R v Chelmsford Crown Court, ex parte Chief Constable of Essex
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE GLIDEWELL,MR JUSTICE CRESSWELL |
| Judgment Date | 25 June 1993 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1993] EWHC J0625-7 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 25 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | CO/1539/92 |
[1993] EWHC J0625-7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(DIVISIONAL COURT)
Crown Office List
Before: Lord Justice Glidewell and Mr Justice Cresswell
CO/1539/92
MR B SILVESTER (instructed by the Solicitor to the Essex Police) appeared on behalf of the Applicant.
MR P WALKER appeared as an Amicus Curiae.
Friday, 25th June 1993
This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by His Honour Judge Beaumont QC, on 15th May 1992, during the course of the trial of Mr N D Carter and five other men in the Crown Court at Chelmsford.
I take the facts which led to this application from the judgment which the learned judge gave on 15th May 1992. In the early hours of the morning of 9th May 1991, a disturbance took place in Colchester which resulted in the six defendants who were before Judge Beaumont and the jury together with other defendants, being charged with various offences of violent disorder.
During the course of the same night, or early the following morning, various people went to the Colchester Police Station saying that they wished to complain about the behaviour of the police officers who were involved in seeking to control that disturbance. They were told to return the following day. Four young ladies did return the following day. They spoke to a woman police inspector of the Essex Police who recorded their complaints.
The responsible officers in the headquarters of the Essex Police decided that the nature of the complaint made it appropriate for resolution under the Police (Complaints) (Informal Resolutions) Regulations 1985 and they set that procedure in train. That involved appointing an officer who was required to seek the views of each of the complainants and to take such other steps as appeared to be appropriate.
At that stage, two of the young women withdrew their complaints. One of them was a Miss Brown who herself became a defendant in the proceedings and eventually pleaded guilty. The two young women who continued their complaints were a Miss Spurr and Miss Symes. They indicated they were agreeable for their complaints to be resolved under the Informal Resolutions Regulations and so the officer who had been appointed proceeded with his investigation under those regulations.
Having taken more detailed statements from the two young women he then interviewed some nine police officers who had been present at the disturbance on 9th May 1991. Each of the officers was told the nature of the complaint that was being investigated and was also told that section 104(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was applicable. And was also told the nature of the complaint that was being investigated. That subsection provides:
"Subject to subsection (4) below, no statement made by any person for the purpose of the informal resolution of a complaint shall be admissible in any subsequent criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings."
Subsection (4) states:
"A statement is not rendered inadmissible by subsection (3) above if it consists of or includes an admission relating to a matter which does not fall to be resolved informally."
On 21st June 1991 both Miss Spurr and Miss Symes were informed by Deputy Constable for the plaintiff that their complaints had been informally resolved. Each was asked to say whether she wanted a copy of the record of the complaint. Neither did and it was there, as far as they were concerned, that the matter ended.
The trial of the six defendants started in the Crown Court, during April 1992, before Judge Beaumont. Counsel for the prosecution, following the Attorney General's guidelines on the disclosure of pre-trial information, disclosed, in writing, the fact that the four young women had made a complaint. He named them and he supplied their addresses. He also told defence counsel, orally, what he understood each of them had said to the woman police inspector when each had made her original complaint. The trial then proceeded. The prosecution case finished.
Then, when one of the defendant's cases was reached, there was called, on his behalf, Miss Brown —one of the girls who had originally made a complaint but who had withdrawn her complaint and in fact become a defendant herself. As I have said, she pleaded guilty. She was cross-examined on behalf of another accused and she said that she had made a complaint. She was then cross-examined by counsel for the prosecution to establish that the complaint she had made had no substance, because she had withdrawn it. He put to her, line by line, what he understood she had said to the woman police inspector when she originally made the complaint.
When she completed her evidence, counsel for the defence applied for disclosure of all of the complaints made on 10th May and, moreover, disclosure of the record of the of the investigation of those complaints. That, in effect, meant copies of the record of the statements made by all the witnesses, that is to say, the two witnesses who made detailed statements and the nine police officers.
Counsel for the prosecution did not object to the disclosure of her statement. However, the Chief Constable did object very strongly. At this point the judge, very sensibly and properly heard representations by counsel for the prosecution and for each of the defendants in the trial, and by Mr Silvester who represented the Chief Constable as he has before us.
There were three issues for the judge's determination. First, did section 104(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply to the complaints themselves? I re-read subsection (3):
"… no statement made by any person for the purpose of the informal resolution of a complaint shall be admissible in any subsequent criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings."
The Judge decided that the subsection did not apply to the complaint itself, and the police were not entitled to claim public interest immunity in respect of complaints made about the conduct of the police officers.
The second question was, did section 104(3) apply to the second of an interview conducted during the informal complaints procedure so as to render such a statement inadmissible in the criminal trial? The Judge decided that the subsection did apply. Thus, he ruled that these statements were not admissible in the trial. However, —and this brings us to the issue which is sought to be raised before us —as a third matter, the judge decided that nevertheless those statements should all be disclosed to counsel and solicitors representing the various defendants.
I should say that originally Mr Silvester was seeking to challenge the first decision as well. That is to say the decision that section 104(3) does not apply to the complaints themselves. However, he no longer wishes to proceed with that argument. The Chief Constable, and Mr Silvester on his behalf, however, still wish to challenge the third decision that these statements should be disclosed.
Although this application for judicial review was made very soon after the judge had given his ruling, the trial proceeded, very properly and the documents were duly disclosed. Thus, the purpose of the challenge now is not, in any sense, to seek to go back over the course that was actually followed in that trial or to reverse it in any way. The purpose is to establish guidance should such a situation arise in the future.
The Chief Constable's approach, if I understand it correctly, is that it is a main characteristic of the procedure of the Informal Resolution of complaints against the police that statements obtained from witnesses are obtainable and officers are told they are obtainable in confidence. Public interest immunity therefore applies to such matters. There is an interest that the contents of such statements should normally not be disclosed to those representing defendants in criminal trials or indeed otherwise.
Section 104(3) renders such statements inadmissible in evidence in a subsequent trial. It is illogical and undesirable that their disclosure should be ordered. If I may say so, that argument may well be correct but we have not heard the argument as such, we have merely sought to summarise what it would be. We have not heard it because as soon as Mr Silvester sought to raise it, we appreciated and he appreciated that we must deal with an antecedent question, namely, does this court have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought? I use the word 'jurisdiction' here in its proper or narrow sense, that is to say, does this court have the power, as a matter of law, to grant the relief sought?
The answer to the question depends largely upon the provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Section 28(1) of that Act provides:
"Subject to subsection (2), any order, judgment or other decision of the Crown Court may be questioned by any party to the proceedings, on the ground that it is wrong in law or is in excess of jurisdiction, by applying to the Crown Court to have a case stated by that court for the opinion of the High Court. (2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to - (a) a judgment or other decision of the Crown Court relating to trial on indictment; or (b) any decision of that court under the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 …" and various other similar provisions.
By section 29:
"(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to make orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari in those classes of cases in which it had power to do so immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Every such order shall be final, subject to any right of...
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