Moodie v Hosegood
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Porter,Lord Morton of Henryton,Lord Reid,Lord Tucker,Lord Asquith of Bishopstone |
| Judgment Date | 25 July 1951 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1951] UKHL J0725-3 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1951] UKHL J0725-3
House of Lords
Lord Porter
Lord Morton of Henryton
Lord Reid
Lord Tucker
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Moodie against Hosegood, that the Committee had heard Counsel, as well on Wednesday the 6th, as on Friday the 8th, Monday the 11th and Tuesday the 12th. days of June last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Louise Moodie (Widow), of St. Anne's Lodge, Headley Road, Grayshott, in the County of Hampshire, praying. That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 5th of February 1951, might be reviewed before His Majesty the King, in His Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King, in His Court of Parliament, might seem meet; as also upon the printed Case of Thomas Crosley Hosegood, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of His Majesty the King assembled, That the said Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 5th day of February 1951, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed: And it is further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Farnham County Court with a Direction to enter Judgment for the Defendant: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondent do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellant the Costs incurred by her in the Courts below, and also the Costs incurred by her in respect of the said Appeal to this House, such last mentioned Costs to be taxed in the manner usual when the Appellant sues in formâ pauperis: And it is also further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Farnham County Court, to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment.
My Lords,
In this case I have had an opportunity of reading the Opinion about to be expressed by my noble and learned friend, Lord Morton of Henryton. As I find myself in complete agreement with both his reasoning and the result I have not thought it necessary to add to the Opinions to be expressed.
My Lords,
This appeal involves yet another consideration by your Lordships' House of the provisions of the Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Acts, 1920-1939, hereafter referred to as "the Acts".
The Appellant is the widow of Mr. William Andrew Moodie, who died intestate on the 20th May, 1950. From November, 1937, until the date of his death Mr. Moodie occupied a dwelling-house known as "Saint Anne's Lodge", Headley Road, Grayshott, in the county of Hants, as the tenant of the Misses Figgis-Smith at a weekly rent of 15s. That dwelling-house was one to which the Acts applied. Accordingly, if the tenancy had been determined by notice in Mr. Moodie's lifetime, he would have ceased to be a contractual tenant and would have become what is commonly called a "statutory tenant". I shall use that convenient phrase to describe a person who is entitled to the protection given by the Acts, bearing in mind, however, that such a person is not a tenant in the ordinary meaning of that word, since he has no existing contract of tenancy and has no right at common law to retain possession.
On the death of Mr. Moodie intestate, his contractual tenancy vested in the Probate Judge under section 9 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925. On the 22nd June, 1950, the Respondent acquired the freehold of Saint Anne's Lodge by purchase from the Misses Figgis-Smith, and on the 30th June, 1950, he served on the Probate Judge a notice in writing to quit the said property at the end of the next complete week of the tenancy after the date of the notice. It is not disputed that the effect of that notice was to determine the tenancy.
The Appellant was residing at Saint Anne's Lodge with her husband at the time of his death, and she continued to reside there after her husband's death. On the 3rd October, 1950, the Respondent issued a plaint in the Farnham County Court against the Appellant claiming possession of the house and certain mesne profits. By her defence the Appellant alleged that she was in lawful possession of the house, as the widow of Mr. Moodie. This defence was based upon certain provisions of the Acts which must now be set out.
Section 12 (1) of the Act of 1920, as amended, provides, so far as material, as follows:—
"For the purposes of this Act, except where the context otherwise requires:—
. . . . . . . . . .
( f) The expressions 'landlord', 'tenant', 'mortgagee', and 'mortgagor' include any person from time to time deriving title under the original landlord, tenant, mortgagee or mortgagor;
( g) The expression 'landlord' also includes in relation to any dwelling-house any person, other than the tenant, who is or would but for this Act be entitled to possession of the dwelling-house, and the expressions 'tenant and tenancy' include sub-tenant and sub-tenancy, and the expression 'let' includes sub-let, and the expression 'tenant' includes the widow of a tenant who was residing with him at the time of his death.…"
Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1933, which replaced, with certain amendments, section 5 (1) of the Act of 1920, provides that "No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house to which the principal Acts apply or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom shall be made or given unless" certain conditions there specified are complied with. It is common ground that these conditions have not been complied with in the present case.
The arguments of the parties to this appeal can now be summarised. The Appellant contends as follows:—
Section 3 of the Act of 1933 protects the possession of a tenant. Section 12 (1) ( g) of the Act of 1920, as amended, provides that, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression "tenant" includes the widow of a tenant who was residing with him at the time of his death. There is no context which "otherwise requires" in this case. My husband was the tenant of St. Anne's Lodge up to the time of his death. I am his widow and I was residing with him at the time of his death. Therefore I am a "tenant" within section 3 of the Act of 1933 and my possession is protected by that section.
To this contention the Respondent replies that the Appellant is not "the widow of a tenant" within the meaning of section 12 (1) ( g) because the word "tenant" occurring in that phrase refers only to a "statutory tenant" and has no application to a contractual tenant.
Thus the decision of this appeal turns entirely upon the meaning of the word "tenant" in the phrase just quoted. Does it mean, or at least include, a contractual tenant, or does it refer only to a statutory tenant?
My Lords, it is plain that if the word "tenant" is to be given its ordinary meaning in the phrase "widow of a tenant", the Appellant must succeed; but the County Court Judge and the Court of Appeal have held that the word "tenant" in this phrase neither means nor includes a contractual tenant. In so holding both the learned Judge and the Court of Appeal followed the decisions in Thynne v. Salmon (C.A.) [1948] 1 K.B. 482 and Smith v. Mather (C.A.) [1948] 2 K.B. 212, but Denning, L.J., while agreeing that these decisions covered the point in dispute, made some observations which I have found most helpful. The cases of Thynne v. Salmon and Smith v. Mather will shortly be considered, but I shall first point out that there are strong reasons why the word "tenant" in the phrase in question should be construed as including a contractual tenant. In the first place, any other construction involves a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word. In the second place, it would be capricious in the extreme to extend the protection of the Acts to a widow whose husband's contract of tenancy had been determined in his lifetime, and to withhold it from a widow whose husband's contract of tenancy was still subsisting at his death. Finally, it is noteworthy that section 12 (1) ( g) of the Act of 1920,...
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