Samuel Collingwood Smith v Esther Ruth Baker
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Griffiths |
| Judgment Date | 17 August 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] EWHC 2176 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB-2020-001013 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
[2022] EWHC 2176 (QB)
The Honourable Mr Justice Griffiths
Case No: QB-2020-001013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Samuel Collingwood Smith (in person)
Esther Ruth Baker (in person)
Hearing date: 26 th July 2022
Approved Judgment
This action originally consisted of a claim and counterclaim but the Claimant's claims have been settled and the former Second Defendant has a result ceased to be a party. All that remains is a counterclaim by the First Defendant, Ms Baker, against the former Claimant, Mr Smith. In it, she claims and damages and injunctions in proceedings based on causes of action in defamation and harassment.
This is a hearing to consider (1) directions for the further conduct of the action (2) an application by Mr Smith to strike out or obtain summary judgment on Ms Baker's counterclaim and (3) an application by Ms Baker for relief from sanctions and an extension of time for her Reply, which was due on 29 April 2022 and served on 25 July 2022, which was the day before the hearing.
It is logical to take these in reverse order and I will do so (and re-number them, accordingly). Ms Baker's application will affect the state of her pleadings. That, in turn, is the proper basis upon which to consider Mr Smith's application to strike out Ms Baker's claim or for reverse summary judgment against Ms Baker. Directions for the further conduct of the action will only be necessary if I decide not to strike out Ms Baker's claim and not to grant reverse summary judgment against her.
Both Mr Smith and Ms Baker have conducted these proceedings as litigants in person. As litigants in person, they are subject to the same rules as any other litigant. Per Lord Sumption in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] USKC 12 at para 18:
“…lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court. The overriding objective requires the courts so far as practicable to enforce compliance with the rules: CPR rule 1.1(1)(f). The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties. In applications under CPR 3.9 for relief from sanctions, it is now well established that the fact that the applicant was unrepresented at the relevant time is not in itself a reason not to enforce rules of court against him: R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 2472, para 44 (Moore-Bick LJ); Nata Lee Ltd v Abid [2015] 2 P & CR 3, [2014] EWCA Civ 1652. At best, it may affect the issue “at the margin”, as Briggs LJ observed (para 53) in the latter case, which I take to mean that it may increase the weight to be given to some other, more directly relevant factor. It is fair to say that in applications for relief from sanctions, this is mainly because of what I have called the disciplinary factor, which is less significant in the case of applications to validate defective service of a claim form. There are, however, good reasons for applying the same policy to applications under CPR rule 6.15(2) simply as a matter of basic fairness. The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter's legal rights, under the Limitation Acts for example. Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which apply to any step which he is about to take.”
Although they are both litigants in person, both Mr Smith and Ms Baker have some knowledge of the law. Mr Smith is not a qualified lawyer but he holds a Master's degree in law. Ms Baker is also not a qualified lawyer but she is studying for a law degree with the Open University. Moreover, in these and in other proceedings to which I will shortly refer, Mr Smith and Ms Baker have previous experience of the practice and procedure of the courts, including the Media and Communications List.
Baker v Hemming
In 2018, Ms Baker issued proceedings against John Hemming in the Media and Communications List claiming defamation in respect of publications online and in the Daily Mail. Mr Hemming admitted that the ordinary and natural meanings of these publications included that Ms Baker was a liar who had maliciously made up false allegations of rape against him, and that she was a fantasist who had made false allegations about the sexual abuse of children. By his counterclaim, Mr Hemming also brought his own claim of defamation against Ms Baker. These details, and others to which I will refer, are from the judgment of Steyn J in Baker v Hemming [2019] EWHC 2950 (QB).
After close of pleadings, Mr Hemming issued an application seeking to strike out Ms Baker's Defence to Counterclaim and for summary judgment on the counterclaim and dismissal of the claim. These applications were heard by Anthony Metzer QC, sitting as a High Court Judge, on 15 April 2019. He resolved them by ordering Ms Baker to amend her pleadings, and ordered Ms Baker to pay Mr Hemmings' costs.
