R SNEYD v DPP
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE SULLIVAN,LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS,MR JUSTICE DAVID CLARKE |
| Judgment Date | 24 February 2006 |
| Neutral Citation | [2005] EWHC 1781 (Admin),[2004] EWHC 2956 (Admin),[2006] EWHC 560 (Admin) |
| Date | 24 February 2006 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/4397/2004 |
[2004] EWHC 2956 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand London WC2
Mr Justice Sullivan
CO/4397/2004
MISS R J CALDER appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT
THE DEFENDANT was not represented and did not attend
This is an application to suspend a period of disqualification from driving, imposed by the Witham Magistrates' Court on 9th June 2004 following the applicant's conviction for an offence of drink driving. The application is to suspend the period of disqualification pending determination of his appeal by way of case stated against the Magistrates' decision. The position will be, on 9th December, that he will have served six months of the disqualification period and will then have a further three months to do because the period of suspension has been reduced to nine months in consequence of the applicant undertaking a course, an alcohol awareness training course.
The immediate reason that prompted the application was the fact that the applicant had started a new job with a firm MPC Print Solutions who are based in High Barnet. The applicant lives in Braintree. MPC Solutions want the applicant to start work at 7 o'clock in the morning, and, to cut a long story short and rather than going through the railway timetables, he says he cannot get there by 7 o'clock in the morning by public transport.
I can well understand the fact that the applicant is disqualified is causing him considerable difficulties. The fact remains, however, that those are precisely the kind of difficulties that anyone who is disqualified from driving could reasonably expect to have to face. It is the applicant's choice to take the job in High Barnet with a starting date of 17th November and a start time of 7 o'clock in the morning. His enterprise in getting a job is certainly to be commended, but I would not regard that as a particularly exceptional reason to justify a suspension.
On his behalf, Miss Calder referred me to the case of Wallwork, a Divisional Court Decision on 4th June 1997, in which a suspension was ordered, but the facts of that case were very different. In that case there had been an appeal from the Magistrates to the Crown Court. There had been a lengthy delay of 15 months and the disqualification imposed by the Magistrates had been suspended for a period of 15 months. The only question before the Divisional Court was whether that period of suspension should be further extended pending the appeal by way of case stated. There is a further distinction in that case in that the Crown Court there had simply refused to state a case, and so it was extremely difficult to form any sort of preliminary view as to the possible strength of the grounds of appeal.
In the present case the Magistrates have stated a case. Although there is an application to remit that case to the Magistrates, on the basis that it is said that the case contains a number of errors, that application was not made until 24th November, it would appear, more than two months after the case stated was served upon the applicant, since the appeal claim form is dated 13th September 2004. It has not been possible, therefore, to deal with the application to remit today and it has had to be adjourned. So I have to deal with the application for the suspension of the disqualification upon the basis of the case stated as it presently stands.
Given that the merits of the appeal by way of case stated will in due course be considered by this Court, it is undesirable to say anything in great detail for the purposes of dealing with this application. I merely say that I have not been persuaded that there is a sufficiently strong prospect of success to justify me in bringing the period of disqualification, which is currently being served, to an end by way of a suspension of it. I appreciate that if the appeal is unsuccessful, then the period of disqualification continues thereafter, but it seems to me that I am faced with the position not of extending a period of suspension, which was granted by the Crown Court, but, at a fairly late stage, suspending a disqualification.
So for all of these reasons, I am not persuaded to grant this application.
[2006] EWHC 560 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Lord Justice Richards
Mr Justice David Clarke
CO/4397/2004
MISS CALDER appeared on behalf of the APPLICANT
MR HOWARD appeared on behalf of the RESPONDENT
This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Mid-North Essex Justices, sitting at Witham Magistrates' Court on 9th June 2004 (though the case stated refers to 8th June) by which they convicted the appellant, Mr Sneyd, of an offence of driving a motor vehicle having consumed excess alcohol, contrary to section 5(1(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The reason for the delay between the date of that decision and the hearing before this court is that first there was a successful application by the appellant in December 2004 to remit the case stated to the justices for amendment; and, secondly, a hearing of the substantive appeal took place before Walker J on 26th April 2005, but before handing down the judgment he directed that the case be adjourned and relisted for hearing before a divisional court, though not before late October 2005. It is pursuant to his direction that the matter has now come for hearing before us.
