WORKERS‘ SELF‐MANAGEMENT AND ITS CONSTRAINTS: THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE
| Date | 01 March 1979 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1979.tb00629.x |
| Author | Joop Ramondt |
| Published date | 01 March 1979 |
WORKERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT AND ITS CONSTRAINTS:
THE
YUGOSLAV
EXPERIENCE
JOOP
RAMOND?
SELF-MANAGEMENT
in Yugoslavia is often described as experimental but in fact it
is
more
institutionalised than might be expected for an experiment. Large-scale experiments in
a
country which has placed control
of
production in the hands of the workers are
of
necessity unwieldy. Self-management does not permit the sails
of
economic policy to be
trimmed at will to sail round treacherous rocks. Self-management cannot be experi-
mental because it is difficult to make the economy
of
an industrially developing country
dependent on an experimental approach. Self-management
is
institutionalised, i.e. it
depends on a comprehensive system
of
rights and obligations which, formally, do not
differ greatly from one firm to another. The essence
of
these rules is that the highest
authority
of
a firm is given to the organs
of
self-management, while the managerial staff
and the management fulfil, respectively, the functions of providing services and carrying
out
policy.
The present article evaluates the research findings
of
a field-work study in four
Yugoslav enterprises. The firms are indicated as
C,
K,
V,
W, being the initials
of
their
Yugoslav names. The intention
of
our research was to find out
if
self-management was
observed in economic and social policy, especially
in
situations economically unfavour-
able
for
the firm. If there are deviations from the administrative model, this indicates
that the legal order has been infringed,
as
self-management
is
a legal obligation. We
asked what the reaction
to
this was, and also
if
the workers could expect the support
of
the party and trade union in those cases where the management and staff assumed
greater power than was provided for in the rules, and where the workers reacted by
going on strike.
The administrative structure
of
the Yugoslavian firm
is
dualistic. By this we mean that
there are two centres
of
authority, the policy authority (the organs
of
self-management)
and the executive authority (the management). This set up
is
institutionalised but it
is
clear that it is a flawed construction. The management and staff play a predominant
role
in decision-making and have more influence than one would expect. The workers have
far less
say
in decision-making and that too
is
unexpected. These findings corroborate
those
of
other researchers. For example Obradovii. came
to
the following conclusions:
(a) There was a discrepancy between the prescribed degree
of
workers’ participation
and the degree achieved which was wider than one would assume;
(b) Economic policy, especially when influenced by the market situation-sales
policy, consumer policy, financial policy, market planning etc.-was very much
under the influence
of
the specialists and the management-in Obradovic’s
terminology, the firm’s technocracy;
(c)ln all fields of policy, especially co-operation with other firms and in income
distribution, there was
a
close
connection between technocratic structure and the
political system.’
Our conclusions are based
on
an analysis
of
the economic and wage policies
of
four
firms. Both wages and economic policy were strongly centralised and the influence of
the central managerial staff and the management was great. The difference between the
two policy areas was that the workers’ councils had
a
greater chance
of
influencing
wagedpolicy. Wages touch the interests
of
the workers more directly
so
that their
tendency to exercise influence was also greater: and it is also an area in which every
*
Lecturer, Free University,
Amsterdam
83
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