Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Robert Jackson
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Warby |
| Judgment Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWHC 1004 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ17M01299 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 01 May 2018 |
[2018] EWHC 1004 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Warby
Case No: HQ17M01299
Caroline Addy (instructed by Irwin Mitchell LLP) for the Claimant
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
Hearing date: 30 April 2018
Judgment Approved
Summary
The claimant (“Pirtek”) applies for an order that the defendant (“Mr Jackson”) be committed to prison, or made subject to some alternative sanction, for contempt of court by breaching injunctions granted against him by me on 9 November 2017. The injunctions prohibited Mr Jackson from further publishing statements and meanings about Pirtek which the company had complained were libels or malicious falsehoods, or both.
The injunctions were among the remedies I granted after hearing applications by Pirtek for final judgment in default of acknowledgment of service, and summary disposal of its claims. I gave a reasoned judgment explaining my conclusions and the remedies that I granted, [2018] EWHC 2834 (QB) (“the November Judgment”).
On that occasion, Pirtek was represented by Ms Addy of Counsel. Mr Jackson did not attend the hearing, nor was he represented. I gave careful thought to whether it was right to proceed in his absence: see the November Judgment at [19]–[24]. Among my conclusions were these (at [23]):
“There is nothing at all before me, by way of evidence or otherwise, that suggests that I ought to adjourn or that it would be unfair to proceed in Mr Jackson's absence. He has not asked for any adjournment. My conclusion is that he is not here because he has decided not to attend, despite having full knowledge of what is going on. … He has not taken any of the many opportunities available to engage with these proceedings, and put evidence before the court.”
Today, Pirtek is again represented by Ms Addy. Again, Mr Jackson is not present, nor is he represented. Again, I have had to consider whether the hearing can fairly proceed in his absence. Applying the principles identified in the November Judgment, and those elaborated later in this judgment, I have decided that it can and should proceed. Mr Jackson has had a fair and ample opportunity to respond to the application. He has decided not to attend, or to participate in any other way.
Having heard Ms Addy, read the written evidence filed, and taken time to consider the matter I have upheld a large number of Pirtek's allegations of contempt. For the reasons given below I find Mr Jackson to be in contempt of court.
I believe that the applicant would have wanted me to go on and decide on penalty forthwith. I have however decided to give Mr Jackson a final opportunity to engage with these proceedings, to apologise, and to make submissions in mitigation.
In paragraph [24] of the November Judgment I made clear why I was handing down a written judgment, and directing Pirtek to serve a copy on Mr Jackson:
“In that way, he will not be hampered or delayed in getting to know my reasons. Anyone has the right to obtain a transcript. But Mr Jackson is a litigant in person who lacks or may lack the knowledge or the financial resources to obtain a transcript. Proceeding in the way I have described will give him an opportunity to consider and, if he thinks it appropriate, to make a timely application to the Court for Pirtek's applications to be re-listed pursuant to CPR 23.11(2), or to set aside the default judgment which I propose to enter.”
For essentially the same reasons, I am again handing down a written judgment. I am doing so on Tuesday 1 May 2018, the day following the hearing of the committal application. The judgment and the formal order will be served on Mr Jackson, giving him fair notice that I will decide penalty at a hearing on Friday 4 May 2018. In the end, Ms Addy has not opposed this course of action.
Factual background
This is an action for libel and malicious falsehood.
The claimant (“Pirtek”) is a company which carries on the business of providing hydraulic hose replacement services to industry. Pirtek does this through a network of franchisees, about 65 in number. One such franchisee was a company called Starflow Hydraulics Limited (“Starflow”). The defendant (“Mr Jackson”) used to own and operate Starflow. He guaranteed the performance of its obligations to Pirtek.
Following a series of disputes between the parties, Mr Jackson was made bankrupt and in early 2016 lost his home.
In and after April 2016, a campaign was carried out online and via social media disparaging Pirtek, its products and services. The campaign was conducted mainly via a website, a Twitter account and a Facebook page. It is that campaign which led to this action. It was Pirtek's case that Mr Jackson was behind all these online and social media postings. It also complained of an email sent in 2017 which it alleged was sent anonymously by Mr Jackson.
