The New Public Management And A New Accountability
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00111 |
| Author | Peter Barberis |
| Date | 01 September 1998 |
| Published date | 01 September 1998 |
THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND A
NEW ACCOUNTABILITY
PETER BARBERIS
There has long been a disparity between the practice and the neo-Diceyan doctrine
of accountability in British central government. This article shows that the New
Public Management (NPM), while not itself the root cause of such disparity, has
nevertheless both exacerbated and further exposed existing fault-lines. This much
is evident from an examination of NPM’s theoretical bearings and from brief case
studies of the Child Protection Agency and the Prison Service. Reflecting broad and
deep-seated forces, the NPM is unlikely to disappear. Thus although there are cer-
tain attractions in retaining neo-Diceyan assumptions, it may be more appropriate
to reconstruct the formal doctrine. Drawing upon Spiro’s notion of ‘multicentric’
accountability and within the context of calls for wider constitutional reform, the
article sketches the basis for a new doctrine, having regard to relevant moralities
and practicalities.
INTRODUCTION: THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
Accountability is an old and tricky subject. It has been and is likely to
remain a salient factor in the day-to-day conduct of government and in the
efficacy of parliamentary democracy. The formal doctrine of accountability
in British government remains in the shadow of A.V. Dicey (1959) and those
writers who followed in his wake during the earlier and middle decades
of the present century (Low 1914; Jennings 1966). Briefly stated it is that
ministers are accountable to the public, via Parliament, for their own
decisions and for the work of their departments; civil servants are account-
able internally – and only internally – to their political chiefs. As
embellished by Sir Ivor Jennings (1966, p. 149), the doctrine means that
ministers cannot blame their civil servants when things go wrong because
‘if the minister could blame the civil servant, then the civil servant would
require the power to blame the minister.’ Such, according to Jennings,
would violate the impartiality and anonymity of the civil service, so
undermining the authority of democratically elected ministers. And if min-
isters are impaired, so too is Parliament since it is through ministers that
Parliament seeks to bring the executive to account.
Largely for these reasons successive governments have clung doggedly
Peter Barberis is Reader in Politics in the Department of Politics and Philosophy at Manchester
Metropolitan University.
Public Administration Vol. 76 Autumn 1998 (451–470)
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA.
452 PETER BARBERIS
to the Diceyan and neo-Diceyan notion of accountability. For example the
Major government reaffirmed that: ‘it is Ministers who are accountable to
Parliament for all that their Departments do, including the work of their
executive agencies’ (Cabinet Office 1994, para. 2.29). The Civil Service Man-
agement Code, derived from the 1985 Armstrong Memorandum, reflects the
Ivor Jennings orthodoxy: ‘the Civil Service . . . has no constitutional person-
ality or responsibility separate from the duly constituted government of the
day’ (HM Treasury 1993, section 4, annex A, para. 3). The Osmotherly Rules
have been redrafted but retain the injunction that: ‘officials who give evi-
dence to Select Committees do so on behalf of their Ministers and under
their direction’ (OPSS 1994, para. 38). Inasmuch as there is a judicial dimen-
sion it resides in Carltona v. Min. of Works ([1943] 2 ALL ER 560). Here
the judge held that the minister was justified in delegating to a civil servant
certain powers bestowed upon him (the minister). This ruling the judge
reconciled with the traditional (Diceyan) doctrine in that the minister was
subject to a direct and active accountability to Parliament, not only for the
actions of civil servants but also for his own decision as to whom to del-
egate. But what if civil servants are now less anonymous – if the official
machine has, by design or otherwise, assumed something of a constitutional
‘personality’? What if ministers can and have blamed civil servants; and if,
on occasion, civil servants have returned fire? What if the lines of account-
ability are unclear – or, more specifically, if, as has been claimed, the
Carltona principles can no longer be taken for granted (Freedland 1996)?
At the least it implies some impediment in the system and reason to think
that the reality of accountability rests at (further) variance with the for-
mal doctrine.
There is now quite widespread acknowledgement that the traditional
notion of ministerial responsibility is itself no longer satisfactory and can
no longer serve as the sole constitutional touchstone of accountability
(Woodhouse 1994, p. 39; Tivey 1995; Pyper 1996). Accepting Sir Robin But-
ler’s distinction between accountability (providing an answer) and
responsibility (liability), Sir Richard Scott appeared to legitimize the split-
ting of the constitutional seam between ministers and officials when, at the
end of his lengthy inquiry into the sale of arms to Iraq, he observed:
If ministers are to be excused blame and personal criticism on the basis
of the absence of personal knowledge or involvement, the corollary
ought to be an acceptance of the obligation to be forthcoming with infor-
mation about the incident in question. Otherwise Parliament (and the
public) will not be in a position to judge whether the absence of personal
knowledge and involvement is fairly claimed or to judge on whom
responsibility for what has occurred ought to be placed (Scott 1996a, vol. IV,
k8. 16 – italics added).
This interpretation seems to imply that constitutional responsibility may be
borne by officials as well as by ministers and that it is of some importance
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998
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