Paula May Gladys Douglas (Applicant/Claimant) v HM Attorney-General and Others (Respondents/Defendants)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMrs Justice Carr DBE,Lord Justice Elias
Judgment Date15 December 2015
Neutral Citation[2015] EWHC 4109 (Admin)
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCO/3909/2015
Date15 December 2015

[2015] EWHC 4109 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

DIVISIONAL COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2A 2LL

Before:

Lord Justice Elias

Mrs Justice Carr DBE

CO/3909/2015

Between:
Paula May Gladys Douglas
Applicant/Claimant
and
HM Attorney-General and others
Respondents/Defendants

The Applicant/Claimant appeared in person

Miss Camilla Chorfi (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared on behalf of the Respondents/Defendants

Mrs Justice Carr DBE

Introduction

2

On 8 May 2006 the Applicant was declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (now the Senior Courts Act 1981)("the Act")("the Order"). By an application dated 6 July 2015, and pursuant to leave granted by Edis J on 14 July 2015, she now seeks discharge of the Order. Permission to pursue various applications for declarations or damages as set out in that application was refused. The Applicant has not sought to revive any such further applications today.

Background

3

The background history can be summarised as follows: between 1997 and 2000 the Applicant commenced forty-two sets of proceedings, including County Court actions, Employment Tribunal claims and applications to apply for judicial review against, amongst other institutions, the Law Society, the College of Law and her former employers at Stockport National Health Service Trust.

4

In 2001, on application by the Attorney-General under Section 42 of the Act, the Applicant was found to be a vexatious litigant. However the application was adjourned for twelve months in order to assess the Applicant's willingness to refrain from further application or action (see Attorney General v Douglas (No 1) [2001] EWHC Admin 610). The judgment there sets out usefully the full background to the Applicant's past and her activities, which background it is not necessary for me to repeat on this occasion.

5

On this adjournment the Applicant indeed desisted in issuing proceedings for the prescribed year (save for one instance where she felt constrained to issue for limitation reasons). In due course the Attorney-General consented to the dismissal of the application against her.

6

However five weeks after such dismissal the Applicant commenced some twenty-eight further sets of proceedings. The Attorney-General duly issued a further application against her which, in due course, led to the Order. I have read the judgment of Maurice Kay J (as he then was) on the making of the Order (see Attorney General v Douglas (No 2) [2006] EWHC 1982 Admin). The Applicant sought unsuccessfully to appeal the Order.

Grounds of Application

7

The Applicant, who represents herself and who has addressed the Court fully both orally and on paper, relies on her two witness statements. She states that she regrets her past litigious behaviour and offers her sincerest remorse. She is currently 53 years of age, and has a university honours law degree, something for which she is of course to be commended. She has, in the summer of this year, become a newly qualified Further Education (Law) teacher and an A1 assessor of Vocational Training Awards. These are again impressive achievements. She now wishes to undertake an LLM at Chester University or a GDL at the University of Law. She wishes to join Lincoln's Inn and become a barrister. She tells the Court that she is a renewed Christian and no longer has the same drive to litigate. She says that her pre-2007 litigation was misconceived since at that time she thought that she was being discriminated against for dyslexia and dyspraxia which, in fact, in 2007 she learned she did not suffer from.

8

The Applicant's evidence is that the order is, for her, a punitive, humiliating and restrictive measure on her prospects of becoming a lawyer. It would be an embarrassment to her and any employer institution. She is concerned that it may lead to disciplinary proceedings and/or dismissal if any of her students and colleagues were to learn of the publication of her name, for example, on the HMCTS website.

9

Noteworthy from her evidence is the fact that the Applicant appears to continue to take issue with a number of decisions or conduct on the part of those whom she sued repeatedly in the past. In particular, by way of example only, in very recent documentation she submits: (a) that HMCTS is breaching data protection and her human rights by publishing her name on the website; (b) that Manchester Metropolitan University's statement that she is not suitable for social work due to the imposition of the Order is injurious to her reputation and feelings and is a false statement; (c) a complaint in relation to Lincoln's Inn's letter of 21 January 2009 which, on her case, wrongfully refused her admission. This refusal (she says) has caused her to experience losses in not having a career at the Bar.

10

The Applicant has expanded on those written matters in her oral submissions today. She tells of the difficulty that she has experienced in qualifying abroad because of the existence of the order. She says that she had to seek to litigate in Northern Ireland because the Respondent would not consent to the discharge of the Order. She refers to Ewing v Times Newspaper Ltd [2010] NIQB 7). She says that nine years is a long time. In 2006 Rix LJ thought that she should have another chance at some stage. She suggests that her recent litigious activity is not litigation as such, it is merely re-litigation in an attempt to challenge the Order. She acknowledges again that she was wrong previously and that she is now simply trying to develop herself professionally. She says that it is time to put the Order and her past activities behind her and for her to have another chance.

11

The Applicant refers to the case of Dr Goldstein, a member of Lincoln's Inn, who was not disbarred or removed from the Inn despite having an order under section 42 of the Act against him. She says that he was treated differently as a white man in contrast to the way she has been treated, being a Caribbean lady. I comment here that that can only be a complaint against Lincoln's Inn and can have nothing to do with the Order. But, in any event, it is clear from the ruling from Lincoln's Inn that Dr Goldstein would, in fact, have been treated in exactly the same way as the applicant was, had he been applying for admission to the Inn.

12

In conclusion, the Applicant says that the Order should be set aside. She offers a number of alternatives, including that effectively that the application should be adjourned for a year with a view to her activities being monitored. She suggests that she could be made the subject of an undertaking, as was the case in CPE Board v Sally Mealing McLeod [2000] All ER (D) 588. She says that this is a rehabilitation opportunity for her and she invites the Court to be merciful.

The Applicant's recent litigious activities

13

The finding that the Applicant was a...

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