R(Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MRS Justice Gloster,Lord Justice Moses |
| Judgment Date | 16 January 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2003] EWHC 195 (Admin) |
| Date | 16 January 2013 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/8237/2012 |
[2003] EWHC 195 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Moses
Mrs Justice Gloster
CO/8237/2012
Mr Piers Marquis and Mr Ian Brownhill (instructed by Bindmans) appeared on behalf of the Appellants
Mr Duncan Penny (instructed by The Crown Prosecution Service) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
Two of those participating in a march on 9 November 2011, demonstrating against cuts in the education budget, left that march to join the Occupy Movement's demonstration in Trafalgar Square against the excesses of capitalism.
They were, on 17 April 2012, convicted by the District Judge at Westminster Magistrates’ Court of breaching conditions imposed under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 in respect of the route the march should take.
The issue in this appeal by way of case stated arises as to the circumstances in which conditions imposed under section 12 of the 1986 Act continue to apply to those who, as they would have it, left the route designated by those conditions for the purposes of joining a different demonstration.
The facts are fully set out in the case stated. Conditions under section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 designating the route had been imposed on 8 November 2011 following meetings between the organisers of the march — the University of London Union and the National Union of Students — and an Inspector of the Metropolitan Police.
The conditions identified what was described as an agreed route, starting in Mallet Street and culminating in London Wall. The march followed a route that took it into Duncannon Street at the junction with Trafalgar Square. There was a police cordon at that point. But, as the District Judge recorded in the case stated, it was not designed to prevent anyone leaving the march should they wish no longer to participate in it, and members of the public taking part in the march would be allowed through, as the District Judge described it, at the discretion of individual police officers.
Shortly after 1.30pm these appellants, with other co-defendants, discussed with police officers their wish to leave Duncannon Street, and go through the cordon to Trafalgar Square. They were advised that they had to remain within the confines of the march. In that particular section, there was in charge a Police Sergeant Woolley, who noticed that members of the march were becoming agitated, and in order to avoid any serious disorder, decided to let a group through the police cordon — a group which included these two appellants. But, as the District Judge found, he made it clear that they would, if they breached the conditions as to the designated route, be liable to be arrested, but that if they did not breach those conditions they could, as he put it, go on their way.
The District Judge found that these appellants, with other members of the procession, had “a pre-planned arrangement to set up an encampment in Trafalgar Square as part of a political protest similar to the anti-capitalist protest at St Paul's Cathedral. They had taken part in the main procession and demonstration against education cuts, but intended to break away once it reached Trafalgar Square. Their aim was to persuade the police to allow them through the filter cordon at that location so they could move to establish their encampment in Trafalgar Square.”
The judge found that they knew they would be liable to arrest for breach of conditions imposed in respect of the march. He found that they were part of a group carrying placards and banners. Once they had been allowed by Police Sergeant Woolley to leave the route of the march, they joined others who were already present forming an encampment with pop-up tents around the base of Nelson's Column in Trafalgar Square.
Police officers sought to break up that encampment and to advise those participating in that assembly either to return to the main march or disperse, lest they should be arrested pursuant to section 12 of the Public Order Act for breach of the conditions.
Both these appellants were approached at different times and locations and warned by a police officer. They denied participation in the march, refused to co-operate and were arrested for an offence contrary to section 12(5) of the Public Order Act 1986.
The magistrate concluded that they had breached the section 12 conditions imposed in respect of the march, and found them guilty, sentencing them to a conditional discharge for 3 months.
It is important to start with the statutory scheme. The relevant provisions are to be found in section 12 of the 1986 Act, which reads:
“12 Imposing conditions on public processions.
(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the circumstances in which any public procession is being held or is intended to be held and to its route or proposed route, reasonably believes that —
(a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or
(b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do,
he may give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession or prohibiting it from entering any public place specified in the directions.
(2) In subsection (1) ‘the senior police officer’ means —
(a) in relation to a procession being held, or to a procession intended to be held in a case where persons are assembling with a view to taking part in it, the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, and
(b) in relation to a procession intended to be held in a case where paragraph (a) does not apply, the chief officer of police.
(3) A direction given by a chief officer of police by virtue of subsection (2)(b) shall be given in writing.
(4) A person who organises a public procession and knowingly fails to comply with a condition imposed under this section is guilty of an offence, but it is a defence for him to prove that the failure arose from circumstances beyond his control.
(5) A person who takes part in a public procession and knowingly fails to comply with a condition imposed under this section is guilty of an offence, but it is a defence for him to prove that the failure arose from circumstances beyond his control.
(6) A person who incites another to commit an offence under subsection (5) is guilty of an offence.”
The conditions in the instant case were imposed pursuant to the power conferred in section 12(1). The conditions are set out in a direction given in writing pursuant to section 12(3). The notice identifies a particular public procession, namely that “which is intended to take place in the following place: London and the City of London (WC2, EC1 EC2)”. The notice sets out the grounds for imposing the condition and the details of the conditions to be imposed. It sets out a specific route, introduced by the words, “Protesters must remain on the agreed route”.
Under paragraph 3(2) of the notice, there is added the words:
“Prohibited from entering the following public place(s):
Protesters are not permitted to march to Bank junction or within 100yds of each of the following streets [which are then specified].”
The notice then warns that if anyone organising or taking part in the procession knowingly fails to comply with the conditions, they would commit an offence.
It is important to note that the conditions imposed pursuant to the power confirmed under section 12(1) are conditions which relate, as the section indicates, to a particular public procession. “Public procession” is defined in section 16 of the Act to mean a procession in a public place. That it relates to a particular public procession is made clear by the identification within section 12(1) of the grounds upon which conditions may be imposed. The circumstances and the route on the basis of which a police officer's belief of risk must reasonably be founded route relate to a particular public procession.
Further, section 12(2)(a) in its reference to a particular scene makes it clear that it is to a particular procession that the conditions must relate. Section 12(2)(b) refers to the particular procession to be held in the future.
It follows from the fact that conditions must only be imposed in relation to a particular procession that they do not apply to those participating, or for that matter organising, some other procession. Nor, as the statutory scheme makes clear, do they apply to those participating in a public assembly. Section 12 conditions do not and cannot apply to those organising or participating in a public assembly.
Separate provision is made in relation to particular public assemblies in section 14. Section 14 reads:
“14 Imposing conditions on public assemblies.
(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the circumstances in which any public assembly is being held or is intended to be held, reasonably believes that —
(a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or...
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