Ryan Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Swift,Dame Victoria Sharp P. |
| Judgment Date | 27 November 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin) |
| Date | 27 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/658/2020 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE PRESIDENT OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
and
Mr. Justice Swift
Case No: CO/658/2020
Alisdair Williamson QC (instructed by Brett Wilson LLP) for the Appellant
Riel Karmy-Jones QC & Rupert Allen (instructed by Capsticks Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 20 October 2020
Dame Victoria Sharp P. and
A. Introduction
On 30 January 2020 the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) issued its judgment on complaints of misconduct brought by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (“the SRA”) against Ryan Beckwith (“the Appellant”). That judgment followed a 9-day hearing that had taken place in September and October 2019, which considered a complaint made to the SRA in 14 August 2017. The Tribunal referred to the complainant as “Person A”. In this judgment we will do the same.
The Appellant was a partner in the firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (“the Firm”), and had been the subject of two complaints, referred to in the Tribunal's judgment as “Allegation 1.1” and “Allegation 1.2”. Allegation 1.1 concerned events that were said to have taken place on either 6 or 7 May 2016. The Tribunal dismissed that allegation.
Allegation 1.2 was in the following terms
“1.2 On 2 July 2016, the Respondent initiated and/or engaged in sexual activity with Person A in circumstances which constituted a breach of one or more of Principle 2 and Principle 6 of the Principles 2011 because:
1.2.1 the Respondent was in a position of seniority and/or authority over Person A in that he was a partner in the Firm, Person A's supervising partner and Person A's appraisal partner;
1.2.2 the Respondent knew or ought to have known from the Person A's reaction to the incident on 6 or 7 May 2016 [i.e. Allegation 1.1] that his conduct on that occasion had not been invited and was unwelcome;
1.2.3 the Respondent knew or ought to have known that Person A was heavily intoxicated to the extent that she was vulnerable and/or her judgement and decision-making ability was impaired.
1.2.4 the Respondent knew or ought to have known on 1 or 2 July 2016 that Person A had not invited him to her home;
1.2.5 the Respondent knew or ought to have known on 1 or 2 July 2016 that Person A had not allowed him into her home with a view to sexual activity taking place; and/or
1.2.6 in all the circumstances the Respondent knew or ought to have known that his conduct was an abuse of his position of seniority or authority and/or inappropriate.”
The reference to “Principle 2 and Principle 6 of the Principles 2011” is a reference to the list of principles set out in the SRA Handbook, as in force at the time of the events that were complained of (“the Handbook”). At that time, the Handbook set out 10 principles, as follows
“SRA Principles
These are mandatory Principles which apply to all.
You must:
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice;
2. act with integrity;
3. not allow your independence to be compromised;
4. act in the best interests of each client;
5. provide a proper standard of service to your clients;
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal services;
7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your regulators and ombudsmen in an open, timely and co-operative manner;
8. run your business or carry out your role in the business effectively and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk management principles;
9. run your business or carry out your role in the business in a way that encourages equality of opportunity and respect for diversity; and
10. protect client money and assets.” We will refer to these as the 2011 Principles.
The Tribunal made detailed findings of fact on the circumstances that had given rise to Allegation 1.2: see paragraphs 25.166 to 25.176 of its judgment, which are set out in the Annex to this judgment.
In summary the Tribunal found that what it described as a “sexual encounter” had occurred between the Appellant and Person A during the evening of 1 – 2 July 2016. Earlier that evening the Appellant and Person A had been part of a group drinking in a pub near the Firm's London office. Person A was an associate solicitor at the Firm in its Restructuring and Insolvency Department, the same department the Appellant worked in. In June 2016 Person A had resigned from her employment with the Firm following an offer of employment with another law firm. Her last day of work was 8 July 2016. The drinks on Friday 1 July 2016 were in anticipation of her departure.