The information preferred against the appellant was that on 2nd February 2004 he had driven a Jaguar motor car in Braintree after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, namely 52 microgrammes in 100 millilitres of breath, exceeded the prescribed limit.
The facts as found by the justices are set out as follows in the case stated:
"(a) That at approximately 23.51 hours on 3rd February 2004, PC Rowland saw two vehicles, one of which was the appellant's Jaguar, leaving the car park of the public house known as the Hare and Hounds. He decided to stop both vehicles and did in fact do so in Broad Road. At this point PC Rowland asked the appellant whether he had been drinking.
"(b) Following the appellant's answer PC Rowland carried out a roadside breath test. This proved positive and the appellant was arrested, cautioned and then conveyed to the police station.
"(c) PC Fraser carried out the Intoximeter procedure at the police station in accordance with the form MGDDA. PC Rowland was also present throughout. PC Fraser asked the appellant set questions. His replies were noted on the form MGDDA by PC Rowland. The machine had been checked and no problems were present. PC Fraser explained the procedure for providing the specimens and the appellant duly provided two specimens of breath. The machine provided a computer print-out showing two readings, the lower of which was 52 microgrammes in 100 millilitres of breath. PC Fraser told the appellant he was therefore over the prescribed limit."
There follows in the case a short statement of the evidence, which I shall also read since it is material to the arguments before us:
"PC Rowland gave evidence as follows: He stopped the appellant's vehicle on the night of 2nd February 2004 on Broad Road, Braintree, after he had seen him leaving the car park of the Hare and Hounds public house. He did so because he suspected the appellant, who was the driver of the vehicle, had been drinking and wanted confirmation.
"The appellant was asked whether he had been drinking. His response was that he had consumed 3 pints.
"The officer explained that as a result he required a specimen for analysis and warned the appellant that failure to provide would make him liable for arrest. The appellant provided a roadside breath specimen, which showed as a failure. He was then arrested, cautioned and conveyed to the police station at Braintree.
"The appellant asked the officer, 'What happens now?' and was advised that he would be required to produce two specimens of breath at the police station for evidential purposes. The appellant was booked in at the police station. PC Rowland was present throughout when the device was operated by PC Fraser.
"In cross-examination PC Rowland stated that he decided to stop the appellant's vehicle as he suspected the appellant had been drinking and wanted confirmation. He confirmed that the appellant cooperated throughout the process.
"The officer confirmed he could smell intoxicating liquor when he was at the rear of the vehicle on the way to the police station."
"PC Fraser gave evidence as follows:
The Intoximeter procedure, which measures the amount of alcohol in breath was carried out at the police station. He took the appellant through the procedure using form MGDDA asking each of the set questions. PC Rowland recorded the answers on the form.
"The appellant's eyes were glazed and his speech was slurred.
"He checked the Intoximeter machine to make sure it was working correctly. The machine indicates when it is ready and signals if there are any errors. He typed the appellant's details into the machine. The procedure was commenced and the machine automatically purged itself. This was followed by taking a sample from the air in the room to...
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R Naidoo v High Court Dublin, Republic of Ireland
...4 So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, she has drawn my attention to what occurred in the case of Sneyd v DPP [2006] EWHC 560 (Admin), another breathalyser case in which Miss Calder appeared for the appellant. In that case Walker J (also sitting as a one-judge Divisional Cou......
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Table of Cases
...194 ................................................... Snelson v Thompson [1985] RTR 220, DC! 296 , 297 ............... Sneyd v DPP [2006] EWHC 560 (Admin), (2006) 170 JP 545, DC! 393, 435 ................................................................ Snook, DPP v [1993] Crim LR 883, DC!......
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Definitions
...he elaborated upon them. There could have been no unfairness. Under all those circumstances, this appeal is dismissed.” Sneyd v DPP [2006] EWHC 560 (Admin), (2006) 170 JP 545, 24 February 2006, QBD (DC) Where officers asked a person whom they had seen driving out of a pub car park if he ha......