R v Humphrys
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE |
| Judgment Date | 05 May 1975 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1975] EWCA Crim J0505-12 |
| Docket Number | No. 5199/C/74 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Date | 05 May 1975 |
[1975] EWCA Crim J0505-12
The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Widgery)
Lord Justice James
and
Mr. Justice Ashworth
No. 5199/C/74
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. R. BELBEN appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR. A. GOMPERTZ appeared on behalf of the Crown.
On the 29th November last year at Chelmsford Crown Court this Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of obtaining property by deception and one of forgery. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment with which this Court is not concerned because we are not concerned with an appeal in respect of those two charges. He was however also found guilty of perjury and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, and it is this count with which the Court is presently concerned because he now appeals on a point of law against his conviction for perjury.
The terms of the charge were these, that contrary to section 1(1) of the Perjury Act, 1911, the Appellant on the 28th June, 1973, being lawfully sworn as a witness in his trial at the Crown Court, Chelmsford, in the County of Essex, wilfully made a statement material in those proceedings which he knew to be false, namely, that he did not drive any vehicle during the year of 1972.
The reason why that gave rise to a charge of perjury was just this. In earlier proceedings in June of 1973 this same Appellant had appeared at the Chelmsford Crown Court and he was charged with driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified. The date on which the offence was alleged to have been committed was the 18th July, 1972, and the principal evidence called by the Crown in support of the charge of driving while disqualified was the evidence of a Police Constable Weight, who spoke to having stopped the Appellant in a radar speed trap and subsequently discovering that he was driving whilst disqualified.
At the initial trial, that is to say the trial on the 28th June, 1973 when the charge was driving while disqualified, it was agreed between counsel that the only issue was whether this Appellant was the man who had been riding a motor bicycle at the time and place spoken to by the police officer. It was agreed that he, the Appellant, was disqualified from driving, and it was therefore perfectly clear that if he was in fact driving on the date stated he committed an offence. It was common ground between everybody then, as it is in this Court today, that the only issue at the first trial was whether the police officer was correct in identifying this man as being the driver of that motor bicycle in the circumstances and the time stated.
In fact the Appellant was acquitted on that charge. It can only have meant that the jury were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was the driver at the appropriate time.
The police made further inquiries. They obtained a certain amount of additional evidence to suggest that the Appellant had been guilty of driving when disqualified, and they accordingly brought a further charge against him. The further charge is the charge of perjury. The reason why that charge referred to his driving a vehicle in 1972 was that in one of his answers towards the end of his evidence at the first trial the Appellant had said that he had not driven a motor vehicle at all during the year 1972. Thus, when the second indictment is preferred the allegation against him is that he committed perjury on the first trial by saying, contrary to the fact, that he had not driven daring 1972.
When the matter came on for trial who was there to prove on behalf of the Crown that the Appellant had been driving during 1972 but Police Constable Weight, who gave precisely the same evidence which he had given at the first trial, namely, that he had stopped the Appellant whilst the Appellant was riding his motor bicycle and could therefore testify that on this date and place, the 18th July, 1972, the defendant had been driving.
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