REFRAMING GOVERNANCE: COMPETITION, FATALISM AND AUTONOMY IN CENTRAL–LOCAL RELATIONS
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12210 |
| Author | STEVE MARTIN,VALERIA GUARNEROS‐MEZA,TOM ENTWISTLE,JAMES DOWNE |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12210
REFRAMING GOVERNANCE: COMPETITION, FATALISM
AND AUTONOMY IN CENTRAL–LOCAL RELATIONS
TOM ENTWISTLE, VALERIA GUARNEROS-MEZA, STEVE MARTIN AND
JAMES DOWNE
Much of the work on contemporary governance points either to a strong central government that
continues to operate hierarchically or else to a relatively weak centre which relies on network forms
of coordination. In place of the choice between hierarchyand networks, the cultural theory pioneered
by Mary Douglas draws our attention to ve distinctive ‘social environments’ characterized in terms
of hierarchy,individualism, egalitarianism, fatalism and autonomy. Based on an analysis of survey
data collected from 488 local government managers across England, Scotland and Wales,this article
uses the Douglas framework to understand patterns of governance. While the data lend support to
the strong centre theorists in revealing little evidence of a central–local partnership and continuing
reliance on regulatory-type instruments,we nd this more a recipe for competition and fatalism than
hierarchy.Our data also point to signicant differences in governance style both across services and
between countries.
INTRODUCTION
There are increasing signs of a backlash against the predominant account of contempo-
rary governance which charts a shift from a hierarchical system based on authoritative
decision making and controlled implementation to networks galvanized by voluntarism
and diplomacy.Commentators argue variously that hierarchy never stopped being impor-
tant, or indeed that it has become more important over time (Bang 2011; Davies 2012; 6
2015). While some rebalancing of scholarship away from the new governance orthodoxy
is helpful, the strong versus weak centre debate, as Lafn (2013) describes it, highlights a
more profound problem in our understanding of governance. The key problem here is not
whether governments use hard or soft instruments to advance their aims – clearly they
use both – but whether we can hope to understand the complexity of governance in the
binary and in some cases zero-sum terms suggested by this debate.
The cultural theory pioneered by Mary Douglas (1970, 1982, 1996), and increasingly
adopted in the policy and political sciences (Swedlow 2011, 2014), provides us with one
way of reframing our understanding of governance. Douglas acknowledges the central
importance of authority and afnity in the organization of social life but rather than envis-
aging these as opposite poles of a continuum, she combines them as an intersection to
generate ve forms of organization rather than two (Swedlow 2011). This arrangement has
two main theoretical advantages. First, it provides a more nuanced account of hierarchi-
cal and network forms of governance recognizing, for example, that hierarchy – properly
understood – requires a combination of both authoritative rules and subordinate partici-
pation. Second, in addition to the usual organizational categories, Douglas suggests three
others – individualism, fatalism and autonomy – which promise new perspectives on the
nature of contemporary governance.
We need a better understanding of the new governance rst, if we are to know who we
should hold to account. A hierarchical style of governance implies a very different set of
Tom Entwistle, Steve Martin and James Downe are at the Business School, Cardiff University, UK. Valeria
Guarneros-Meza is at the Department of Politics and Public Policy,De Montfort University, Leicester, UK.
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 4, 2016 (897–914)
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
898 TOM ENTWISTLE ET AL.
accountability arrangements from a network form. Second, we need to be clear about how
the new governance works if we are going to evaluate its effectiveness and efciency. The
rise of the new governance is attributable, in large measure, to a prospectus which claims
an efciency advantage over traditional bureaucratic structures. While it seems unlikely
that there is, or could be, a simple answer to efciency and effectiveness questions of this
sort (although see Hood and Dixon 2015), the starting point for any systematic inquiry
must be to understand the terrain as it currently lies.
Based on an analysis of survey data collected from 488 local government managers at
the turn of 2012/13 across England, Scotland and Wales, this article uses insights from
Douglas’s work to describe and better understand the relationships between central and
local government. To that end we ask four questions. First, does the central–local relation-
ship, as perceived by managers, look more like a hierarchy or a partnership? Second, to
the extent that this is not the case, do the new categories suggested by Douglas – fatalism,
individualism and autonomy – provide a better characterization? Third, to what extent
can variations in governance style be attributed to a country effect in which (for example)
Scotland is governed rather differently from England? Or nally, does governance style
vary across service areas such that managers in social care, for example, have a differ-
ent relationship with their government from managers in sport, or other non-statutory
functions?
The article is organized into four parts. First, against the backdrop of the traditional
models of contemporary governance we use cultural theory to identify ve accounts of
the relationship between central and local government. Second, we describe our survey
of local government managers and make the case for an analysis pitched at both service
and country level. Third, we present the results of that survey in the form of service and
country means for each of our different accounts of central–local relations. Fourth and
nally, we discuss our ndings and explore their implications for research and practice.
FROM TWO TO FIVE WAYS OF GOVERNING
Commentators largely agree that decades of public sector reform – embracing marketi-
zation, agencication and devolution – have led, certainly in Europe but perhaps less so
in the US (Peters and Pierre 1998), to a more fragmented and diverse network of public
service providers far removed from the archetypal, and perhaps apocryphal bureaucratic,
model of the post-war period. Stoker (1998, p. 19) describes the new structure of gov-
ernment as ‘fragmented with a maze of institutions and organizations’. Rhodes (1988,
p. 412) characterizes the landscape in terms of ‘disaggregation, differentiation, interdepen-
dence’. Sørensen and Torng (2009, p. 235) talk of ‘increasingly complex, fragmented and
multi-layered societies’. There is fundamental disagreement, however, about what these
changes tell us about the way in which we are governed. Lafn (2013) suggests that two
main accounts can be distinguished.
The rst – weak centre account – maintains that processesof fragmentation and hollow-
ing out have disempowered central governments and forced them to resort to a new set
of policy tools or instruments (Jordan et al. 2005). Rhodes (1988) describes governance as
negotiated in, and dened by,a series of professional networks in which recognizing their
interdependence, different stakeholders voluntarily come together to negotiate a com-
mon set of priorities. He argues that the ‘keys to effective network management’ lie in
‘facilitating, accommodating and bargaining’ (Rhodes 1996, p. 665). Fragmentation and
hollowing out have, according to Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 58), ‘undermined the ability
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 4, 2016 (897–914)
© 2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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