Planning in UK Law

The single indivisible question, in my opinion, which the court must ask itself whenever a planning decision is challenged on the ground of a failure to give reasons is whether the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency of the reasons given.

If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local planning authority or the Secretary of State.

Personal circumstances of an occupier, personal hardship, the difficulties of businesses which are of value to the character of a community are not to be ignored in the administration of planning control. It would be inhuman pedantry to exclude from the control of our environment the human factor. It can, however, and sometimes should, be given direct effect as an exceptional or special circumstance.

They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds.

Although the planning authorities are given very wide powers to impose "such conditions as they think fit", nevertheless the law says that those conditions, to be valid, must fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development. The planning authority are not at liberty to use their powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to be in the public interest.

Also they must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed them ( Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B.223; Hall & Co. Ltd. v. Shoreham-by-Sea Urban District Council [1964] 1 W.L.R.240 per Willmer L.J. at p.248, per Harman L.J. at p.255, per Pearson L.J. at p.621: City of London Corporation v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1971) 23P. & C.R. 169: Reg. v. Hillingdon Borough Council Ex parte Royco Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 Q.B.720).

In the practical application of section 18A it will obviously be necessary for the decision-maker to consider the development plan, identify any provisions in it which are relevant to the question before him and make a proper interpretation of them. His decision will be open to challenge if he fails to have regard to a policy in the development plan which is relevant to the application or fails properly to interpret it.