almost no formal power on the provincial offices
of the MIT.
The Armed Forces have direct and indirect influence on domestic security.
While some military units are deployed for fighting against the terrorist organiza-
tion the PKK, some other units are responsible for border protection. The Armed
Forces’ affiliation to the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard constitutes its indirect
relation to domestic security. Recently, governors were provided with discretionary
power to decide operations within their jurisdiction. Local military forces have to
obtain governors’ permission to initiate a military operation.
Background and literature review
Network effectiveness
Network effectiveness is defined as ‘‘the attainment of positive network level out-
comes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational partici-
pants acting independently’’ (Provan...
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