WORKS COUNCILS AND THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY*
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1979.tb00628.x |
| Author | Heinz Hartmann |
| Published date | 01 March 1979 |
| Date | 01 March 1979 |
WORKS COUNCILS AND THE IRON LAW
OF
OLIGARCHY*
HEINZ HARTMANNt
HARDLY
any trauma has haunted the labour movement as persistently as has the fear
of
alienation between its leaders and their constituency,
or
the ‘masses’of old.
If
anything,
this fear has increased over the past several decades, with the growing need for ever
more elevated levels
of
organisation (e.g. at the European level). Even
if
the half-
decade
of
1967 to 1972 which in many countries was notorious
for
wildcat activities is by
now part
of
contemporary history, labour leaderscontinue to be very much aware
of
the
vigilante attitudes among activist employees and
of
past remonstrations against
‘remote’ officials in the movement. Recent instances
of
independent evaluation and
of
dissatisfaction with leadership performance, such as the rejection by German dock-
workers
of
the union suggestions for a collective contract,’ are analysed anxiously for
signs
of
a more general protest.
Meanwhile, social distance between upper and lower levels
of
labour continue to
increase. We intend to make this point by presenting new evidence on the professional-
isation of key members in German works councils. Works Councils, required by law in
all
business establishments with five employees
or
more, consist
of
employee represen-
tatives enjoying assorted rights
of
co-decision, consultation, and information. They are
elected by their fellow employees. German trade unions are not officially represented
inside the firm. The division of labour is such that trade unions are in charge
of
collective
bargaining on an industry-wide level while works councils are concerned with problems
specific to each enterprise.*
Members of the councils show a very high degree
of
trade union organisation, but
both formally and factually, in representing employees they follow their own interests
vis-a-vis
management. It seems well worth while to examine works councils for the
quality of their leader-membership relations. Both the legal design and the actual
situation would lead
us
to expect that relationships between employee representatives
and their electorate here would be very close; in a sense, the situation seems to allow for
but one level
of
hierarchy. Accordingly, opportunities for alienation should be poor
or
close to nil.
If,
therefore, we encounter instances
of
remote leadership in works councils,
such evidence would seem to be especially telling with regard to the pervasiveness and
penetration
of
trends toward social distance. There are some,
to
be sure, who are
suspicious
of
electoral relations even in this apparently favourable case. Resistance in
Great Britain against introducing works councils at the expense
of
the current system of
shop stewards partly seems to be rooted in fears that increased institutionalisation of
worker representation may be accompanied by increased aloofness from the shop
floor.
I
In
our
search for evidence, we shall be following a classical thesis: in 1911, Robert
Michels surmised that all organised groups were subject
to
the Iron Law
of
Oligar~hy.~
‘This contribution was prompted by
Jon
Clark’s criticism of my ‘highly questionable
.
. .
statement that co-determination has become yet another victim of Michel’s “iron law
of
oligar-
chy”
’(British Journalof Industrial Relations,
Vol.
16, March 1978, p. 130). He was referring to a
statement which
I
had made in the same journal three years earlier
(BIIR,
Vol.
13, March
1975,
p.
58). My present rejoinder
to
Clark’s one-sentence offensive may appear out of proportion. Since a
large amount of pertinent data has become available in the meantime, however,
I
prefer
to
enter
into a new discussion
of
the subject rather than confine myself
to
quoting the evidence which gave
rise
to
my former statement.
?Professor, University of Munster
70
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