The Tribunal next set out its specific findings on the component parts of Allegation 1.2: see paragraphs 25.177 to 25.191 of its judgment, also set out in full the Annex to this judgment. The Tribunal's findings on these matters can be summarised as follows. It accepted that the Appellant was in a position of seniority and/or authority over Person A. The Appellant had not disputed this. The Tribunal found that the Appellant knew that Person A was “heavily intoxicated and that her judgement and decision-making ability was impaired”. The Tribunal had, earlier in its judgment (at paragraph 25.172.1) found that the Appellant's judgement was also “influenced by his own alcohol consumption that evening”. Notwithstanding that Person A was “heavily intoxicated”, the Tribunal rejected the contention that she was “vulnerable”. The Tribunal found that the allegation at paragraph 1.2.4 of Allegation 1.2 had not been proved: i.e. it concluded that the Appellant had not entered Person A's home without being invited in. In respect of the next part of Allegation 1.2, the Tribunal found that the Appellant knew he had not been invited in with a view to sexual activity. The Tribunal rejected the allegation that the Appellant had acted in abuse of his position of seniority or authority. It found instead that by engaging in sexual activity with Person A he had acted “inappropriately”.
Based on these findings the Tribunal went on to conclude that the Appellant's actions were a breach of Principle 2 of the 2011 Principles, the obligation to act with integrity, and also a breach of Principle 6 the requirement to behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in solicitors and in the provision of legal services.
The Tribunal's reasoning on these matters was as follows
“25.189 The Tribunal determined that the Respondent's conduct affected not only his personal reputation, but the reputation of the profession and thus was a matter that ought to bear the scrutiny of the regulator. In addition, the Tribunal found that whilst the subject matter and the particular circumstances of these proceedings was novel, the application of Principles 2 and 6 to a solicitor's private life was not. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that it was proper to assess whether or not the Respondent's conduct was in breach of the Principles as alleged.
25.190 That the Respondent had failed to maintain the trust the public placed in him by conducting himself in the way that he did, was clear. Members of the public would not expect a solicitor to conduct himself in the way that the Respondent had. Such conduct, the Tribunal found, would attract the approbation of the public [sic]. Accordingly, the Tribunal found beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent's conduct was in breach of Principle 6 as alleged.
25.191 When considering whether the Respondent's conduct lacked integrity, the Tribunal considered the oral and written testimonial evidence presented on his behalf. The Tribunal found that the Respondent's conduct had fallen below what was expected of him by members of the public and of the profession. The Respondent had accepted that his conduct had fallen below the standards expected by a partner at the Firm, by virtue of his acceptance of the final written warning. The Tribunal did not consider that the standards employed at the Firm were any higher than the standards of the profession in general. The Respondent had sought, in his evidence, to suggest that he considered that his standards had fallen below expectations on the basis that he was married. The Tribunal rejected that explanation. There was nothing in the final warning letter or any of the relevant investigatory documents that suggested that the Respondent's conduct had been assessed through the prism of his marriage. The fact of his marriage, whilst highly relevant to the Respondent personally, was irrelevant to the Firm's findings and irrelevant to the Tribunal's assessment of his conduct. For the avoidance of doubt, whilst it had been Firm's finding (and the Respondent seemingly accepted) that the Respondent's conduct had fallen below accepted standards, the Tribunal's finding was based on the evidence that it heard and not on the Firm's view of his conduct. That the Firm and the Tribunal were in accord in their assessment of the Respondent's conduct was, the Tribunal determined, indicative of the expected standard of conduct of the profession. Accordingly, the Tribunal found beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent's conduct was in breach of Principle 2 as alleged.”
Having set out those conclusions, the Tribunal decided that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dr Mxm v General Medical Council
...matters referred to in the paragraph above were not material. 60 Ms Barnfather relies on Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin) at [50] in which Swift J observed: “It is one thing to accept that any person who exercises a profession may need, for the purposes o......
-
Watson (Gareth) Application for Judicial Review and in the matter of The Police Service of Northern Ireland (Conduct) Regulations 2016 and The Police Service for Northern Ireland and The PSNI Professional Standards Department
...17 [64] Mr Skelt argues that there is no such duty expressed within the Code itself. He points to the authority of Beckwith v SRA [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin) which dealt with regulations enforced by the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority (“SRA”) in relation to the professional conduct of solicit......
-
Jon Frensham v The Financial Conduct Authority [2021] UKUT 0222 (TCC)
...to failings of professional integrity. 42. This issue was considered in the High Court’s recent judgment in Ryan Beckwith v SRA [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin), an appeal from a decision of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal The facts in this case were that the SDT found what it described as a ......
-
Maxine Barnes v Solicitors Regulatory Authority Ltd
...has exceeded the general ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.” 31 In Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the jurisdiction went “no further than to consider whether the tribunal's decision on costs reveals any e......