R v Bloomfield
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE STAUGHTON |
| Judgment Date | 25 June 1996 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1996] EWCA Crim J0625-10 |
| Docket Number | No: 9603539 W4 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Date | 25 June 1996 |
[1996] EWCA Crim J0625-10
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London WC2
Lord Justice Staughton
Mr Justice Ian Kennedy
and
His Honour Judge Crane
(Acting as a Judge of the CACD)
No: 9603539 W4
MR G BIRCH appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MR I WADE appeared on behalf of the Crown
Tuesday 25th June 1996
Mark Bloomfield pleaded guilty at Luton Crown Court, before Judge Findlay Baker, to an offence of possession of a Class A controlled drug. On 23rd May 1996 he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. He was aged 33 at the time. He had some previous offences recorded against him, but there is no renewed appeal against sentence today and, in any event, the document produced by the Hertfordshire police computer is virtually incomprehensible.
The prosecution case against the appellant was that on the evening of 31st May 1995 police officers arrested him on suspicion of possession of drugs. Asked if he had any drugs on him, he agreed that he had and a bag containing 100 Ecstasy tablets was removed from his pocket.
When interviewed he said he had bought the tablets for his own use and to share with with his girlfriend.
He was released on bail.
He requested a further interview on 23rd July. He stated that a woman, whom he named, had purported to give him the drugs for safe keeping as she was about to be raided by the police. He felt that he had been set up.
The appellant's view of this matter is set out in his counsel's opinion. He says that at about 8 o'clock on the evening of 31st May he had a phone call from a named woman who said she had heard over the police scanner that she was going to raided - her house - and asked him to pop up and see her. He went to her house and she gave him these Ecstasy tablets, and asked him to keep hold of them till the next day. He returned home at about 8.45pm - that is three quarters of an hour after the initial telephone call - and when he got there he was arrested. He was subsequently charged with the offence of possession with intent to supply in relation to the Ecstasy tablets, and released on bail.
An additional and lesser charge of simple possession was added later and the original charge of possession with intent to supply was withdrawn.
Following committal the case was listed for plea and directions on 20th December 1995 at Luton Crown Court before Judge Marshall. When they got there prosecuting counsel approached defence counsel and indicated, in the clearest of terms, that the Crown wished to offer no evidence against the defendant on the charge of possession. This was because the prosecution accepted the defendant's account as to how he came to be in possession of the 100 Ecstasy tablets. They accepted that he had been the victim of a set up.
We can add to that what Mr Wade has told us today, for the prosecution; that there was nobody from the Crown Prosecution Service present, only police officers, and that prosecuting counsel was inexperienced.
We continue with the defendant's account. He says that it was further explained that because of the presence at court of certain other people it would be embarrassing to the police and prosecution if no evidence were to be offered that day. It was therefore suggested that if the plea and directions hearing could be adjourned to a later date, then no evidence would be offered at that adjourned hearing.
Counsel then went to see the trial judge in his room. A transcript of what was said in the judge's room has been obtained. What prosecution counsel said was:
"What I would like to do today is to adjourn the plea and directions hearing and re-list it 'for mention' to offer no evidence."
The judge, with the approval of the defence, subsequently made that order in open court. The defendant was fully informed and he was naturally very happy to cooperate.
We do have the transcript of what took place that day. Prosecuting counsel said:
"I want to offer no evidence, but I do not want to do it today for the very simple reason which is that someone else who is involved in the wider police operation is present in this court building today. He is someone who is aware of certain police practices and is likely to smell a rat if I stand up and offer no evidence today at this plea and directions hearing."
Then she continued:
"What I would like to do today is just adjourn the plea and directions hearing and re-list it 'for mention' to offer no evidence.
JUDGE MARSHALL: All right."
There are certain further facts that should be mentioned. On 9th January 1996 defence counsel was told, apparently in chambers, by somebody for the prosecution, that the Crown Prosecution Service had decided not to adopt the course indicated on 20th December. He got in touch with his solicitors and asked them to seek clarification, which they did by a letter to the Crown Prosecution Service on 12th January.
The next thing that happened was that there were two letters from the Crown Prosecution Service, one of 17th and one of 24th January. Those said, as we understand it, that the Crown Prosecution Service had arranged a conference with new prosecuting counsel and would thereafter inform the defence solicitors of the Crown's stance. That was done on 8th February when the Crown Prosecution Service, by letter, indicated that the Crown intended to continue the prosecution.
There was a request by the defence solicitors for reasons, and the answer was that prosecuting counsel at the hearing on 20th December had no instructions from the Crown Prosecution Service to indicate that the Crown would offer no evidence.
There was an application at the trial before Judge Findlay Baker to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process. That was dismissed. Following the failure of that application, Bloomfield pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment.
