Minstrell Recruitment Ltd v John Lockett
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Snowden |
| Judgment Date | 21 December 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 3537 (Ch) |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: E30MA506 |
| Date | 21 December 2020 |
[2020] EWHC 3537 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTER
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Civil Justice Centre
Bridge Street West
Manchester
M60 9DJ
Mr Justice Snowden Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster
Case No: E30MA506
Martin Budworth (instructed by Knights plc) for the Claimant
Peter Gilmour (instructed by Cartwright King) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 13–16 October, 4 November, 18 December 2020
Approved Judgment
Introduction
This is an application by the Claimant (“Minstrell”) to commit the First Defendant (“Mr. Lockett”) to prison for contempt of court.
The application is the result of an extraordinary and bitter conflict between Minstrell, its directors and employees on the one hand, and Mr. Lockett on the other. As I shall relate, that conflict has involved dishonest conduct on both sides, which has included the falsification of evidence and the alteration of documents. It is a series of events that reflects badly on all concerned.
Mr. Lockett is an ex-employee of Minstrell, which conducts business as a recruitment agency providing “candidates” for employment or short-term engagement by “client” companies in the construction and civil engineering sector. The contempt application essentially relates to breaches of an order which Minstrell obtained from HHJ Eyre QC on 28 September 2018 which enforced the terms of an agreement which the parties had entered into after Mr. Lockett's employment had terminated in June 2018.
The principal acts relied on as constituting breaches of the order of HHJ Eyre QC are communications made by Mr. Lockett with third parties and posted on social media which are alleged to have been untrue and disparaging of Minstrell and its directors and managers, contrary to an injunction restraining the making of such statements. The other alleged breaches consisted of soliciting and dealing with one of Minstrell's clients in breach of an injunction to enforce a post-employment restrictive covenant; a failure to deliver up any of Minstrell's property and information in Mr. Lockett's possession; and a failure to provide confirmatory witness statements or affidavits of compliance with such requirements.
Mr. Lockett originally denied such contempts and filed evidence in response to the application. Minstrell then withdrew the first five allegations of contempt which were said to have been committed by text messages alleged to have been sent by Mr. Lockett to another ex-employee of Minstrell. After Mr. Lockett had pointed out that the ex-employee had surrendered her company phone when she had left the company, it transpired that those messages had in fact been sent by Mr. Lockett to one of Minstrell's own managers, who had impersonated the ex-employee by using her phone, and had initiated the exchange of messages with Mr. Lockett. I shall return to that matter later in this judgment.
On the first day of the hearing of the application, Mr. Lockett produced a document entitled “Basis of Plea” in which he indicated that he would admit that he had breached HHJ Eyre QC's injunction during January 2019 by making a large number of disparaging and untrue remarks about Minstrell and its directors and managers in a series of posts on social media. Those posts closely followed the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against Mr. Lockett by Minstrell based upon an unpaid order for costs made by HHJ Eyre QC. Whilst ultimately admitting that the posts breached the order, Mr. Lockett maintained that he had thought that the relevant part of the order of HHJ Eyre QC was no longer in force.
Mr. Lockett denied the other breaches of the orders and sought to raise a number of counter-allegations about Minstrell and how it conducted its business, which he said went some way to justifying the views which he had expressed about them to third parties, and therefore mitigated the seriousness of the contempts which he had admitted. He also contended he had been reacting to a campaign of harassment by persons connected with Minstrell.
I then proceeded to hear the evidence, both with a view to deciding whether the disputed allegations of contempt were made out, and also in order to determine whether the factual matters asserted by Mr. Lockett were true or not.
I indicated at the conclusion of the hearing on 16 October 2020 that, after a further day of closing submissions on the evidence, I would give a judgment setting out the factual matters that I found to be established in order to provide a foundation for the hearing at which I would decide what sanction to impose upon Mr. Lockett for the contempts that had been admitted or proved. I circulated this judgment in draft on 17 December 2020 and held the hearing to determine sanction on 18 December 2020. This approved version of my judgment also includes my remarks on sanction and on costs and other consequential matters.
As an introductory remark I should also say that the evidence of both sides strayed into what, on any view, were tangential matters and arguments which could have no bearing upon the outstanding allegations of contempt, or upon the sanction that would be appropriate. I will attempt not to be unduly distracted or to extend this judgment by dealing with such matters. Accordingly, if I do not mention a particular matter raised in the evidence, it is because I consider it to be irrelevant (or not materially relevant) to the issues that I actually have to decide, or to the sanction that I should impose.
The Law
There was no dispute between the parties that when considering whether a contempt of court is proven, the standard of proof of the matters constituting the contempt is the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (or satisfied so that one is sure): see Re Bramblevale Limited [1970] Ch 128.
There was also no dispute that for a contempt of court to be established it is not necessary to prove that the breach of the order was done in the knowledge that it was a breach of the order or with the intention to breach the order. The defendant must be shown to have known of the relevant order, and to have known that he was doing or omitting to do the relevant things. But once those matters are established, it is not necessary also to show that the defendant knew his actions put him in breach of the order. It is enough that as a matter of fact and law they do so put him in breach: see Varma v Atkinson and Mummery [2020] EWCA Civ 1602 at [52]–[54] per Rose LJ quoting Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) [1995] 1 AC 456. Accordingly, if such requirements are met it will be a contempt even if the defendant did not believe that his acts or omissions amounted to a breach (e.g. because he did not understand or misunderstood the order), and even if he had followed legal advice to that effect: see e.g. Adam Phones v Goldschmidt [1999] 4 All ER 486 at 492j–494J and Masri v Consolidated Contractors [2011] EWHC 1024 at [155]–[155]. Questions of the state of mind of the defendant are, however, relevant to mitigation of the contempt and hence to sanction.
There was, however, a dispute between the parties about the standard of proof applicable to matters that might go to mitigate the contempt and hence to sanction. As indicated, this would include Mr. Lockett's state of mind when committing a breach of the order; and it might also include the matters in relation to the conduct of persons associated with Minstrell upon which Mr. Lockett relied for mitigation. For Mr. Lockett, Mr. Gilmour submitted that such matter are akin to a “trial of an issue” in a criminal court and that if Mr. Lockett raised such matters, they should be accepted unless disproved by Minstrell to the criminal standard. Mr. Budworth, for Minstrell, submitted that such matters should simply be determined on the basis of the normal civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probability.
In my judgment the position is that if Minstrell contends that Mr. Lockett wilfully or recklessly breached the orders, then it must prove that beyond all reasonable doubt: see Z Bank v D1 [1994] Lloyds Rep 656 at 667. To that extent Mr. Lockett is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But I do not accept that just because Mr. Lockett makes a factual allegation concerning Minstrell or persons associated with it, that such allegation must be accepted by me as the basis for sanction unless it is disproved by Minstrell beyond reasonable doubt. In my judgment all other matters of that nature are simply to be determined in accordance with the normal civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities by the person making the allegation. That is also the case even though some of the matters alleged by Mr. Lockett might themselves amount to dishonest conduct by Minstrell and those associated with it.
The facts
I find the facts set out in the following narrative to be established on the basis of the evidence, applying the standards of proof set out above. I shall also deal at the relevant juncture in the narrative with the various disputed allegations of contempt.
Mr. Lockett's employment by Minstrell
Mr. Lockett is 52. After working as a joiner and doing some voluntary work and work in sales, he was introduced to the recruitment industry and worked for another agency (Multi Trades) from January 2014 for just over two years. He decided to leave that employment because of concerns over drug use and...
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