Rowell v Pratt
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Atkin,Lord Thankerton,Lord Macmillan,Lord Wright,Lord Maugham |
| Judgment Date | 26 July 1937 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1937] UKHL J0726-1 |
| Date | 26 July 1937 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1937] UKHL J0726-1
Lord Atkin
Lord Thankerton
Lord Macmillan
Lord Wright
Lord Maugham
House of Lords
My Lords,
I have had the opportunity of reading the Opinions which are about to be delivered by my noble and learned friends Lord Wright and Lord Maugham. I entirely agree with them, and they so completely cover the ground that, though we are differing from the Court of Appeal, I find it unnecessary to express the same reasons in different words.
My Lords,
I also concur in the Opinions about to be delivered by my noble and learned friends.
My Lords,
I also concur.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in print the opinion prepared and about to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Maugham in this appeal. I completely concur in that opinion. The few observations I now add relate merely to the principles which should in my opinion be followed in construing the material section, that is, section 17, of the Agricultural Marketing Act. It is inevitable that a Court of Law should approach in a critical spirit any legislation which is calculated to impede a Court in the discharge of its duty to administer justice by preventing it from obtaining any material evidence of a nature likely to assist it to ascertain the truth. Hence a Court will be disposed, as was the majority of the Court of Appeal, to construe the section, if possible, so as to avoid that result. Now it is true that if the words of an enactment are fairly capable of two interpretations, one of which seems to be in harmony with what is just, reasonable and convenient, while the other is not, the Court will prefer the former. But if the words properly construed admit of only one meaning, the Court is not entitled to deny to the words that meaning, merely because the Court feels that the result is not in accordance with the ordinary policy of the law or with what seems to be reasonable. The Court cannot mould or control the language. This is particularly true of legislation in these days, when Parliament has established so many new institutions and bodies, and has imposed on individuals so many duties and disabilities for which in the former law no precedents can be found. A Statute must be construed as a whole and with some regard to its apparent purpose and object. The language of one part may help to interpret the language of another. On the other hand, it is seldom that the construction of one Statute can be determined by comparison with other Statutes. Apart from some general rules of construction, each Statute, like each contract, must be interpreted on its own merits.
For myself, I find the language of Section 17 (2) clear and unambiguous, and not even difficult when read as a whole. It is curious that the subsection does not contain an express prohibition, but a prohibition of an act must be implied when the act is made a criminal offence, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. This prohibition is quite unqualified. It is not necessary to determine whether the first paragraph, if it stood alone, would require a judge to refuse to order any person by whom information of the character described has been obtained, to disclose that information in Court, because in my opinion the matter is put beyond doubt by the saving paragraph which follows. That paragraph falls into two parts, an exception and then a limitation upon that exception. The exception relates to disclosures so far as required for the purposes of legal proceedings. If the paragraph stopped there, that exception would have covered the present case. But the super-imposed limitation is fatal to that view. The exception is limited by the super-imposed limitation to legal proceedings under or in virtue of the Act. It is only within these narrow limits that the information may be disclosed. The present case seems to me to fall outside the precisely expressed limits of the proviso, and the proviso removes any doubt there might be whether the main prohibition applies to disclosure for the purposes of legal proceedings. A Judge cannot compel a man to commit a criminal offence. I need not consider if the objection could be cleared by the interested party's consent.
I cannot construe the words "for the purposes of legal proceedings" in a restricted sense which would cover only matters anterior to the proceedings in open Court or in the actual hearing of the arbitration, but would exclude from their scope proceedings in open Court or Arbitration. The words "for the purposes of legal proceedings" are wider than "in legal proceedings." But in any case only legal proceedings under the Act come within the liberty.
I do not agree that there is any rule of construction or any prima facie implication which makes it necessary to have express words to prohibit a person from producing a document or giving oral testimony if ordered to do so by a Court in legal proceedings. But perhaps it is more accurate to say that here the actual language can only be construed as covering such a case.
In the Act in question, like other Acts of a similar character, an individual is required by law to disclose to the proper person or body certain information as to his private affairs. The Act proceeds to secure to him that this information shall be kept secret, save only in the one specially defined circumstance. So regarded, the provision is, in addition to being unambiguous, quite reasonable
On the further question, now become hypothetical, whether if the Judge's order had appeared to be wrong, the case was one in which the Court should exercise its discretion to order a new trial, I do not attempt to add anything to the opinion of Lord Maugham.
