Royal Taj HQ Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice McGowan |
| Judgment Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 3226 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB/2016/0055 |
[2016] EWHC 3226 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
The Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Mrs Justice McGowan
Case No: QB/2016/0055
Mr A Razzaq-Siddiq appeared on behalf of the Claimant
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
(As Approved)
The application before me today is a renewed application for permission to appeal. The submissions are said to be made on the merits and on the question of jurisdiction. They fall into two identifiable categories, as set out in the skeleton argument of Mr Razzaq-Siddiq dated 6 June 2016. He submits that the drafting of section 17 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, which deals with the provisions governing the bringing of appeals in cases of this sort, grants a discretion to the court.
The facts of the case are set out in the judgment of HHJ Luba QC and I need not rehearse them here, but section 17, and in particular at section 17(4)(b), says in terms that an appeal must be brought within a period of 28 days beginning with the relevant date, and it is accepted that in this case the actions required were one day out.
Mr Razzaq-Siddiq submits that because the Act does not deal with sanction or indeed any matter relating to what should occur in the event of something being out of time that I should read that section to mean that there is a discretion and, further, that the Civil Procedure Rules, and in particular rule 13.3, grants some form of discretion to extend time.
He submits in the second part of his submission, that 17(4)(b) cannot oust the court's jurisdiction. The simple position is, that the statute says in terms an appeal must be brought within 28 days. That is a clear expression of the intention of Parliament. It does not on its face, or in any of the subordinate legislation, go on to say "in the event of a delay the court has jurisdiction or discretion;" it sets a time limit and a time limit which must be complied with.
The judgment of HHJ Luba QC dealt with the wider point of...
To continue reading
Request your trial