R v Wilmot
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE GLIDEWELL |
| Judgment Date | 04 November 1988 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1988] EWCA Crim J1104-10 |
| Date | 04 November 1988 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No. 6381/A3/87 |
[1988] EWCA Crim J1104-10
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Lord Justice Glidewell
Mr. Justice Owen
and
Mr. Justice Ian Kennedy
No. 6381/A3/87
MR. J. ROBERTS Q.C. and MR. P. FEINBERG appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR. G. BOAL appeared on behalf of the Crown.
On 3rd March 1987, this appellant, Alan Wilmot, was arraigned on an indictment containing 20 counts at the Central Criminal Court. He pleaded guilty to five of them, namely one of taking a conveyance without the owner's consent; one of theft; one of driving whilst disqualified; and two of handling stolen goods. He also pleaded guilty to another count of driving whilst disqualified on another indictment. He pleaded not guilty to four counts alleging rape; four counts alleging robbery; one wounding with intent; and one theft. After a trial on 23rd June 1987, he was convicted of all those offences. He was acquitted of one count of robbery and one of indecent assault. Three other counts: rape, robbery and attempted robbery were not proceeded with. He was sentenced as follows. For each of the rapes he was sentenced to life imprisonment; for two robberies he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment consecutive to each other; for the other two, three years' imprisonment concurrent with each other and with the earlier sentences; for wounding with intent, six years' consecutive; for theft, 18 months' concurrent; for taking a conveyance - these are the guilty pleas - 18 months' concurrent; for theft, six months' consecutive; for driving whilst disqualified, each case nine months' consecutive; and for the two handling charges, 18 months' concurrent. That makes a total of 14 years determinate sentences. He now appeals against conviction as of right because his grounds include a point of law alone. He also applies for leave to appeal against sentence. This judgment deals with the appeal against conviction.
The prosecution allegations in the trial related to offences againt six young women. It was alleged that on 14th December 1985 the defendant had picked up in a blue Sierra car a young woman called Desiree Soleas, who had accepted a lift from him, and he had offered, according to her, to take her to Paddington Station but instead had driven her to a garage site. He struck her in the face several times on the way. When they arrived he stopped the car and raped her. He hit her on the head with one of her own shoes. He then told her to get out of the car, which she did, with blood coming from her mouth and cuts and bruises to her head. She was picked up by an ambulanceman. It was suggested to her that she had agreed to have sexual intercourse for money. She denied this and she denied that she was a prostitute. However, all the other women admitted that they were prostitutes.
The next series of offences occurred on 16th April 1986 and thereafter all the remaining offences occurred within a space of some two weeks. The second young woman was called Angela Steele. She also was picked up in a car, a white Cortina, by the appellant. They agreed that he would pay her £20 for sexual services. He drove her to some land near what is called Clifton Nursery and paid her the £20. She did indeed perform a sexual act on him. He then butted her on the head, got out a knife and held it to her throat, forced her to have oral sex with him and then raped her. Finally he took money out of her pocket and seized her jacket. He told her to get out of the car and threw such other clothes as she had taken off after her.
The third girl was called Pauline Burke. She also was picked up in the white Cortina car. Again, she agreed to have sexual intercourse, in her case, for £30. She was driven to an underground car-park. The money was paid. In that case she did carry out the bargain - that is to say that he did not rape her - they had consensual sexual intercourse but afterwards he demanded the money back. She refused. He then pulled out a knife and demanded all her money, which she gave to him, some £80.
The fourth girl, and by now we have reached 21st April, was called Kathleen Beech. She was picked up in a white Cortina. Again, there was an agreement to pay money for sexual intercourse. She was driven to the underground car-park. She said that she got out a small penknife with which to clean her nails. In her case he paid her no money. When she got out the penknife, he seized hold of a wheel brace and hit her several times on the head with it, so severely that her head required stitching. He then raped her. He told her to get out of the car and she did. He threw her clothes out but kept her handbag and her jacket.
Four days later, on 25th April, Barbara Jack was picked up in the white Cortina by the appellant. She agreed to have sexual intercourse for £30. She was driven to Clifton Nursery. The appellant produced a knife. He forced her to have oral sex with him. This particular incident led to a count of indecent assault, not rape, since there was no full sexual intercourse. He then took her bag and told her to get out which she did.
Finally, three days later on 28th April, a young woman called Lesley Watson was picked up in a white Cortina. She was driven to the underground car-park. She was threatened by the appellant with a screwdriver. He forced her to have oral sex and then raped her. He took money from her purse and told her to get out, which she did. She took the number of his car as he drove away and flagged down a police car, and reported it, which showed a good deal of courage on her part.
