Sassy Garcia v Arima Door Centre Holding Company Ltd
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Leggatt |
| Judgment Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] UKPC 31 |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Docket Number | Privy Council Appeal No 0069 of 2021 |
[2023] UKPC 31
Lord Briggs
Lord Kitchin
Lord Leggatt
Lord Stephens
Lord Richards
Privy Council Appeal No 0069 of 2021
Privy Council
Trinity Term
From the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Appellant
Navindra Ramnanan
(Instructed by Magna Mentes (Trinidad))
Respondent (written submissions only)
John Jeremie SC
(Instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton LLP (London))
Heard on 4 July 2023
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal upholding an order for possession of land at 10 Farfan Street, Arima, in Trinidad and Tobago (“the property”). The appeal turns on the correct interpretation of section 9 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1846 (“the Act”) and its application to the facts found in this case, being the sole issue on which the Board granted permission to appeal.
The claimant (and respondent to the appeal) began this action to recover possession of the property from the appellant on 18 May 2012. Although other defences were originally raised, the only one that remains relevant is the appellant's contention that the action was begun after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by section 3 of the Act, with the result that the claim is barred and the claimant's title to the property has been extinguished. Section 3 provides:
“No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within sixteen years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to some person …”
Section 22 provides that, at the end of this period of 16 years, “the right and title of such person to the land or rent for the recovery whereof such entry, distress, action, or suit respectively might have been made or brought within such period shall be extinguished.”
The trial judge, Rampersad J, found as facts that: (i) the property was let to the appellant's father (without any written lease) as a monthly tenant on 16 September 1971, with each period commencing on the first day of the month; (ii) in 1982 the father registered the tenancy under the Rent Restriction (Dwelling-Houses) Act; (iii) after the father died, the appellant's mother was served on 29 March 1996 by the then owners with a notice to quit, to expire on 30 April 1996; (iv) the appellant and her mother nevertheless continued to occupy the property; (v) on 23 August 1996 the rent still outstanding for the months of March and April 1996 was paid; (vi) apart from that payment, no rent has been paid since 30 April 1996; and (vii) the claimant acquired the title to the property from the previous owners by a deed dated 5 March 2012.
The judge dealt with the effect of the notice to quit on two alternative bases. He found that, upon the death of the appellant's father, the statutory tenancy vested in her mother and that, if the notice to quit was sufficient to determine the statutory tenancy, the tenancy came to an end on 30 April 1996. Alternatively, if the notice to quit was not sufficient to determine the statutory tenancy, it came to an end when the appellant's mother died in March 2002.
As counsel for the appellant, Mr Ramnanan, has pointed out, the claimant's pleaded case, not disputed by the appellant, is that the tenancy was terminated, at latest, by the notice to quit served on 29 March 1996. The claimant has never sought to argue that the appellant's mother had a right to retain possession of the property after 30 April 1996, by reason of any statutory tenancy or otherwise. The Board therefore proceeds on the basis that the tenancy came to an end on that date.
The Act is modelled on the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 enacted in England and Wales (“the 1833 Act”) and it has not been suggested that (apart from the length of the limitation period) there is any material difference between the two statutes or their legal effect. In Trinidad and Tobago, as in England and Wales, the basic rule is that, if a person has been in uninterrupted possession of land for the statutory period without the consent of the owner, an...
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