He applied for leave to appeal against conviction. That was granted by a Single Judge. He is recorded as saying that there was no argument in favour of an appeal, but it is agreed that he probably meant that there was an argument.
The application for leave to appeal against sentence failed and has not been renewed.
What Judge Findlay Baker said in his reasons for dismissing the application to stay was, in essence, as follows:
"One must necessarily ask whether there has been any prejudice to the defence in the course of the proceedings. One must separately ask whether it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant in the circumstances to continue with the proceeding and one must also ask whether it would bring the administration of justice into dispute among right thinking people if the proceedings were to continue.
I have asked all those questions of myself and I have been addressed upon them.
I have come to the conclusion that although the defendant is understandably disappointed by the change of direction which this case has taken there is no prejudice to him by the continuation of the proceedings other than that inherent in the fact that he once again faces a criminal charge.
I ask myself whether it would be manifestly unfair in the circumstances to continue with those proceedings and I conclude that it would not and I ask myself whether it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the change of course which the prosecution wish this case to take is permitted. I think if anything the reverse is the case, but I do not have to go as far as that."
The judge refused the application.
There are, as it seems to us, two questions which have to be asked. First, can the Crown Prosecution Service - if you like, in the person of the Attorney General himself - revoke a previous decision which he has made and has communicated to a defendant and the court to offer no evidence, or is it capable of being an abuse of process if the Crown seeks to do that? The second question: if the answer to the first question is that it may be an abuse of process, does it make any difference that it was not the Attorney General himself, or the Director of Public Prosecutions, but prosecuting counsel who made that decision and communicated it to the defendant in court without authority to do so?
Taking the second question first, we have been referred to the Farquharson Committee's recommendations on the role of Prosecuting Counsel and her relationship with the Crown Prosecution Service. This is a topic of interest and importance, but we do not think that it is one that we need enter on today. Whether prosecuting counsel was, or was not, doing the right thing, vis-a-vis those instructing her - that is to say the Crown Prosecution Service - and whether she had the discretion to act on her own views or not is not what we have to consider. The question is whether the court, and for that matter the defendant, were entitled to assume that she had authority to say what she did say. We are of the view that prosecuting counsel has ostensible authority to conduct a case in court in any ordinary circumstances. There is some discussion on the topic of the authority of counsel generally in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 3(1), paragraph 520 and 521, but this does not deal with the specific topic of the authority of prosecuting counsel in a criminal case.
We do not see how the court can possibly be expected to enquire whether prosecuting counsel has or has not authority to say what she says in court. Nor can a defendant be expected to enquire whether counsel prosecuting him has authority to say what she does say. We would say that the court and the defendant are entitled to assume...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R v Chalkley ; R v Jeffries
...of a conviction may be marked in some manner other than quashing the conviction. 77 An early case under the new statutory formula is R v. Bloomfield [1997] Cr App R 135, CA, where the accused sought a stay of prosecution on the ground of abuse of process because the prosecution had reneged ......
-
R v Yacub Ebrahim Mulla
...make a decision to proceed on the afternoon of that day. Mr Wood relies on a passage in the judgment of this Court given by Staughton LJ in Bloomfield [1997] 1 Cr App R 135 at 143 just above B, which is in these terms: "The statement of the prosecution that they would offer no evidence at t......
-
R v AJ
...or implied) not to prosecute – including R v Croydon Justices ex parte Dean [1993] QB 769; Mahdi (CA 15 March 1993); Bloomfield [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 135; Townsend [1997] 2 Cr. App. R. 540; R v D [2000] 1 Archbold News 1; DPP v Edgar (2000) 164 JP 471; DPP v Taylor [2004] EWHC 1554 (Admi......
-
The King (City of York Council) v AUH
...the United Kingdom law enforcement agencies procured the unlawful deportation of the defendant from Zimbabwe to the United Kingdom; R v. Bloomfield [1997] 1 CR App R 135 where going back on an assurance that no evidence will be offered when there was no material change of circumstance woul......
-
Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice
...to prosecute in exchange for providing evidence against another: see Croydon Justices,ex parte Dean (1994) 98 Cr App R 76, Bloomfield [1997] 1 Cr App R 135, and Townsend, Dearsleyand Bretscher [1998] Crim LR 126.19 (1986) 52 CR (3d) 188, building on comments in the Supreme Court of Canada i......
-
Divisional Court
...happen where there are special reasons todo so (para. 12.1). In R v Abu Hamza [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] QB 659 and R vBloomfield [1997] 1 Cr App R 135, the courts have indicated certainpreconditions can be applied. First, the defendant must show that hewas given an ‘unequivocal represe......