Ridge v Baldwin
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 30 January 1962 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1962] EWCA Civ J0130-2 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 30 January 1962 |
[1962] EWCA Civ J0130-2
Lord Justice Holroyd Pearce,
Lord Justice Harman and
Lord Justice Davies
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
Mr. Neil Lawson, Q. C. and Mr. J. Mcmanus (instructed by Messrs Haslewoods, agents for Messrs Bosley £ Co., Brighton) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Appellant (Plaintiff).
Mr. Neville Faulks, Q. C. and Mr. A. Harmsworth (instructed by Messrs Sharpe, Pritchard £ Co., agents for Town Clerk, Brighton) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Respondents (Defendants).
The Plaintiff appeals from a Judgment of Mr. Justice Streatfeild dismissing his claim. The Defendants are the Watch Committee of Brighton, and the Plaintiff asks for a declaration that their purported termination on 7th March, 1958, of his appointment as Chief Constable of Brighton was illegal, ultra vires and void. He also claimspayment of salary and pensions, or, alternatively, damages.
He was 58 years old when he was dismissed. Had he not been dismissed he could have retired on a pension at the age of 60. He joined the Brighton Police Force in 1925 as a police constable, and from 1935 onwards be passed through various Higher ranks. From 1950 to 1954 he was Detective Superintendent, that is, the head of the Brighton Criminal Investigation Department. He then became Deputy Chief Constable, and on 22nd February, 1956, he was appointed Chief Constable by the Watch Committee as from 1st July, subject to the approval of the Some Office.
On the 25th October, 1957, he was arrested and charged, together with Detective Sergeant Heath, Detective Inspector Hammersley (both of the Brighton Police Force) and two civilians, Bellson and Lyons. They were all charged with conspiring to obstruct the course of justice from January, 1949, to 16th October, 1957.
On the 28th October, 1957, the Plaintiff was suspended by the Watch Committee and placed on suspension allowance.
During nineteen days between the 3rd and the 27th February, 1958, the conspiracy indictment was tried at the Central Criminal Court before Mr. Justice Donovan and a Jury. A second indictment charging the Plaintiff and Bellson and Lyons with corruption stood over to a later date. The Plaintiff gave evidence himself but called no witnesses. At the end of the trial he was acquitted and discharged. So too was Lyons. Bellson and the two other police officers were convicted.
On 28th February, in passing sentence of five years' imprisonment on the two police officers, the Judge made certain observations about the Plaintiff. He said: "I am not going to prolong your ordeal, but there is this also to be said, and it is based not on disputed allegations but on facts admitted in the course of this trial. Those facts establish that neitherof you had that professional and moral leadership which both of you should have had and were entitled to expect from the Chief Constable of Brighton, now acquitted, for it he could contrive, as he did, to go to a suspected briber of the police in private and alone it is small wonder that you, Heath, followed that example in the case of Mrs. Brabiner; and if he could admit, as did, to his private room a much convicted and hectoring Bookmaker and there discuss with him, almost as a colleague, the policy of the police in certain matters, well then, it is small wonder that you, Hammersley, saw little or no wrong in going off on holiday with a local man with a serious criminal record".
On that same day, although the second indictment for corruption was pending, the Plaintiff through his solicitor applied to be reinstated.
On 6th March the second indictment was heard. No evidence was offered by the Solicitor General and the Judge directed an acquittal. Again Mr. Justice Donovan made some observations about the Plaintiff. He said: "Mr. Solicitor, there is a statement which I desire to make. It could be based on a number of facts proved in the trial but I will select the matter of the £15,000 theft of cigarettes only". He referred to the concealment by the Brighton Police of certain facts from the Railway Police. "At last", he continued, "Superintendent Moody was driven to the drastic step of sending his own men to Brighton unknown to the local force, in order to conduct their own independent investigation. The result was that within three days Waite was found in possession of some of the stolen cigarettes, which he was selling". He then refers to a true accusation made to the Brighton Criminal Investigation Department against Waite with regard to other stolen property. "Within a few hours", the Judge continued, "someone in the Brighton C. I. D. disclosed it to Waite himself. It is small wonder, therefore, that Superintendent Moody said that he had lost faith in that force. He meant,of course, to refer to those members of it whom he had encountered, for the trial has shown that there are other members of that force who would be a credit to any force. It is not difficult now, however, to foresee the use to which the incidents I have mentioned, and others like them to be found in the case, will or may be put for the purpose of discrediting the officers of that force when they give evidence in future prosecutions, and the results in some cases may be unfortunate. This prospect and this risk will remain until a leader is given to that force who will be a new influence, and who will set a different example from that which has lately obtained. I realise, Mr. Solicitor, that this is a matter which is about to engage the attention of those persons whose responsibility it is, and I have no desire to trespass upon their domain, but since the matter will also affect the administration of justice in the Courts I felt it right to make these observations".
