The role of social structure for governing natural resources in decentralized political systems: Insights from governing a fishery in Indonesia
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12586 |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Author | Rijal Idrus,Philipp Gorris,Marion Glaser,Andi Yusuf |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The role of social structure for governing natural
resources in decentralized political systems:
Insights from governing a fishery in Indonesia
Philipp Gorris
1
| Marion Glaser
2
| Rijal Idrus
3
| Andi Yusuf
3
1
Institute of Environmental Systems Research
(IUSF), University of Osnabrueck, Germany
2
Social Science Department, Leibniz Centre for
Tropical Marine Research (ZMT), Germany
3
Marine, Coastal and Small Islands Research
and Development Center (MaCSI), Hasanuddin
University (UNHAS), Indonesia
Correspondence
Philipp Gorris, Institute of Environmental
Systems Research (IUSF), University of
Osnabrueck, Barbarastr. 12, 49069
Osnabrueck, Germany.
Email: philipp.gorris@uni-osnabrueck.de
Funding information
Financial support was received from the SPICE
III Project (grant number: 03F0643A) funded
by the German Ministry for Research and
Education (BMBF); from the Leibniz Centre for
Tropical Marine Research (ZMT) in Bremen,
Germany; and from the Alexander von
Humboldt (AvH) Professorship for
Environmental Economics of the University of
Osnabrück (UOS).
This empirical research investigates whether distinct network con-
figurations between actors facilitate or impede successful local nat-
ural resource governance in decentralized political systems.
Network analysis is applied to disentangle the interaction between
actors involved in a decentralized fishery governance system in
Indonesia from a polycentric perspective. Using an embedded net-
work case study design, the study examines whether common
interaction patterns are observed in local study sites with more
successful governance outcomes compared to study sites with less
successful outcomes. Three common patterns are identified:
(i) higher frequency of interaction of local actors, and (ii) stronger
activity of local non-governmental actors in the polycentric gover-
nance network are found in the sites with more successful out-
comes. Furthermore, the results show (iii) a higher centralization of
the local governance networks with rent-seeking actors in strong
brokerage positions where highly unsustainable resource use pre-
vails. This points to the existence of a ‘dark side’of brokerage.
1|INTRODUCTION
This study investigates whether, and if so how and why, distinct network configurations among actors facilitate or
impede successful local natural resource governance in decentralized political systems. The work of Elinor Ostrom
and colleagues emphasizes the effectiveness of self-organization for governing natural resources (see Ostrom 1990;
Dietz et al. 2003). Their research shows that local governance approaches based on cooperation are often better
suited for addressing the roots of unsustainable resource use thancentrallyorganizedsolelygovernment-driven approaches
(Ostrom 1990, 1999; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Moreover, centralized organization of natural resource mana gement
based on strong coercive control is often associated with high levels of bureaucratization and costs (Lemos and Agrawal
2006). Catalysed by these insights, decentralization and increased stakeholderinvolvement have emerged as important tools
to better address natural resource problems (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Applying these tools, however, does not automati-
cally lead to the emergence of effective local rules (Schlager and Ostrom 1999; Berkes2007; Ostrom 2007).
Received: 12 May 2017 Revised: 13 December 2018 Accepted: 15 December 2018
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12586
654 © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm Public Administration. 2019;97:654–670.
Numerous actors engage in today’s localized governance processes in their attempt to resolve existing natural
resource problems (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The governance of natural resources, in contrast to traditional notions
of government, encompasses the formal and informal means of conceiving and exercising authority and power
(Larson and Soto 2008), and takes into account the interactive process among different governmental and non-
governmental actors through which natural resource policy and/or other effective means of steering the use of natu-
ral resources are formulated and implemented (Pahl-Wostl 2009). The interactions among the relevant actors in
these processes form relatively stable, distinct network structures (Carlsson 2000). Recent research suggests that the
particular shape of these network structures plays a key role for enabling (or constraining) governance actors to
effectively deal with natural resource problems (see Bodin et al. 2016; Bodin 2017) .
This empirical research analyses the interaction between actors involved in decentralized natural resource gover-
nance to investigate whether common network structures are observed in local study sites with more successful gov-
ernance outcomes compared to study sites with less successful outcomes. A polycentric perspective is adopted to
account for the nestedness of local governance endeavours in the wider political system (see Ostrom 1990; Berkes
2007; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Social network analysis is used to examine the interaction between actors
involved in a decentralized fishery governance system in Indonesia. The results provide empirical evidence highlight-
ing the role of relational structure between actors for explaining (un)successful local natural resource governance in
decentralized political systems. Importantly, this study shows the value of looking beyond the local level for under-
standing which, and why, distinct network configurations among actors facilitate, or impede, the successful institu-
tionalization and maintenance of effective local rules.
1.1 |Governing natural resources in decentralized political systems
The notion of decentralization typically refers to the ‘transfer of power from the central government to actors and
institutions at lower levels in a political–administrative and territorial hierarchy’(Larson and Ribot 2004, p. 3). Multi-
ple functions and responsibilities are bundled into what may be generally called a governance unit (GU; e.g., a district
administration, a provincial administration) (see also Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Mandates in a GU are then func-
tionally divided among different government agencies that hold responsibility, a certain amount of (human and finan-
cial) resources, and (semi-)autonomous decision-making spheres for a predefined policy arena, or sector, within a
certain territory as specified by the jurisdiction (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Yet, rather than fully localizing the gover-
nance of natural resources, decentralization in most countries has diffused responsibility and decision-making author-
ity across multiple levels in the political system (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). This commonly results in what is called a
nested polycentric governance system (Ostrom 2010).
Developed in the 1960s to contradict the then prevailing wisdom that public service provision in metropolitan
areas should be organized in a hierarchicaland centralized way (Ostrom et al. 1961), today’s notion of nested polycen-
tric governance describes political systems wherein multiple GUs are dispersed throughout a decentralized political
system in which the division of tasks and responsibilities between the multiple quasi-autonomous decision-making
centres nested across administrativelevels overlap (Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014; Car-
lisle and Gruby 2017). Scholars argue that concerted effort in such nested polycentric governance settings nurtures
diversity, facilitates dynamic responses and allows for greater flexibility compared with a political system wherein
authority is centralized (McGinnis2011). Moreover, the idea of nested polycentric governance resonates with the rec-
ommendation that complex natural resource problems should be addressed at multiple geographical scales simulta-
neously to better account for spatial socioeconomicand ecological interdependencies (see Young 2002).
Organizing natural resource governance in decentralized political systems with overlapping authority of multiple nested,
quasi-autonomous decision-making centres (hereinafter referred to as polycentric governance) necessitates interaction among
the numerous relevant actors to arrive at coordinated and successful governance endeavours (Andersson and Ostrom 2008;
Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016). Different government agencies are responsible for separate but
often interdependent and sometimes conflicting policy arenas or sectors within a given jurisdiction (e.g., conservation of
GORRIS ET AL.655
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