The Constitution Unit, University College, London, Scotland’s Parliament: Fundamentals For A New Scotland Act
| Date | 01 September 1998 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00124 |
| Published date | 01 September 1998 |
| Author | Dylan Griffiths |
596 REVIEWS
SCOTLAND’S PARLIAMENT: FUNDAMENTALS FOR A NEW
SCOTLAND ACT
The Constitution Unit
University College London, 1996. 175 pp. £10
The Constitution Unit’s report on devolution for Scotland reflects the maturity of the debate
on this topic, at least in comparison with devolution for Wales or the English regions. Unlike
the reports on devolution for Wales or the English regions, which were published simul-
taneously with this report, there is little discussion of arguments for devolution in principle
or of the internal workings of a settlement in Scotland, how a Parliament would operate and
what it might actually do. Instead there is more discussion on the possible relationships
between a Scottish Parliament and the rest of the political system. Much of this maturity comes
not only from the merits of the authors of this report or of the large Consultative Group in
Scotland they dealt with, but also from the fact that a great many wise heads have pondered
over the intricacies of Scottish devolution since the 1970s. The report often explicitly refers to
the Scottish Devolution Bills of the 1970s, Dewar’s Devolution Bill of 1987 and, of course, the
work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. The deliberations of all these bodies and per-
sons means that there is, by today, a great deal of agreement among what might be termed
‘progressive opinion’ in Scotland on the main elements of a devolution package for Scotland.
This report reflects that consensus.
If that was all that could be said for this report then it might be left unread, save by those
who wanted a concise introduction to Scottish devolution and the wider issues it raises. How-
ever, the Constitution Unit has wisely used its independent status to be a critical friend to a
government which wishes to create a Scottish Parliament as part of a wider package of consti-
tutional reform and has sought to discuss how much detail might be needed in a draft Scottish
Devolution Bill and what elements might need to be added or subtracted to make the pro-
posals work in practice. Here, the report is prepared to describe and face difficulties squarely,
in contrast sometimes to the Scottish Office’s White Paper on devolution, Scotland’s Parliament,
published in the summer of 1997. The Constitution Unit report is blunt about the potential
difficulties concerning the financial provisions of Scottish devolution and calls for mechanisms
to examine need and expenditure throughout the nations and regions of the United Kingdom
to be established as part of a devolution settlement. This seems like sound good sense.
Although, as the report states, it will take a measure of goodwill on all sides to make devol-
ution in the United Kingdom work, structures can facilitate the bargaining and negotiation that
will inevitably take place. Also, the Constitution Unit is clearer about the logic of devolution to
a Scottish Parliament and the implication of redundancy this has for the position of Secretary
of State for Scotland in the longer run, a logical consequence the government either rejects or
refuses to acknowledge. Generally though, the extent to which this report reads like a prospect
of the White Paper of the same name is remarkable. An enforced pause for thought of over
twenty years duration has not been altogether in vain and this report reads like a accurate a
distillation of that prolonged reflection as I have seen.
Dylan Griffiths
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998
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