THEORIZING AND EXPLAINING VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTABILITY
| Published date | 01 September 2014 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12058 |
| Date | 01 September 2014 |
| Author | CHRISTEL KOOP |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12058
THEORIZING AND EXPLAINING VOLUNTARY
ACCOUNTABILITY
CHRISTEL KOOP
Public organizations are not only subject to statutory obligations to give account, but they also
commit themselves voluntarily to additional accountability practices. What motivates the organi-
zations to do so? After all, such practices are costly to the organizations in a number of ways. This
study argues that public organizations opt for voluntary accountability for two main reasons: they
regard it as an appropriate practice and they respond to perceived legislative threats. Building on
these explanations, hypotheses are formulated on the variation in the degree to which organizations
voluntarily render account. These hypotheses are tested using new data on voluntary accountability
of 103 independent agencies in the Netherlands. The study finds that more voluntary account
is rendered by agencies which deal with more salient policy issues, by agencies which depend
on public funds, and by agencies with more staff. Agencies without legal personality render less
voluntary account.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, five Dutch independent executive agencies announced that they had
formulated a charter in which they agreed to render more account to stakeholders.1
In this Public Accountability Charter (Handvest Publieke Verantwoording), the organiza-
tions committed themselves to transparency, responsiveness, consultation, and quality
assessment. A few years later, the collective drew up the so-called Governance Code
for Public Service Providers (Charter Group for Public Accountability 2004). This code
of conduct included commitments to the publication of annual reports and complaints
procedures, the creation of websites with information on the task, structure, products,
and performance of organizations, and periodic evaluations by an external committee of
professional peers. None of these practices were legally required.
These voluntary practices are not unique to this group of agencies, but reflect a broader
trend towards the introduction of forms of accountability which are not provided for
in legislation, and which are often directed towards societal rather than state actors (cf.
Schillemans 2008; Meijer and Schillemans 2009; Potoski and Prakash 2011). The increase
in self-imposed accountability – practices that go beyond those required by law – is one
of the factors that have contributed to the expansion of accountability in established
democracies (Bovens et al. 2008, p. 225). As the practices are self-imposed, this study refers
to them as forms of voluntary accountability. Voluntary accountability is defined as the
degree to which an actor is, without being required to, committed to offering information
on, and explanation of, his or her own conduct to another actor, and may be sanctioned
for this conduct.
As voluntary commitments to accountability can be adopted as well as abandoned by
organizations, they are less coercive than provisions for mandatory accountability –thatis,
accountability requirements which are imposed on actors by law. They can, therefore,
not fully substitute mandatory accountability. Nonetheless, voluntary accountability to
stakeholders and professional peers does have added value in democratic systems as it
stimulates learning, and it facilitates the operation of fire-alarm oversight (Schillemans
Christel Koop is in the Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, UK.
Public Administration Vol. 92, No. 3, 2014 (565–581)
©2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
566 CHRISTEL KOOP
2008; on fire-alarm oversight, see McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).2Hence, it can contribute
to the democratic quality of public organizations and the quality of the democratic process.
Yet, though voluntary accountability may be valuable from a democratic perspective, it
does raise questions about the logic behind its introduction. Rendering account requires
time and resources, and makes organizations more vulnerable to criticism. The argument
that an instrumental rationality is at work is, therefore, not fully convincing. Instead,
a focus on the institutional environment of organizations points to two alternative
explanations. First, it is argued that organizations are driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’.
Hence, voluntary account is rendered because it is regarded as ‘natural, rightful, expected,
and legitimate’ (March and Olsen 2006, p. 689). Second, drawing insights from the
literature on self-regulation, voluntary accountability is argued to be a consequence of
legislative threats.
Building on these explanations, the study addresses the question under what circum-
stances public organizations render more voluntary account. Hypotheses are formulated
on five factors: issue salience, the nature of the organization’s competences, its source of
funding, its legal status, and its age. These are tested using new data on the voluntary
accountability of 103 independent agencies in the Netherlands. The question of account-
ability is particularly important for this category of public organizations. Like units within
ministerial departments, independent agencies exercise public authority – the authority
to decide on the rights and obligations of other legal subjects. However, unlike ministerial
units, the organizations are insulated from ministerial hierarchies and the electoral pro-
cess. Hence, they face more opportunities to shirk and misuse political power. Also, they
lack the possibility to legitimize their decisions by reference to the democratic process
(Majone 1999, p. 7). They are, therefore, often criticized for suffering a democratic deficit.
As voluntary accountability practices can contribute to the democratic quality of public
organizations, and can thus serve to ease the critique of democratic deficits, independent
agencies are likely cases of organizations that introduce these practices.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section elaborates on the two explanations
of voluntary accountability. In the third section, the question of variation in voluntary
accountability is addressed, and hypotheses on the effect of five factors are formulated.
In the fourth section, the voluntary accountability practices introduced by Dutch inde-
pendent agencies are described, and a composite measure of voluntary accountability is
created. In the fifth section, the explanatory and control variables are operationalized,
followed by the analysis of their effect on degrees of voluntary accountability. In the last
section, the findings are discussed and reflected upon.
THEORIZING VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTABILITY
Commitments to voluntary accountability impose considerable costs on organizations. As
accountability involves the provision of information and explanation, it requires human
and financial resources. It may therefore even contribute to accountability overloads
(Bovens et al. 2008). Furthermore, as accountability facilitates the external evaluation
of activities and decisions, it makes organizations more vulnerable to criticism from
stakeholders, politicians, and the media. Curtin and Meijer explain that since the media
are typically more interested in failure than in success, openness is likely to result in
negative press, which may damage an organization’s reputation (Curtin and Meijer 2006,
p. 118; cf. Hazell et al. 2012). Indeed, it is far from evident that more openness leads to
an increase in public understanding of, and trust in, public organizations (O’Neill 2006;
Public Administration Vol. 92, No. 3, 2014 (565–581)
©2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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