Wealden District Council v McCreadie
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Nicol |
| Judgment Date | 03 March 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] EWHC 1120 (QB) |
| Date | 03 March 2017 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: IHQ/2016/0626 |
[2017] EWHC 1120 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
7 Rolls Buildings
Fetter Lane
London EC4A 1NL
Mr Justice Nicol
Case No: IHQ/2016/0626
Mr Beglan appeared on behalf of the Claimant
The Defendant appeared in person
COSTS JUDGMENT
(As Approvaed)
The claimant is the local planning authority. The defendant owns property to the southern side of London Road, Forest Row. By these proceedings the claimant seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting in breach of three enforcement notices relation to the land. At a hearing on 8 December 2016 the defendant gave certain undertakings and an interim order was made. Blake J gave directions for the hearing of the final trial of the claim, which came before me today. The defendant has applied for permission to appeal Blake J's order to the Court of Appeal. As I understand it, that application for permission has yet to be determined. A bundle of papers which the defendant, who has been acting in person, used for the Court of Appeal was made available to the present court and has been relied upon by the defendant in opposition to the claimant's application.
The first enforcement notice was issued by the claimant on 3 April 2014. It alleged that the defendant had materially changed the use of his land by parking, storing, repairing and selling motor vehicles from the land. The enforcement notice required these activities to cease and the removal of all vehicles and parts from the land. The defendant appealed against that notice. He relied on the following grounds under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 174(2): ground D, on the basis that the activities referred to in the enforcement notice had been continuous for at least ten years prior to the enforcement notice; ground F, that the steps required by the enforcement notice were excessive by comparison to what was necessary to remedy any injury to the amenity caused by the breach of planning control; and ground G, alleging that the period of three months allowed by the claimant for compliance with the enforcement notice was too short.
Each of these grounds of appeal was rejected by the inspector in his decision of 19 February 2015. He made some alterations to the wording of the enforcement notice, but I agree with Mr Beglan for the claimant that the changes were not material to any issue which I have to resolve. Mr Beglan draws attention to the fact that the appeal was not based on any of the following additional grounds set out in section 174(2): ground A, that planning permission ought to be granted for the development which was the subject of the enforcement notice; or ground C, that the defendant was already allowed to do what was alleged in the enforcement notice.
After the inspector's decision there was no further appeal or legal challenge. In those circumstances the defendant's duty was to comply with the notice. I understand that the defendant did in fact remove the cars which had been on the land up to the inspector's decision. Towards the end of 2014 the defendant brought a caravan onto the site, and by the beginning of 2015 he had started to live in the caravan. He told the council it was his main home. Around this time a domestic shed also appeared on the land. These actions led the council to issue two further enforcement notices on 19 June 2015. One of these further notices related to the caravan. It required him to stop using the land for stationing a caravan and required him to remove it from the land as well as various other associated articles. The other of these enforcement notices related to the shed. This notice required him to demolish and remove the shed and break up and remove any base on which it was founded. Each of these notices gave the defendant three months to comply; in other words, until 19 September 2015.
The defendant did not exercise his right to of appeal against either of these further enforcement notices. Accordingly, it was his duty to comply with them by the date in September to which I have already referred. In fact the claimant extended the time for compliance. However, the caravan remained, and on 19 July 2015 the defendant told the council that he did not intend to remove the caravan as it was no longer being used for residential purposes. In August 2016 the claimant inspected the site. It found that the shed had been removed but the caravan remained. These proceedings began with the issue of the claim form on 24 October 2016.
On about 14 November 2016 the claimant observed two things. First, the caravan had been removed from the land, but a number of cars and other vehicles, about 25 in total, had been brought back onto the land. As to this, Mr Beglan draws my attention to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 181(2), which says:
"…an enforcement notice requiring a use of land to be discontinued shall operate as a requirement that it shall be discontinued permanently, to the extent that it is in contravention of Part III; and accordingly the resumption of that use at any time after it has been discontinued in compliance with the enforcement notice shall to that extent be in contravention of the enforcement notice."
By a letter of 5 December 2016 the claimant advised the defendant that the presence of the vehicles was in breach of the first...
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