My Lords,
This appeal is from an Order of the Court of Appeal setting aside a Judgment in favour of the Respondent after trial of an action and counterclaim in the County Court of Cambridgeshire. The learned County Court Judge gave judgment with costs for the Plaintiff Rowell in the sum of £97 12s. 10d. and dismissed with costs a counterclaim which had been limited to £100. On appeal the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Greer dissenting) set aside the judgment on the counterclaim and directed a new trial, the costs of the appeal to be paid by the Plaintiff. Leave to appeal to this House was given on the unusual terms that the Plaintiff (the Appellant) should obtain from the National Farmers Union an undertaking to pay the costs of the appeal as between party and party of both parties.
My Lords, the Appellant, Plaintiff in the action and Defendant in the counterclaim, is a farmer carrying on business at Inkerson Fen, near Sutton St. Edmunds. He is a grower of potatoes. The Respondent is a Wisbech merchant and he is also a grower of seed potatoes. By Agreements dated the 6th January, 1934, and the 31st March, 1934, the Appellant contracted to grow for the Respondent 9 1/2 acres of royal kidney potatoes, sufficient seed for the purpose being supplied free of charge by the Respondent. The potatoes were to be paid for by the Respondent at the price of 50s. per ton delivered. The Appellant in pursuance of the agreements delivered to the Respondent 74 tons 14 cwt. 2 qrs. and 20 lbs. of royal kidney potatoes. He sued for the balance of the purchase price, and this claim was admitted by the defence. The Respondent, however, alleged in his counterclaim that in breach of contract the Appellant had not delivered to the Respondent the whole product of the 9 1/2 acres, but had sold to certain other merchants some 43 tons of potatoes belonging to the Respondent from the 9 1/2 acres. He counterclaimed for the value of these potatoes £131 18s. 3d., a sum reduced to £100 on the action being remitted to the County Court. The Appellant denied that the potatoes which he had sold to other merchants were the produce of the 9 1/2 acres. The sole issue as it was developed on the trial of the counterclaim was whether or not the Appellant had planted royal kidney potatoes in a field (called at the trial "field A") on his farm in addition to those admittedly planted on approximately 9 1/2 acres on a field called "field C".
The action was heard in the County Court before His Honour Judge Farrant on the 23rd July, 20th and 21st August and 19th November, 1935. The Respondent called certain witnesses in an effort to prove that no royal kidney potatoes at all were planted in field A, and that the royal kidney potatoes admittedly sold to other merchants were his. He sought to support this evidence by an endeavour to obtain the production on summons of a return made by the Appellant under an Order made pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931. His failure to obtain this document is the sole ground on which the Court of Appeal have based their Order for a new trial. It will be necessary, therefore, carefully to state the facts as to this attempt. In the absence of the document the learned Judge felt no difficulty on the evidence before him in believing a number of witnesses for the Appellant and discrediting some witnesses for the Respondent. He found as a fact that the Appellant, as he alleged, did plant about four acres of royal kidney potatoes in field A apart from those which were planted in field C; and he further found that the Appellant delivered to the Respondent all the royal kidney potatoes which were the produce of approximately 9 1/2 acres of land in field C, in compliance with the terms of the two contracts entered into between the Appellant and the Respondent. The amount so delivered worked out at about 8 tons per acre which he found was a fair average yield in the circumstances which had existed. Lastly, he found as regards the sale of certain royal kidney potatoes to some other merchants that these represented the produce of the four acres planted in field A and that they...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
The Police Federation v The Commissioner of The Independent Commission of Investigations
...principles of interpretation, as these are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity. In another House of Lords case, Rowell v Pratt [1938] AC 101 at page 105, Lord Wright stated that: “Now it is true that if the words of an enactment are fairly capable of two interpretations, one of which ......
- The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and Others v The Shipping Association of Jamaica
-
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets v Pytel
... ... State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 ; [ 2003 ] 1 AC 837 ; [ 2002 ] 3 WLR 1800 ; [ 2002 ] 4 All ER 1089 , HL(E) Rowell v Pratt [ 1938 ] AC 101 ; [ 1937 ] 3 All ER 660 , HL(E) Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2014] EWCA Civ 185 ; [ 2014 ] ICR 550 ; [ 2014 ] ... ...
-
A v A; B v B
...All ER 76, [1981] 2 WLR 668, HL. Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881, [1977] 3 All ER 677, [1977] 3 WLR 63, CA. Rowell v Pratt [1938] AC 101, [1937] 3 All ER 660, S v S (disclosure to Revenue) [1997] 3 FCR 1, [1997] 1 WLR 1621, [1997] 2 FLR 774. Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 2......
-
Secrecy Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation
...r19(2).119[1952]AC571.l~Supran79, 532; Re SheepskinandOpal ExportersandExport Development GrantsBoard(1984) 2AAR 115.121Rowell vPratt [1938] AC 101, 104; courts in the United States adopt asimilar narrowapproach: see "DiscoveryofGovernment Documents and the Official InfonnationPrivilege" (1......