By this time some of the other girls had reported what had happened to them, which also showed courage, and some had not, but when they learned of the fact that reports were being made by other young women of whom they knew, then all five finally reported these incidents to the police.
The appellant's evidence at the trial was that in each case, including that of Desiree Soleas, the girl was a prostitute who was willing to have sexual intercourse or give him sexual satisfaction for payment. In each case he and the girl had either consensual intercourse or committed some other sexual acts consensually, but he then demanded back the money he had paid. That was his case. He admitted that when he had paid money, and in one or two cases he had not already paid it, he had used a certain amount of force or threat to regain the money he had paid but he denied stealing anything other than the amount of money he had paid over. Thus, he denied the rapes. He denied the indecent assault. He admitted the robberies but only to the extent of the £20 or £30 which he said he had paid over for consensual sexual intercourse. The trial as far as the robberies were concerned therefore proceeded on the basis that it was a trial to ascertain whether what the young women said was true, that property had been stolen from them and as to the degree of force that had been used upon them.
The trial originally started on 3rd March 1987. At that time only Desiree Soleas, Angela Steele and Kathleen Beech were available to give evidence for the prosecution. Mr. Feinberg for the defendant applied to sever the counts, that is to say he made an application at the start that there should be separate trials of the various counts relating to each girl. The basis of his application was that evidence relating to one incident was not admissible to prove what was alleged in relation to another incident, whether the charges were rape, or robbery, or indecent assault, or whatever they were. He submitted if the evidence in relation to one incident was inadmissible in relation to another, then the prejudice of trying the counts together was so great as to be really overwhelming and there should therefore be separate trials
As a generality, evidence that a person has committed one offence is not admissible to prove that he has committed another offence, if all it does is to prove a propensity to commit offences of that kind.
In the leading authority of Boardman v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] A.C. 421 and [1975] 60 Cr.App.R. 165, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest said at page 170 in the Criminal Appeal Reports:
"My Lords, the well-known words of Lord Herschell L.C. in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] A.C. 57 have always been accepted as expressing cardinal principles. On the one hand, it is clear that the prosecution cannot adduce evidence which tends to show that an accused person has been guilty of criminal acts other than those with which he is charged for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that he is one who is likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the criminal acts with which he is charged. On the other hand, there may be evidence which is relevant to an issue in a criminal case and which is admissible even though it tends to show that an accused person has committed other cr imes."
Two pages further on Lord Morris said:
"But there may be cases where a judge, having both limbs of Lord Herschell's famous proposition in mind, considers that the interests of justice (of which the interests of fairness forms so fundamental a component) make it proper that he should permit a jury when considering the evidence on a charge concerning one fact or set of facts to consider the evidence concerning another fact or set of facts if between the two there is such a close of striking similarity or such an underlying unity that probative force could fairly be yielded."
In the same case Lord Wilberforce said at page 174:
"The basic principle must be that the admission of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R v Seaton (Oral)
...the defendant's evidence took. Mr Carey-Hughes, however, raises a number of questions about the import of the decision of this court in R v Wilmot (1989) 89 Cr App R 341, which has appeared in the textbooks for many years, when considered together with other decisions upon privilege as appl......
-
R v Z
...the evidence of the four complainants came within the ambit of the similar facts rule and he cited the judgment of Glidewell L.J. in Reg.. v. Wilmot (1989) 89 Cr. App.R. 341, 345: "It has been suggested sometimes that such evidence can never be admissible in relation to the defence of conse......
-
R v Lisa Joy Loizou
...a defendant to show his innocence by relying upon material protected by another's legal professional privilege. 41 Mr Levett referred us to Wilmot (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 341, at 352 (a pre-section 34 case) where Glidewell LJ said: "In the course of his submission to us, Mr. Boal told us that......
-
Robert Phillips v R
...was conducted before us as to whether the timing of a client's instruction to his legal advisers is or is not privileged: we were referred to Wilmot (1989) 89 Cr App R 341, 352, in which it was said that it was not privileged. Mr Ryan submitted that Glidewell LJ's view, there expressed, was......
-
Female Rape—An Ongoing Concern: Strategies for Improving Reporting and Conviction Levels
...character unrelated to the current85 [1975] AC 421 at 456, per Lord Cross.86 [1975] AC 421.87 R v Butler (1986) 84 Cr App R 12, CA.88 (1988) 89 Cr App R 341, CA.89 [1991] 3 All ER 337.90 Ibid. at 348.91 Ibid.Female Rape—an Ongoing charge. However, there were exceptions to this general rule ......