Pre-Napoleonic centralization in a decentralized polity: the case of the Dutch Republic
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| Author | Simon Groenveld,Pieter Wagenaar,Frits van der Meer |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852309359044 |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Pre-Napoleonic centralization in a decentralized polity:
the case of the Dutch Republic
Simon Groenveld, Pieter Wagenaar and Frits van der Meer
Abstract
The interest in the origins of present-day government is often derived from the
thought that its current functioning and problems can be at least partial y explained
by the institutional choices made at the moment of origin. The institutional reforms
made during the so-cal ed French (or Napoleonic) era divert attention from the at
least equal y relevant Ancien Régime reform origins. For a thorough understanding
of the origins of a ‘modern’ governmental system we have to examine the Ancien
Régime period more closely. This is highly relevant in the Dutch case. Contrary to
popular opinion, during the Republic a more centralized system of government did
gradual y develop from the two power centers (Stadtholders and Estates-General).
Points for practitioners
The importance of the Dutch case is that it highlights, due to the very absence
of monarchical absolutism, the deeper mechanisms working towards centralizing
(the system of) governance.
Keywords: central–local government relations, decentralization, redesign system
of governance
Introduction: centralism and modernization
Over recent decades much effort has been put into tracing the origins and back-
grounds of the organization of modern central government (Raadschelders, 1998;
Raadschelders and Rutgers, 1996). Apart from an intrinsic historical interest, the
Simon Groenveld is affiliated to the department of History of Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Frits van der Meer is employed by the department of Public Administration of the same University
and Pieter Wagenaar works at the Department of Public Administration and Organization Science
of the VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
© The authors, 2010. Reprints and Permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
Vol 76(1):47–64 [DOI:10.1177/0020852309359044]
48 International Review of Administrative Sciences 76(1)
relevance of this search has been rooted in the idea that many of the problems with
which modern government is confronted are determined by conditions during its
coming into being. This also applies to the institutional origins of the government
system design. The format and institutional order created at the time of organiza-
tional birth constitutes a dominant and determining factor in later organizational life.
In short, in accordance with a historical institutional approach, the original institutional
design and context do matter (Krasner, 1984; Peters, 1999). The roots of contempo-
rary government in continental Western Europe have often been dated to the turn of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. What is often called in the Netherlands the
French era is seen as a more or less sharp rift in the political-administrative develop-
ment. A division is pictured separating so-called ‘pre-modern and modern times’. More
specifically, the introduction of an alleged ‘Napoleonic system’ has been attributed to
the rise of modern government with its relatively high level of political-administra-
tive centralism and the prominence of, for instance, central government departments
(Van der Meer and Raadschelders, 1995). This representation needs adjustment. For
instance, the IIAS working group study on the influence of the Napoleonic system on
other countries’ polities edited by Wunder toned down such claims. The emphasis on
Napoleonic influences on modern continental European government directs attention
away from what can be called Ancien Régime roots of reform. Reformist ideas and
processes are thus easily overlooked and discarded (Wunder, 1995).
What has been discussed above in more general continental European terms also
applies to the Dutch case. The new dawn for Dutch government and society is often
argued to have begun after the collapse of the Dutch Republic (1795). Revolutionaries
(using the label ‘patriots’) were greatly helped by the invading French and experi-
mented with fundamental (but sometimes abortive) reforms in the following years.
Thus in that period the present-day Dutch form of government would have been cre-
ated. It was confirmed after 1813 in the Dutch kingdom. Our argument in this article
is that this depiction of events greatly underestimates the contributions both in terms
of conceptual ideals as well as in reform efforts made during the Republic towards a
more centralized system of government. Many of the ideas have their roots in earlier
times and not only among the (more radical) opponents of the Republic. Wagenaar
has argued that the almost ideal-typical decentralist polity which the Republic formed
did contain a more centralized administrative philosophy adhered to by the then
powerful groups in government: the Stadtholders (House of Orange) and the Estates
(Groenveld, 1996a, 1998; Wagenaar, 2002: 95–112). We will argue in this article that
centralization in the Republic did not confine itself to theory, but was also to be found
in practice, although it has been hidden thus far due to the overshadowing events in
the French era. Thus for a thorough historical institutional analysis of the origins of a
‘modern’ governmental system we have to look into the Ancien Régime period.
The Netherlands might seem the odd man out in pre-nineteenth-century Europe,
given its federal and republican structure. Nevertheless, the occurrence of processes
of centralization both regarding the processes and structure of governance can help
us to make visible what can be seen as a ‘hidden’ history of similar processes in other
countries. Whereas in other European countries attention to the issue of centraliza-
tion is conceptualized in terms of monarchical absolutism, the Dutch case highlights,
due to the very absence of monarchical absolutism, the deeper mechanisms working
Groenveld et al. Pre-Napoleonic centralization in a decentralized polity 49
towards centralizing (the system of) governance via representation that might also
exist in these other countries, but have thus far been concealed.
A few words should be said about the concept of centralization, which often
remains fuzzy in public administration and historical literature. Centralization is often
considered to be either a derivative of or — alternatively — a prerequisite for modern
state formation. Basically, centralization pertains to the increase of concentration of
power in single centers, thus reducing the competition for power. For our purposes
it is important to notice that there are two dominant perspectives on centralization
that have often produced much conceptual confusion when used in unison. Speaking
from the perspective of power, a political science perspective is frequently implied. The
formal nature of the power source is considered secondary to the ability to change
societal interaction in a direction desired by the decision-making center involved. For
example, personal connections, knowledge, closeness to a decision center, etc. are
considered to be as important as legal authority. The legal perspective on centraliza-
tion relates to the concentration of tasks, authority, responsibilities and means in one
hand. It revolves around concepts of permission, obligation and accountability. That
‘hand’ might be an organizational entity or a person. For both the political science and
the legal conceptualization, we can speak of formal and informal forms of centraliza-
tion, though the emphasis in the legal perceptive is often put on formal approaches.
In this article we use a centralization definition that entails formal and informal per-
spectives on the concentration of political power which can stem from a variety of
formal and informal sources.
This article is structured as follows. First, the Netherlands will be presented as a
decentralized anomaly in the European pattern of centralizing states. In this section we
will also discuss the main features of its government system. Notwithstanding the for-
mal decentralization often associated with the constitutional build-up of the Republic,
gradually much contemporary thought was given to the necessity of centralization
in order to keep the system working. These ideas are examined by analyzing the
dual power structure consisting of Stadtholder and Estates. We will demonstrate that
centralist tendencies did emanate from both power centers and that the efforts made
by both powers were mutually reinforcing. For our analysis we will first pay attention
to centralist trends during the periods in which the Stadtholders were dominant. We
will find that the ideas held and the attempts at reform are closely similar to those in
surrounding countries ruled by aspiring absolute monarchs. Then we will turn to the
years in which power was predominantly wielded by the Estates. Although it is often
supposed that the Estates pushed a policy agenda directed towards decentraliza-
tion, we find that even in these periods the internal organization of government and
the management of the various policy areas were strongly affected by a movement
towards centralization. Centralization crystallized around three points: the Estates of
Holland, the Estates-General, and the Stadtholderly court.
New monarchs, representative assemblies and the Dutch exception
In late medieval European government two parallel developments can be witnessed.
The first is the rise of the so-called ‘New...
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