RIVAL REGULATORY REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF BIOSAFETY
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Author | KAI SCHULZE,JALE TOSUN |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12176 |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12176
RIVAL REGULATORY REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF BIOSAFETY
KAI SCHULZE AND JALE TOSUN
The literature on international regulatoryregimes has highlighted how rival standards can create dif-
ferent points of convergence. Scholarly attention has also focused on how the European Union (EU)
and the United States (USA) attempt to ‘export’ their environmental standards internationally. Here,
we explore the effectiveness of these attempts by means of third states’ decisions to ratify the Carta-
gena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a multilateral environmental
agreement regulating genetically modied organisms that is promoted by the EU but opposed by
the USA. Our ndings conrm that both rivals are able to inuence the ratication decision of states,
but they also suggest that these effects may have different origins. Countries relying more heavily
on US markets for food exports tend to be less likely to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, while countries
that have applied for EU membership are more likely to ratify the protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Despite critical evaluations of the EU’s efforts to be a global environmental leader (Gupta
and Ringius 2001; De Bièvre 2006; Skodvin and Andresen 2006; Vogler and Stephan 2007),
most scholars tend to support the view that the EU now plays a central role in establishing
global environmental norms (e.g. Sbragia and Damro 1999; Zito 2005; Falkner 2007; Poletti
and Sicurelli 2012). The EU’s leadership role is closely linked to the development of an
increasing number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and regimes(Jordan
et al. 2003; Vogel 2003; Vogler and Stephan 2007; Kelemen 2010; Kelemen and Vogel 2010;
Schulze and Tosun 2013). According to Kelemen and Vogel (2010), MEAs currently offer
important means for the EU to add international legitimacy to its regulatory standards and
to protect those standards against pressure arising from international regulatorycompeti-
tion. While this argument is logically compelling, it seems incomplete, given the possibility
that some of the MEAs promoted by the EU might be contested by other inuential actors
in the international system, such as the USA. In fact, Drezner (2007) has argued that inter-
national regulatory politics is affected by the existence of two points of convergence: one
corresponding to the preferences of the EU, and another based on the preferences of the
USA. Drezner also identies the reason for the absence of global convergence in regula-
tions, namely, that these two economic superpowers cannot agree on uniform standards.
Considering Drezner’s argument that competition exists between regulatory regimes,
the question emerges whether the EU can also exert environmental leadership in situations
where a powerful competitor such as the USA opposes a certain type of regulation. In
order to address this question, we must study an international regime that is supported
by one actor but opposed by another.A case in point is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, whose establishment was strongly inuenced
and promoted by the EU, but has to date neither been signed nor ratied by the USA.
The Cartagena Protocol seeks to ensure an adequate level of protection with regard to the
safe transfer, handling, and use of genetically modied organisms (GMOs) resulting from
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
Kai Schulze is at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, Germany. Jale Tosun is at the
Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University,Germany.
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 1, 2016 (57–72)
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
58 KAI SCHULZE AND JALE TOSUN
biological diversity. The issue of biosafety is widely characterized by uncertainty, giving
scientic experts a prominent role in the policy-making process (e.g. Montpetit 2008).
The literature typically regards the EU and the USA as having opposite preferences
for the regulation of GMOs. The EU has adopted a precautionary – or some observers
would even say prohibitive (Paarlberg 2001) –stance on GMOs (Tosun 2013), while the
USA has favoured a liberal regulatory approach (e.g. Bernauer 2003; Bernauer and Meins
2003; Prakash and Kollman 2003; Schreurs 2005; Rhinard and Kaeding 2006; Bernauer and
Aerni 2008; Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Skogstad 2011;Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). Dur-
ing the negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol, the EU emerged as the leader in the nal
round of negotiations and ‘pushed for the adoption of the precautionary principle in risk
assessment and sought to assist developing countries in their efforts to strengthen domes-
tic regulations, against the interests of the US and other GMO exporters’ (Falkner 2007,
p. 513; see also Arts and Mack 2003; Andree 2005; Rhinard and Kaeding 2006; Groenleer
and Van Schaik 2007; Pollack and Shaffer 2009).
In order to study the EU’s and the USA’s inuence in contested regulatory areas, we
focus on theoretical aspects of economic integration with these two economic powers, as
well as the aid and assistance provided by them, and empirically assess whether these
factors help to explain why other states ratify the Cartagena Protocol. More specically,
we argue that a stronger integration with a given jurisdiction in terms of market access
and aid inows will affect the chances that a third state will participate in the Cartagena
Protocol. Totest our expectations, we employ data over the period 2000–12. In so doing, we
build on and seek to further develop the rich existing literature on this subject in general,
and a recent study by Schneider and Urpelainen (2013) in particular.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We rst outline the theoretical argu-
ment and present the dependent variable of this study. Thereafter, we turn to discussing
the measurement of the explanatory variables before presenting the results of our analy-
ses. We conclude by summarizing the theoretical implications of our study and pointing
to directions for further research.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXPORT MARKETS AND DEVELOPMENT AID
There is a widespread consensus in the literature that the EU plays a central role in estab-
lishing both general international regulatory norms (e.g. De Francesco 2012) and envi-
ronmental norms in particular (e.g. Zito 2005; Falkner 2007; Groenleer and Van Schaik
2007; Voglerand Stephan 2007; Kelemen 2010; Kelemen and Vogel 2010; Biedenkopf 2012;
Damro 2012; Schulze and Tosun 2013). In this process, it is predominantly the individual
EU member states and the European Commission ofcials that take the lead in communi-
cating the EU’s position to international actors involved in negotiations (Delreux and Van
den Brande 2013). One prominent explanation for this leadership role follows the logic of
regulatory competition: signicant increases in environmental concerns among EU mem-
ber states since the 1980s, paired with the dynamics of EU politics, have, especially as a
rst step during the 1990s, led the EU to adopt ambitious environmental policies (Kelemen
2010, pp. 339–41).
However, because high regulatory standards are generally presumed to lower prot
rates by raising the cost of production, capital is expected to move to countries with lower
burdens, potentially inducing a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards (e.g.
Prakash and Potoski 2006). Therefore, when confronted with the dynamics of regulatory
competition and high domestic environmental standards, EU governments and business
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 1, 2016 (57–72)
© 2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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