On the 7th March the Defendants had a meeting at which they unanimously dismissed the Plaintiff from his office and passed other consequential resolutions. They informed him by letter of the same date which reads: "I have to inform you that at a meeting of the Watch Committee held today, the Committee unanimously passed the following resolutions:- (1) The Committee after carefully considering (a) the request by Mr. Ridge's solicitors that Mr. Ridge's suspension be removed and Mr. Ridge be reinstated in his office as Chief Constable, (b) the length of Mr. Ridge's period of service in the Brighton Police Force, (c) the trial of Mr. Ridge, Detective Inspector J. Hammersley and Detective Sergeant T. E. Heath, two senior members of the Brighton Police Force and others on a charge of conspiring to obstruct the course of public justice and the conviction of Hammersley and Heath and another, (d) the statements of Mr. Justice Donovan on the 28th February, 1950, and the 6th March, 1956, (e) the statements made by Mr. Ridge inevidence at his trial and (f) certain statements made today by members of the Committee and the Town Clerk, decide that Mr. Charles Feild Williams Ridge has in the opinion of the Committee been negligent in the discharge of his duty and is unfit for the same and the Committee in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by section 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, accordingly hereby dismiss him from his office as Chief Constable of Brighton forthwith. (2) That in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 7 of the Police Pensions Regulations 1955 the amount of Mr. Ridge's aggregate pension contributions is paid to him. Please accept this letter as formal notice terminating your appointment as Chief Constable of Brighton forthwith. A copy of this letter has been sent to your solicitors".
Prior to the 7th March, 1958, the Plaintiff was not given notice of the proposal to dismiss him or particulars of the grounds on which it was based. Nor was he given an opportunity of putting his case.
On the same evening the Plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the Home Secretary contending that the dismissal was contrary to natural justice and bad in law on various grounds, the details of which were being formulated and would be lodged with him shortly.
On the 10th March the Plaintiff's solicitors again wrote to the Home Secretary stating that any notice of appeal to him was without prejudice to the Plaintiff's right to contend that the purported notice of dismissal was bad in law as being contrary to natural justice and not in accordance with the appropriate Statutes and Regulations.
By Notice of Appeal dated 12th March the Plaintiff appealed to the Home Secretary under the Police Appeals Act, 1927. The Notice of Appeal states that it is made "in accordance with the Statutes and Regulations, and naturaljustice. The grounds are:- (1) Mr. Ridge has been given no opportunity of being heard at all. (2) He has been given no notice of what is alleged against him. (3) He has been given no opportunity of placing his evidence, contentions, explanations, documents and views before the Watch Committee. (4) He has been given no opportunity of being heard on the allegations of neglect and unfitness which the Watch Committee find proved without any or any sufficient evidence. (5) He has been given no details of such findings. (6) The Notice of purported dismissal is bad because it does not comply with the principles of natural justice, particularly in that it gives no facts justifying dismissal, and no details of incidents or allegations which would enable Mr. Ridge to know why such dismissal was intended. … (8) It does not appear that justice has been done." Paragraph 27 reads: "This Notice of Appeal is without prejudice to the validity of the decision of the Watch Committee, and is given within the limited time in case it should be held that the Watch Committee's procedure is valid. Mr. Ridge reserves his rights to contend that the procedure is bad as not complying with the appropriate Statutes and Regulations, and as being a denial of natural...
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