Opportunistic decision-making in government: concept formation, variety and explanation
| Published date | 01 December 2017 |
| Date | 01 December 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315595279 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2017, Vol. 83(4) 636–657
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852315595279
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International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
Opportunistic decision-making
in government: concept formation,
variety and explanation
Perri 6
Queen Mary University of London, UK
Abstract
The notion of opportunism is too often used loosely in policy and administrative
research on executive decision-making: its various meanings are too rarely clearly dis-
tinguished. To make it useful for explanation, this article presents fresh concept forma-
tion work, clarifying the concept to recognize different kinds and degrees of
opportunism. To illustrate the use of the refined concept, the article examines key
decisions by British cabinets and core executives between 1945 and 1990. It proposes
that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory can help to explain why different kinds of
opportunism are cultivated in differently ordered administrations, so providing new
insight into decision-making.
Points for practitioners
The article provides a framework through which public managers can identify degrees
and types of opportunism among the elected politicians they serve. It will help public
managers to identify risks associated with such decisions, when they are asked to
execute them.
Keywords
bias, cost, decision-making, neo-Durkheimian institutional framework, opportunism,
planning horizon, political judgement, risk, short-termism, thought style
‘Opportunism’ describes a stance in decision-making. Unfortunately the term is
often used loosely (Das and Rahman, 2010). Its relationship with an ‘opportunity’
is rarely defined. To exhibit explanatory power, greater definitional rigour is
needed; varieties must be distinguished. Concept formation is a necessary precursor
Corresponding author:
Perri 6, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK.
Email: p.6@qmul.ac.uk
to explanation (6 and Bellamy, 2012; Goertz, 2005; Sartori, 1970). For this purpose,
this article identifies the concept’s basic elements, using several bodies of literature.
Examining difficulties in these literatures’ uses lights the way to a more refined con-
ception. To illustrate the clarified concept’s usefulness, the article examines British
governments’ key domestic, economic and foreign policy decisions between 1945
and 1990. The final section proposes a neo-Durkheimian institutional account of
these decisions, providing new insights about distinct for ms of opportunism.
Concepts of opportunism and opportunity
Uses of the term, ‘opportunism’, can be distinguished by whether they define it by:
(i) deficiencies in some normative, moral or ideological commitment; or stances
toward
(ii) action in particular contingent situations,
(iii) time horizons, or
(iv) potential supporters.
Among ‘deficiency’ conceptions, Williamson’s (1985, 1993) definition is widely
used in political economy and in strategic management studies (Besley et al., 2012).
It was developed for transaction cost analysis of relationships between principals
and agents. For Williamson, opportunism means self-interest with willingness to
use guile, or deliberately giving ‘incomplete or distorted disclosure of information,
especially [making] calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or
otherwise confuse’ (1985: 17) in ‘expectation [of] individual advantage’ (1985: 26)
at others’ expense (Das and Rahman, 2010: 57). Williamson regards opportunism
as a constant disposition, not a variable, checked only by varying costs, moral
education and institutions’ disciplinary effects. Some theorists narrow it to mean
willingness to defect from agreements (Liu et al., 2010). Others emphasize guile so
much that opportunism becomes a general disposition to engage in any unethical
behaviour for gain (Vafaı
¨, 2010). Studying corporate behaviour, Gibbins et al.
(1990: 130), drop Williamson’s condition of guile, stretching opportunism to
cover any gain-seeking whatsoever.
In studying whether governments manipulate economic policy before elections
to enhance their chances of reappointment, many political scientists use ‘opportu-
nism’ to mean parties’ willingness to present policies as being in wider public
interests when (presumably knowing that) they are mainly in the party’s interest
(Aidt et al., 2001; cf. Elster, 2007: 297). Some studies even allow decisions to be
opportunistic if the actor cares both about policy outcomes or citizens’ welfare and
their own re-election (Rogoff, 1990; Walter, 2008: 372). Sometimes opportunism is
used to describe decision-making deficient, not in altruistic or moral but in ideo-
logical principle (Brass, 1977; van Dalen and Swank, 1996).
Other political scientists use the term to mean merely being astute to contingen-
cies, to take advantage of opportunities (Jasiewicz, 2008; Messina, 2001).
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