TRANSNATIONAL BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRY PERSPECTIVE ON EU NETWORK GOVERNANCE
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12252 |
| Author | MARTINO MAGGETTI,FABRIZIO DE FRANCESCO,EVA RUFFING,TOBIAS BACH |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12252
TRANSNATIONAL BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS:
AN INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRY PERSPECTIVE ON EU
NETWORK GOVERNANCE
TOBIAS BACH, FABRIZIO DE FRANCESCO, MARTINO MAGGETTI
AND EVA RUFFING
This contribution introduces our symposium by highlighting four distinctive aspects of transna-
tional governance from a bureaucratic politics perspective: the emergence of transnational
institutions, their functioning, their impact on the domestic level, and the diffusion of regula-
tory standards. The general argument is that many accounts of transnational governance seem to
be overly optimistic about the conditions for effective problem-solving and fail to take into account
that institutional rivalry may either support or constrain the implementation of supranational
policies. The aim of this piece is to review existing research, to highlight the contribution of the
symposium articles in furthering an institutional rivalry perspective on transnational governance,
and to sketch pertinent areas for further research building upon this perspective.
INTRODUCTION
This symposium focuses on administrative power struggles as an explanation for the
development, actual functioning and effects of transnational administrative networks in
the European Union (EU) and beyond. These networks address transboundary policy
problems, and they facilitate the functioning of the internal market of the EU. They are a
fundamental component of modern regulatory governance in the absence of centralized
coordination capacity at the global (Slaughter 2004) or EU level (Dehousse 1997). Such
transnational networks are composed of specialized domestic ofcials and regulators who
directly interact with each other, often with minimal ministerial supervision (Raustiala
2002 ). Recent research has addressed the emergence of networks of national regulatory
agencies as a means to deliver coherent implementation of EU policies (e.g. Coen and
Thatcher 2008; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Maggetti and Gilardi 2014). Moreover, the
literature on EU agencies – which often work as hubs for networks of national agen-
cies – also provides insights into the structures, processes and effects of transnational
governance (Dehousse 1997; Egeberg 2006; Levi-Faur 2011).
Yet, as much of the literature focuses on functional explanations, taking network-
building and effective coordination for granted as a result of functional necessities
(e.g. Majone 1997), we still lack systematic empirical knowledge on the actual develop-
ment, functioning and effects of transnational networks (Kelemen 2002; O’Toole 2015).
The functional perspective has been complemented by recent research highlighting the
inuence of political interests on transnational governing structures (Groenleer 2011;
Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Blauberger and Rittberger 2015). However, the strategic
motivations of administrative actors have hitherto not played a major role in theoretical
and empirical research on transnational governance (but see Thatcher 2011; Groenleer
2014). This is surprising, considering that bureaucratic self-interest and resulting turf
TobiasBach is at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway. Fabrizio De Francesco is at the School
of Government & Public Policy,University of Strathclyde, UK. Martino Maggetti is at the Institute of Political and Inter-
national Studies, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Eva Rufng is at the Department of Political Science, Leibniz
University Hannover, Germany.
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 1, 2016 (9–24)
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
10 TOBIAS BACH ET AL.
battles are considered major impediments to bureaucratic coordination at the national
level (Wilson 1989; Peters 1998; Heidbreder 2014). The bureaucratic politics approach
elaborated in this contribution synthesizes existing research on the emergence, actual
functioning, and effects of agency networks and networked governance and suggests
directions for further research. It builds upon and further develops existing research
viewing institutional design as power struggles between national and supranational
interests, and it provides theoretical underpinnings based on the institutional interests
of executive bodies regarding the conditions under which transnational cooperation is
likely to solve pressing policy problems.
The aim of this article is to systematically shed light on the ‘administrative factor’ in
transnational network governance. First, we uncover the role of bureaucratic politics, i.e.
the institutional interests of public sector organizations and networks thereof, in the emer-
gence and change of institutions of transnational governance. This contribution argues
that functional explanations which emphasize the need for transnational coordination fall
short of recognizing the role of bureaucratic politics in shaping cross-level interactions.
Transnational agencies (which are usually ‘networked agencies’) emerge in a crowded
environment consisting of various organizations all pursuing their own distinct interests,
which will affect the politics of institutional design.
Second, we claim that the actual functioning and the effectiveness of transnational agen-
cies and networks can be fruitfully analysed through an institutional rivalry perspective.
Much of the literature analyses EU agencies and transnational networks as means to tackle
coordination problems, such as dealing with interdependent policy problems or ensuring
a consistent implementation of EU policies across member states. However, as evidenced
by scholarship on coordination within and between national bureaucracies, effective coor-
dination across organizations seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Arguably, this
is especially relevant in the case of voluntary coordination, as opposed to horizontal coor-
dination ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997). We therefore suggest considering
the institutional interests of national agencies to provide a more realistic picture of the
effectiveness of administrative coordination ‘after delegation’.
Third, there is a lack of systematic knowledge regarding the impact of the ‘transnation-
alization’ of executive decision-making on bureaucratic autonomy in the national setting
(Mastenbroek and Princen 2010; Yesilkagit2011). Egeberg and Trondal (2009) characterize
national agencies as double-hatted, meaning that they serve both ministerial departments
and the Commission. As members of transnational networks, national agencies keep ful-
lling many of their traditional tasks and have to deal with well-established political,
societal and economic actors. At the international level, though, they become part of an
entirely new constellation of actors and thereby potentially gain new channels of inuence,
but also have to face new restrictions (Rufng 2015a). As a result, the agencies’ parent min-
istries compete with the Commission over who controls the agencies (Egeberg and Trondal
2009). Moreover, the agencies’ participation in EU administrative networks strengthens
their role in domestic policy-making (Bach et al. 2015).
Finally, an analytical perspective emphasizing institutional rivalry provides additional
leverage for the analysis of the EU’s external governance, in particular with regard to
competition, diffusion and harmonization of regulatory standards in international trade.
Diffusion approaches typically adopt a macro perspective and understate actor-level
explanations. Nonetheless, as shown by Schulze and Tosun (2016) in this symposium,
institutional rivalry matters in diffusion studies, in two ways. On the one hand, rivalry
exists at the international level, with respect to standards inspired by different regulatory
Public Administration Vol.94, No. 1, 2016 (9–24)
© 2016 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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