PM v CF
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Keehan |
| Judgment Date | 03 October 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWHC 2658 (Fam) |
| Court | Family Division |
| Docket Number | No. BM17P08874 |
| Date | 03 October 2018 |
[2018] EWHC 2658 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Mr Justice Keehan
No. BM17P08874
Mr. C Hames QC appeared on behalf of the Applicant.
Ms. F. Judd QC and Ms Cox appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
Ms Jaffar, of Cafcass Legal, appeared on behalf of the Children by their Children's Guardian
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Introduction
In this matter, I am concerned with two children, A, who is five years of age, and B, who is four years of age.
The mother of both children is PM and the father of both children is CF. Although he has parental responsibility for A, he does not have parental responsibility for B because the parents were not married at the time of her birth and his name does not appear on the birth certificate.
An application has been made on behalf of the mother for a number of orders in respect of the children. First, that the father's parental responsibility in respect of A is terminated. Secondly, that there be permission to the mother to change the forename and surnames of both children. Thirdly that the court makes a s.91(14) order preventing the father from making any application in respect of the children without permission of the court first being obtained.
CF, the father, had opposed the making of any of those orders, save that he accepted that:
(a) the children's surnames should be changed and;
(b) a child arrangements order should be made in favour of the mother for the children to live with her.
This matter was set down for today and tomorrow for a fact-finding hearing to determine the truth of serious allegations made by the mother against the father in respect of his alleged abuse of her over an extensive period of time. In support of these allegations, a Scott Schedule was filed and served by the mother which contained nineteen itemised allegations against the father. Some of those allegations the father accepted, the majority he denied.
This morning, and after having had the benefit of a consultation with leading counsel, Ms. Judd and junior counsel, Ms. Cox, the father's position dramatically changed. I was told and accept that the father had made further admissions in respect of mother's allegations contained on the Scott Schedule, that he did not oppose the termination of his parental responsibility in respect of A. He accepted that the girls' names, both forenames and surnames, should be changed and he accepted, in principle, that the court should make a s.91(14) order against him.
The issues remaining between the parties were threefold. First, the mother, supported by the children's guardian, contended that the s.91(14) order should be for the duration of the whole of the girls' respective minorities, whereas the father submitted that these orders should be limited to three years or perhaps five years. Secondly, the father sought indirect contact by way of letters, perhaps only annually, between him and the children. This application was strenuously opposed by both the mother and the children's guardian as not being in the welfare best interests of either child. Finally, the father sought information to be given to him periodically on how the children were faring. This application was also opposed by the mother and by the children's guardian. It was submitted on behalf of both of them that the only information that should be provided to the father was in the tragic event that one or other of the children died.
It had at one stage been floated that the father ought to be notified if the children suffered a life-threatening illness or suffered a life-threatening injury. The mother, supported by the children's Guardian opposed this information being provided to the father on the basis that it would require the mother, at a most tremendously stressful period of her life, to contemplate making contact, albeit indirectly, with the father. It was agreed by all parties that these issues could be resolved by me on the basis of submissions and that I did not need to hear oral evidence from any party to determine those matters. I agreed.
The father had made concessions but did not accept all of the mother's allegations against him. Was a fact-finding hearing still necessary? It was accepted by Mr. Hames QC, on behalf of the mother, that although the mother maintained that all of her allegations were true and she was prepared to give evidence in support of them, given:
(i) the father's concessions as to the allegations made against him by the mother and;
(ii) his revised stance in relation to the orders sought,
a fact-finding hearing was neither necessary nor proportionate. Neither the father nor the children's guardian sought to persuade me otherwise. I agree that in the circumstances now pertaining a fact finding would serve no useful purpose.
Background
The background for the purposes of this judgment can be stated fairly shortly. The mother and the father were in a relationship. The mother asserts that this was a violent, physically and emotionally abusive relationship. It culminated with a serious sustained assault by the father upon the mother on 26 December 2015 for which he was sentenced to forty-two months imprisonment. On 11 March 2016, the mother obtained an indefinite restraining order against the father. Very shortly afterwards, he breached that restraining order by telephoning the mother from prison.
In September 2016, the relevant Children Services department assessed the father to be:
“Such a high-risk individual that on release, he is highly likely to seek out PM and the children and has threatened to kill them. The Local Authority are of the view that CF poses a risk of significant harm or death to the mother and/or to the children.”
On 6 October last year, the mother and the children, given the risk posed by the father, were accepted onto the United Kingdom Protected Persons Scheme and were moved to a confidential address where they remain. On 17 October last year, the father was convicted and imprisoned for a breach of the restraining order.
In the Scott Schedule, the father admitted that in May 2014 he was abusive and threatening towards social workers. He admitted that on 5 July 2016, he threatened to do a ‘Raoul Moat’ style killing of the mother upon his release from prison. The father explained that he admitted making this threat but that he had no intention of carrying it out. By his conviction, he is bound to accept the assault upon the mother in late 2015 although I note from the witness statement filed by him that he sought to deflect blame from himself and to suggest that the mother was blameworthy for some of the acts of violence which took place. He has admitted that on two occasions in 2016 and again in 2017 he breached the life-long restraining order. He also accepted that:
(a) the mother's asserted fear of and anxiety about him are such that it has compromised her ability to parent the children and;
(b) she remains anxious about the prospect of further applications and remains fearful that the father will make a determined effort to find her.
Further, he accepted that the children are vulnerable as a consequence of being exposed to domestic abuse which has caused them emotional harm.
The Law
When considering these applications, I bear in mind that the welfare best interests of both of the children are my paramount consideration: s.1(1) of the Children Act 1989. I also have regard to those factors as set out in the welfare checklist of s.1(3) of the 1989 Act. I have been referred to two principal authorities in relation to the making of s.91.14 orders namely, Re P [1999] 2 F.L.R 573 and Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility) [2014]...
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