R v Jones (Robert) (No. 2)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE ROSKILL |
| Judgment Date | 09 March 1972 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1972] EWCA Crim J0309-3 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No. 5321/R/71 |
| Date | 09 March 1972 |
[1972] EWCA Crim J0309-3
Lord Justice Karminski
Lord Justice Roskill
and
Mr. Justice Lawson
No. 5321/R/71
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. J. LLOYD-ELEY, Q.C. and MR. STURGESS appeared as Counsel for the Applicant.
MR. MICHAEL WORSLEY appeared as Counsel for the Crown.
Notwithstanding Mr. Lloyd-Eley's careful argument, it seems to this Court plain that the application for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal must fail. The case is a somewhat remarkable one. The Applicant is a man named Robert Jones, and as long ago as the 25th June, 1970 at the Central Criminal Court, before Judge Gillis he pleaded not guilty to an indictment charging him on two counts with conspiracy to defraud, one one count with theft of a motor vehicle and on eight counts respectively numbered 12 to 19 inclusive with fraudulent conversion of motor cars or the proceeds realised by the sale of motor cars of persons who had entrusted the cars to Jones or one of the companies he controlled for the purpose of sale at a minimum price. There were seven others initially charged on one or other of the conspiracy charges, but Counts 12 to 19, the fraudulent conversion counts, were charged against the Applicant only. That trial proceeded with all the prisoners present until the 28th July, 1970, that is over eighteen months ago. Shortly before the 27th July the Prosecution case had been concluded; there were long and elaborate submissions by Counsel, particularly I am sure from Mr. Lloyd-Eley, in relation to Counts 12 to 19 whether or not the facts proved in evidence by the Prosecution could constitute in law the then offence of fraudulent conversion. The learned Judge overruled all those submissions, whereupon, when the trial was resumed the next day on the 28th July, the Applicant, who was the last but one defendant on the indictment and whose turn to give evidence, if he wished so to do, was not likely to arise for some time, to use a colloquialism deliberately jumped his bail.
Questions then arose whether or not the trial should continue. Mr. Lloyd-Eley and his learned Junior who appeared for the Applicant at the trial, as they have in this Court, sought to persuade the Judge that although this was a case of deliberate jumping of bail, nonetheless the trial ought not to be allowed to go further, at least so far as the Applicant was concerned. The learned Judge was asked to discharge the Jury from giving verdicts upon the counts against the Applicant. We have not got a transcript of what passed on that occasion, hut we have had a very clear statement from Mr. Lloyd-Eley of his recollection, no doubt accurate, of what passed. The learned Judge overruled that submission and he ordered the trial to go on in the Applicant's absence along with the trial of the other six prisoners.
Mr. Lloyd-Eley, his learned Junior and those instructing him, very properly remained in Court to try and protect the Applicant's interests, but when the time came to call the Applicant or to call witnesses whom it had been intended to call on his behalf, they felt unable to place those witnesses before the Court and jury, because they felt there must be some doubts as to their authority, to continue to represent the Applicant in those circumstances. They properly withdrew from the trial. The trial went on; there was an immensely long summing-up by the learned Judge. At the end the Jury convicted the Applicant not only upon the main conspiracy charge against him, but also upon Counts 12 to 19. The learned Judge, on the fraudulent conversion charges, Counts 12 to 19, sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, and on the conspiracy charge to a concurrent sentence of three years' imprisonment.
Thereupon the Applicant's Solicitors, again trying to do their utmost for him, filed Forms N and G on his behalf, on the 8th September, 1970. The documents say, and Mr. Lloyd-Eley confirmed, that it had always been the Applicant's intention to appeal if he were ultimately convicted, because it was to be argued that the facts proved did not constitute an offence or offences of fraudulent conversion. The filing of those forms raised the question whether the Solicitors had authority to file them on the Applicant's behalf. This matter appears to have been debated in part at the trial. It would seem that the learned Judge, wrongly as it ultimately turned out, thought or may have thought that they would have such authority. As this was a somewhat novel point the matter was ordered to be set down for argument before the then Lord Chief Justice, the present Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Cooke on the 7th March, 1971. The Applicant was given Legal Aid, Solicitors and leading and junior Counsel and the Court, in a reserved Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Cooke on the 17th March held that those forms had been filed without authority.
It is not unimportant to observe that at the end of the judgment Mr. Justice Cooke said: "If Jones should at any time surrender and should then decide that he wishes to apply for leave to appeal, it will be open to him if so advised to seek an extension of time, although it is of course obvious that in the circumstances of this case an application for extension of time would be subjected to a rigorous scrutiny". I do not think Mr. Lloyd-Eley would complain that this application has not been subjected to such rigorous scrutiny.
The Applicant was then traced to Denmark. He had apparently married a girl friend with whom he had been living in England, a Danish lady. Extradition proceedings were brought. It is to be observed that at no time did he return voluntarily; an Extradition Order was obtained, and finally just before...
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