R Petrovics v The Judicial Authority of Hungary
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Cranston |
| Judgment Date | 16 June 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 3663 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 16 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CO/2728/2016 |
[2016] EWHC 3663 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Cranston
CO/2728/2016
MISS C BROWN (instructed by Criminal Defence Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
The Defendant was unrepresented
(As approved)
This is an application to extend a period so that the applicant can lodge an appeal. He seeks to appeal the decision of District Judge Inyundo which was handed down on 18 May 2016 at the Westminster Magistrates Court.
The district judge ordered that the applicant be extradited to Hungary pursuant to a conviction European Arrest Warrant. That warrant had been issued by a judge of the court in Pecs, Hungary, on 21 October 2015. It was certified by the National Crime Agency on 18 November 2016.
The applicant's extradition was sought to serve two sentences of imprisonment of six months and seven months and 26 days in respect of a total of six offences. They ranged from theft from commercial premises through to a theft from what seems to be the backyard of a dwelling house.
The judge gave what I would respectfully describe as a careful and clear judgment, considering the submissions which Miss Brown made on his behalf, both in relation to the deficiencies which he contended were contained within the warrant and also the applicant's Article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
There is no need for me to address the merits of any appeal since I have concluded that the appeal is out of time.
That follows because this court received this application for permission to appeal by post on 27 May 2016. It should have been received by the Administrative Court, at the latest, on 24 May 2016, that day falling within the very tight seven day period.
Section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 ("the 2003 Act") provides that the notice of application for leave to appeal must be given in accordance with the rules of court before the end of the permitted period, which is seven days starting with the day on which the order is made. Under the Criminal Procedure Rules, rule 4.10(2(b, the deemed date of service when items are posted first class is the second business day after the date it is posted. Section 26(5) of the 2003 Act reads as follows:
"But where a person gives notice of application for leave to appeal after the end of the permitted period, the High Court must not for that reason refuse to entertain the application if the person did everything reasonably possible to ensure that the notice was given as soon as it could be given."
Section 26(5) was considered in Szegfu v Court of Pecs, Hungary [2015] EWHC 1764 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 322. Burnett LJ gave the judgment of the court, comprising Cox J and himself. The court decided a range of matters: first, holding that the burden of establishing that everything reasonably possible had been done rested on the appellant on the balance of probabilities; secondly, suggesting that an applicant, and possibly his solicitors, should provide a witness statement explaining the reasons for the delay and why they contended that the requirements of section 26 (5) were met; and thirdly, stating that the underlying merits have no bearing on the issue:[12]. Importantly the court also stated that the enquiry under that section was not limited to the personal conduct of the applicant but could encompass delay generated by his legal advisers. Thus it was possible to distinguish between the behaviour of the applicant and that of his solicitors. If they were at fault the applicant was responsible for it.
Burnett LJ gave three reasons for this: first, the statutory language, in particular the use of the word "person"; secondly, that the context was a system designed to operate swiftly and; thirdly, distinguishing between the actions of an...
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