Public service bargains and non-partisan ministerial advisors: servants of two masters
| Author | Rose Cole |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320955217 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Public service bargains
and non-partisan
ministerial advisors:
servants of two masters
Rose Cole
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
To what extent can the public service bargain framework be applied to non-partisan
ministerial advisors? Public service bargains are defined as ‘explicit or implicit agree-
ments between public servants – the civil or uniformed services of the state – and
those they serve’. The public service bargain framework has increasingly been used as
an analytical tool with which to examine the elements of the bargain as experienced by
various actors in different jurisdictions. The elements of the public service bargain
framework are explored through the experiences of a distinct subgroup of non-
partisan advisors – portfolio private secretaries – serving in the politicised environment
of ministers’ offices. The minister’s office has been characterised as the ‘purple zone’
where politics (represented by the colour blue) and administration (represented by the
colour red) converge to transform political will into administrative action. This quali-
tative research article: briefly reviews the public service bargain literature; describes the
actors and setting; gives voice to their experience of the public service bargain; applies
the public service bargain heuristic; and reveals new insights into how the public service
bargain operates with dual principals.
Points for practitioners
The public service bargain framework allows for dual principal–single agent relation-
ships within public administration settings. Applying the public service bargain heuristic
to this group of non-partisan advisors: enables a view of how the public service bargain
operates at different levels (macro, meso and micro); shows that the public service
Corresponding author:
Rose Cole, Victoria University of Wellington School of Business and Government, PO Box 600, Wellington
6140, New Zealand.
Email: rose.cole@vuw.ac.nz
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852320955217
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2022, Vol. 88(3) 757–773
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
bargain for these advisors has changed over time in response to administrative reforms;
and demonstrates that these advisors are professionally and personally affected through
the misaligned expectations of dual principals.
Keywords
civil service, partnerships, professionalism/professions, public administration
Introduction
To what extent can the public service bargain (PSB) framework be applied to non-
partisan ministerial advisors? PSBs are defined as ‘explicit or implicit agreements
between public servants – the civil or uniformed services of the state – and those
they serve. The other partners in such bargains consist of politicians, political
parties, clients, and the public at large’ (Hood and Lodge, 2006: 6). The PSB
theoretical framework acknowledges the explicit or implicit agreements between
these parties as constructive deals that can be expressed formally, for example,
through laws or contracts, or informally through convention, or a series of under-
standings. PSBs have three basic features: reward (what is offered), competency
(the nature of the services rendered), and responsibility (loyalty to commitments
and obligations) (Hood and Lodge, 2006: 7). These features describe what each
party gives and receives to create equilibrium.
The PSB framework has increasingly been used as an analytical tool with which
to examine the elements of the bargain as experienced by various actors in different
jurisdictions (e.g. Bezes and Lodge, 2015; MacCormaic, 2016; Shaw and
Eichbaum, 2017). PSBs ‘can vary widely on such matters across time and different
state traditions, as well, within the respective systems across domains and position’
(Hood and Lodge, 2006: 7).
This article examines the PSB framework as experienced by a distinct subgroup
of non-partisan advisors: portfolio private secretaries.
1
These actors are employed
by departments to serve in New Zealand government ministers’ offices. Bargains
are dynamic and change over time; they adapt in response to conflict or pressure;
and different types of bargains can coexist, for example, between ministers and
officials, and between ministers and political advisors (Lodge, 2010: 112; van
Dorpe and Horton, 2011: 249). Hood (1999: 8) suggests that bargains for private
secretariat or advisor roles can exist separately from those for the wider public
service. A bargain described for political advisors (PAB) working in ministers’
offices (e.g. Lodge, 2010; Shaw and Eichbaum, 2017) creates a distinction between
partisan and non-partisan parties and their bargains, and does not refer to their
non-partisan colleagues, that is, private secretaries.
Hood and Lodge (2006: 53) note that PSBs can exist with multiple principals for
an agent in the case of a tenured agent serving sequential principals over time.
758 International Review of Administrative Sciences 88(3)
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