Ms Baker did amend her pleadings but Mr Hemmings exercised the right, granted to him by the Order of Anthony Metzer QC, to revive his applications against her. Although Mr Smith was not a party to this action, he provided a witness statement which was relied upon by Mr Hemming (para 27 of the judgment of Steyn J).
On 5 November 2019, Steyn J granted Mr Hemming's application in part: Baker v Hemming [2019] EWHC 2950 (QB). She struck out parts of Ms Baker's pleadings. She gave judgment for Mr Hemming on his defamation counterclaim, based on the ordinary and natural meaning “that [Mr Hemming] raped and sexually assaulted [Ms Baker], then stalked and defamed her to cover it up” and that he had “committed other rapes and is a serial rapist” (paras 14 and 128(h) of the judgment of Steyn J).
She also ordered that Ms Baker's defamation claim was to be struck out unless she served yet further amended pleadings.
Steyn J's judgment provided a summary (at paras 30–33), with quotations (at para 32) from the version of Practice Direction 53 in force at that time, of the particular requirements of a pleading in a defamation case and of the provisions for striking out and summary judgment. She recognised Ms Baker's difficulties in representing herself, but said “it is obvious that merely repeating what she had already been informed was inadequate could not, on any view, comply with paragraph 7a of the Order [of Anthony Metzer QC]”.
Steyn J referred to Ms Baker's reliance upon a letter dated 9 April 2019 from Dr John Stevens, a Consultant Psychiatrist. She said (at para 49):
“This letter is not a report that complies with CPR Part 35. Nor does it address the question whether the Claimant had capacity to litigate…”
Steyn J made the point that the defects of Ms Baker's pleadings subsisted notwithstanding specific opportunities which had been given to her by Anthony Metzer QC to remedy them. Steyn J decided that these defects meant that the Practice Direction 53 para 2.1 requirement that the defendant be informed of the case he had to meet were not satisfied.
I am not aware of subsequent steps in in the case of Baker v Hemming but I do know that it remains on foot although it has not yet been tried.
Lavery v Baker
In January 2018, Andrew Lavery issued proceedings against Ms Baker in the County Court at Newcastle on Tyne. Mr Lavery claimed damages and an injunction against Ms Baker under section 3(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 as a result of what he contended was a campaign of online abuse directed at him by her on Twitter.
The case was tried before His Honour Judge Mark Gargan who gave judgment on 13 November 2019 (the “Gargan Judgment”). Judge Gargan identified 20 allegations of harassment against Ms Baker. Of these, one was abandoned and three were dismissed, but the remaining 16 were all found proved against Ms Baker. Judge Gargan found that Ms Baker's conduct was “vindictive, obsessive and unpredictable”; and that her harassment had been “particularly malevolent” and “part of a sustained campaign” (Gargan Judgment para 122). Ms Baker's victim, Mr Lavery, was a survivor of child sexual abuse who had core participant status at the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. He suffered from complex PTSD. The Gargan Judgment found (at para 112) that he suffered further damage as a result of the harassment from Ms Baker. Judge Gargan decided that Ms Baker “has demonstrated a facility to convince herself that whatever she is saying at the time is correct” and “even if she is honest, she is certainly not reliable” (para 49). Her evidence “bore little or no resemblance to the assertions made in her witness statement” (para 45).
Mr Smith relies on these findings in support of a submission that Ms Baker's reputation is such that her claim in defamation is weak. They do not, however, appear to me to be relevant to the procedural points which I have to consider first.
These proceedings
The Claim Form in these proceedings was issued on 12 March 2020. The Defence and Counterclaim in its original form by Ms Baker was dated 6 June 2020.
Judgment of Master Sullivan on 20 October 2020
On 8 July...
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John Alexander Melvin Hemming v Sonia Vanessa Poulton
...what he had said was true. On 17 August 2022, Griffiths J granted the Third Party summary judgment on the counterclaim: Smith v Baker [2022] EWHC 2176 (QB) at [64]–[95] and 19 The Third Party also brought a claim against Muhammed Naeem Butt, for whom the Defendant works in a freelance capa......