Robinson v Unicos Property Corporation Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE HOLROYD PEARCE,LORD JUSTICE HARMAN,LORD JUSTICE DAVIES |
| Judgment Date | 27 February 1962 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1962] EWCA Civ J0227-2 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 27 February 1962 |
[1962] EWCA Civ J0227-2
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
(Interlocutory List).
Lord Justice Holroyd Pearce
Lord Justice Harman and
Lord Justice Davies
Mr Frank Whitworth (instructed by Messrs Sydney Hackman & Co.) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Appellants (Defendants}.
MR JOHN MAY (instructed by Messrs Reynolds Porter & Taylor Jelf) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Respondents (Plaintiffs).
The Defendants appeal from an Order of Mr. Justice Glyn Jones overruling the Master's Order and allowing an amendment to a Statement of Claim. The Defendants appeal to this Court on the ground that such amendment should not be allowed because it will deprive the Defendants of a defense under the Statute of Limitations.
The Plaintiffs are estate agents and they claim commission as a reward for introducing certain property to Defendants. In 1938, on the introduction of the thirdPlaintiff, acting either on his own behalf or on behalf of himself and his then partner, Mr. Borland, the Defendants took a building lease from the Goldsmiths Company under which the Defendants were to rebuild on the site. In consideration of the introduction the third Plaintiff was paid £5,000 and was appointed sole letting agent in respect of tenancies in the new building when it should be constructed. For that he was to be paid 10 per cent on the first year's rent. It appears that such commission would have been in the region of £6,000.
The war prevented the Defendants from developing the property. They never erected a new building. In 1953 they sold the building lease to another company, which then developed the site. The Defendants did not assign their liability to employ the third Plaintiff as sole letting agent. In the result the third Plaintiff was deprived of the remuneration which he would have got from letting the rebuilt premises.
The Writ was issued in the name of the third Plaintiff and two other Plaintiffs, who are now his partners. The Statement of Claim pleaded the agreement as made by the third Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the first and second Plaintiffs The Writ was issued on the 29th October, 1959. The Statement of Claim was delivered on the 3rd February, 1961. On the 11th March, 1961, the Defendants delivered their Defense, and at the same time a request for particulars of the Statement of Claim. The Defense admitted that the contract in 1938 had been made by the third Plaintiff on his own behalf, but it denied that the other Plaintiffs had any interest in the matter. The Plaintiffs then sought to deliver an amended Statement of Claim. The amendments are as follows. In place of the allegation that the third Plaintiff, in making the contract the allegation that the third Plaintiff, in making the contract of 1938, was acting on behalf of all the Plaintiffs in this action, It is alleged that he was acting, if not on behalf of himself alone, on behalf of himself and his then partner Worland. The amendment alleges that there have been various alterationsof the partnership although the third Plaintiff has been a partner throughout. It further alleges that rights which existed in 1938 in the Plaintiff and his then partner have been assigned through the various partnerships and are now rested in the present partnership, namely, the third Plaintiff and his two co-Plaintiffs. The learned Master refused leave to amend the Statement of Claim because the period under the Statute of Limitations had expired.
It is conceded that the claim in this action had arisen at the latest by the 24th March, 1955, when the Plaintiffs submitted their claim for payment, the new building having been erected and let. Therefore the claim would be statute-barred by the 24th March, 1961.
Mr. Justice Glyn Jones reversed the Order of the Master and gave leave to amend.
The Defendants put forward two reasons why the amendment should not be allowed. First, they contend that by the amendment the Plaintiffs are raising a different cause of action. Alternatively, they contend that the amendment creates a material change in the capacity in which the Plaintiffs sue, and that the Court will not allow an alteration of status in the Plaintiff by...
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Smith (Geoffrey) v Henniker-Major & Company
...raised by section 35 of the Limitation Act 1980. I think he was right in that, and that he was also right to regard Robinson v Unicos Property Corporation Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 520 as a case on special facts (involving the changing membership of a partnership). Although a claimant's title to su......
- Government of Malaysia v Mohamed Amin bin Hassan
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Roberts v Gill & Company and Another
...(The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 25, 34, per Oliver LJ; Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26, 40, per Scott J; and cf Robinson v Unicos Property Corpn Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 520, 525-526, per Holroyd Pearce and Harman LJJ; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank o......
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Haq v Singh and another
...no title to sue before the assignment. (2) There was no change of capacity. He relies on Robinson v Unicos Property Corporation Limited [1962] 1 WLR 520. In that case, the plaintiffs originally sued as individuals, but later took an equitable assignment and sought to amend to sue as assigne......