The action was started on 13 April 2017. In summary, the meanings or imputations that Pirtek complained of as libels and/or malicious falsehoods are:
(1) That Pirtek either knowingly or recklessly acted illegally and caused a grave risk to public safety by supplying unsuitable hoses to the aviation industry and by undertaking installation of hoses for which its employees were neither qualified nor trained; these actions may have caused fatal crashes by Spitfires;
(2) That Pirtek abused and extorted its franchisees, including Mr Jackson, with fraudulent sanctions; furthermore, in Mr Jackson's case its directors had conspired to ruin him and take his family home;
(3) That Pirtek is a shady company that practised tax avoidance.
On 7 November 2017 I heard an application by the claimant for judgment in default of acknowledgment of service and summary disposal pursuant to ss 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996 and CPR 53.2. I reserved judgment and two days after the hearing I handed down the November Judgment.
The November Judgment sets out the factual background more fully. In it, I concluded that it was right to proceed in the absence of Mr Jackson (see above); that the court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter; that the relevant procedural requirements had been satisfied; that Pirtek's pleaded case made out good causes of action in both libel and malicious falsehood; and that the company was entitled to
(1) default judgment for damages to be assessed for both libel and malicious falsehood and an injunction to restrain further publication;
(2) damages for libel in the sum of £10,000 pursuant to the summary disposal provisions of the Defamation Act 1996.
I decided that a declaration of falsity was not required but awarded the company 90% of its costs of the action, and made a summary assessment of costs in the sum of £53,560.
An order was drawn up to give effect to those conclusions.
The injunctions
The wording of the final injunction order I granted was as follows:-
“… that the Defendant be prohibited from further publishing or causing the publication of (i) any of the statements complained of in the Particulars of Claim or (ii) any statements bearing the meanings complained of in the Particulars of Claim or (iii) any statements of and concerning the Claimants bearing meanings the same as or similar to those complained of in the Particulars of Claim. The Defendant must not do any of these things himself, or by an employee or agent, or by any other means.”
The order contained provisions as to service. Paragraph 6 provided that if it was not possible to effect personal service of the Order on the Defendant by 4:30pm on 14 November 2017, it could be served on him by sending it to a specified email address in his name, service to be deemed effected at the time that the email was sent. Paragraph 7 required Pirtek to serve on Mr Jackson with reasonable dispatch in any event a copy of the Order and the Approved version of the November Judgment. That was to be done by first class post to an address in Hitchin and by email to the same email address.
The evidence before me on this occasion shows that these provisions were complied with. The affidavit of the claimant's solicitor, Ms Yates, shows that on 10 November 2017 she emailed Mr Jackson an unsealed copy of the Order and a copy of the Approved Judgment. A process server attended the address which Mr Jackson had previously used in correspondence. This was his daughter's home. She said he did not live there and that she had thrown away correspondence sent to that address. Attempts to effect personal service were thus unsuccessful, so on 17 November 2017 Ms Yates emailed the order and Approved Judgment to the specified address again. On 20 November 2017 she emailed him a copy of the sealed version of the order.
There has evidently been no indication that these emails did not reach their intended destination. There are some clear indications that Mr Jackson did receive them. Ms Yates records, as a result of monitoring Mr Jackson's website, and his Facebook and Twitter accounts, that he made changes to the website and Twitter account after the emails were sent. He imposed password protection on some parts of the website and removed the Twitter account that had been complained of in the Particulars of Claim. Another Twitter account came into existence, with the handle Pirtek-franchise. com@pirteksurvivors. Pirtek's case is that this is a matter of Mr Jackson just changing his Twitter handle, not removing himself from the platform.
The allegations of breach
By its application notice dated 9 March 2018, Pirtek asks the Court to determine that Mr Jackson is in contempt of court by carrying out the acts specified in a Schedule to the application notice; to commit Mr Jackson to prison,...
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