Yuri Mendes v Secretary of State for the Home Department

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Freedman
Judgment Date25 January 2021
Neutral Citation[2021] EWHC 115 (Admin)
Docket NumberCase No: CO/2561/2019
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

The Queen on the application of

Between:
Yuri Mendes
Claimant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Defendant

and

The Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (Aire) Centre
Intervenor

[2021] EWHC 115 (Admin)

Before:

Mr Justice Freedman

Case No: CO/2561/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Becket Bedford and Mark Bradshaw (instructed by Instalaw Solicitors Limited) for the Claimant

David Blundell QC and Julia Smyth (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant

Simon Cox and Bojana Asanovic (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) for the Intervener

Hearing dates: 8 & 9 December 2020

Approved Judgment

Mr Justice Freedman

SECTION NUMBER

SUBJECT

PARAGRAPH NUMBER

I

Contents

II

Introduction

1–6

III

The facts

a) The Claimant

7–11

b) Notice of liability to deport

12–16

c) Events following notice of liability to deport

17–20

d) Deportation order

21

e) Events after deportation

22–36

f) The appeal

37–38

g) Judicial review and removal

39–42

h) Judicial review and application to return to the UK

43–52

i) Events since the Court of Appeal hearing

a) The CD2

53–64

b) Further statements of the Claimant dated 19 October 2020

65

c) The decision of the FTT to extend time for the Notice of Appeal

66–67

IV

The legal framework

68

a) Deportation — general

69–71

b) The Citizens' Free Movement Directive: procedural protection

72–74

c) The 2016 Regulations

70

V

Should the notice of liability to deport (the DLN) be set aside?

a) Introduction

77

b) The Source of the DLN

78–80

c) The factual inquiry

81–87

d) Was the DLN defective without more?

88

e) Was the DLN in effect a notice of deportation?

89–90

f) Was the DLN defective because it allowed for a decision to deport prior to the Claimant becoming an adult?

91

g) Was the DLN defective because its language led to the possibility of administrative detention against the Claimant before he was 18?

92

h) Was the DLN issued in bad faith with no intention to give an opportunity to state his case?

93

i) Was the Claimant entitled to legal representation at the point of service of the DLN?

94–99

j) The opportunity to make representations, the DLN and the decision to deport

100–115

VI

The overlap between the judicial review claim and the FTT appeal

116–122

VII

Events after the decision to deport/deportation notice

123

(1) The certification

124–126

(2) The Claimant's removal

127

(3) Damages for detention and/or removal

128–129

VIII

Mandatory injunction pending the statutory appeal requiring return/facilitation of return of the Claimant to the UK

130–152

IX

The roadmaps

153

a) Consideration of the roadmap of the Secretary of State

154–186

(b) Consideration of the roadmap of the Claimant

187–196

X

Conclusions

197–206

II Introduction

1

This is a case with a complicated procedural history. The Claimant, who is a national of Portugal, was deported to Portugal on 2 July 2019 following a decision to deport him and a deportation order made on 17 September 2018. He was at that time coming to the release date of a sentence of detention in a young offenders' institution (“YOI”) for 6 counts of robbery. The date of the decision was his 18 th birthday. About a month before his 18 th birthday, the Claimant was served with a notice of liability to deport (a “DLN”) whilst still at a YOI.

2

The Claimant's claim for judicial review arises out of the decision to deport and the deportation order each dated 17 September 2018, the regulation 33 certificate also dated 17 September 2018 and the earlier DLN made on 16 August 2018. An order is sought to require the Defendant to return or facilitate the return of the Claimant to the UK.

3

In recent months, there have been important developments. In July 2020, the Court of Appeal found that the regulation 33 certificate was unlawful but adjourned the judicial review and the question of a mandatory injunction to the Administrative Court. Since then, in September 2020, the Secretary of State issued a fresh certificate, albeit long after the deportation had taken effect. There had not been a notice of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) against the deportation order until at earliest 24 June 2019, many months out of time. On 19 October 2020, time was extended by the FTT for bringing the notice of appeal, but the hearing of the appeal was stayed until after the hearing before the Administrative Court.

4

There is before the Court a rolled-up hearing as ordered by Julian Knowles J on 9 September 2020 to determine:

(a) the Claimant's application to amend his grounds of claim;

(b) his application for relief in the form of a mandatory order returning him to the UK;

(c) the application for permission to bring the claim; and

(d) subject to permission, the claim itself.

5

This claim was heard over two days on 8 and 9 December 2020. Before the Court was a large amount of material. It includes 2 main bundles comprising about 1200 pages. It also comprises 2 bundles of authorities comprising 60 dividers which have been supplemented by more than 10 additional authorities. In addition to having the benefit of the submissions on behalf of the Claimant and the Secretary of State, the Court has received written and oral submissions on behalf of the Aire Centre.

6

The parties have been unable to agree a list of issues. At the start of the hearing, there were lists of issues of the Claimant and the Secretary of State respectively: The Intervener agreed with the list of the Secretary of State. In the course of the hearing, the Court asked for the issues to be reordered in what was called a roadmap so as to present the issues in a way that might reflect the order in which the Court would have to consider the issues. There were two roadmaps prepared, which are referred to in the last section of this judgment. The Court is very grateful to all Counsel for their respective expertise and experience and for their very carefully prepared written and oral submissions throughout the applications.

III The facts

(a) The Claimant

7

The Claimant, Yuri Mendes, is a national of Portugal. He was born on 17 September 2000. He came to the United Kingdom from Portugal with his mother and siblings. On his own account, he arrived in the UK in December 2013, although the Secretary of State has said that it was in 2014. As an EU national, he would have entered the UK on the basis of his right of free movement within the EU. The Secretary of State does not accept on either account that the Claimant gained a right of permanent residence before the date of the Deportation Order by virtue of five years' continuous residence under regulation 15(1) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (“the EEA Regulations 2016”)

8

A summary of the offending history of the Claimant was described by Murray J in his judgment of 15 August 2019 neutral citation number [2019] EWHC 2233 (Admin). Although Murray J's judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal [2020] EWCA Civ 922, it is still convenient to set out the history of the Claimant's offending as follows from para. 9 of Murray J's judgment in this matter as follows:

“Between 21 November 2015, when the Claimant was 15 years old, and 6 March 2018, he was convicted on five occasions for 12 offences:

i) On 21 November 2015 at Manchester and Salford Juvenile Court, he was convicted of possession of an article with a blade/sharp point on school premises. For that offence, on 26 November 2015, he was made subject to a 9-month referral order.

ii) On 7 July 2016 at Greater Manchester Juvenile Court, he was convicted of criminal damage and battery. For those offences, on 28 July 2016, he was given a 12-month youth rehabilitation order, with a supervision requirement and an electronically-monitored curfew requirement. He was also ordered to pay compensation of £250 and made subject to a 12-month restraining order.

iii) On 1 September 2016 at Greater Manchester Juvenile Court, he was convicted of attempted robbery. For that offence, on 22 September 2016, he was made subject to an 18-month Detention and Training Order (“DTO”), which was subsequently varied on appeal to a 12-month DTO. He was also ordered to pay compensation of £250.

iv) On 12 June 2017 at Greater Manchester Juvenile Court he was convicted of failing to comply with the DTO resulting from his conviction on 1 September 2016. He was fined £30.

v) On 6 March 2018 at Greater Manchester Juvenile Court he was convicted of six counts of robbery and remanded in youth detention accommodation, until he was sentenced on 27 March 2018 to [a] 12-month DTO.”

9

On 3 April 2018, nearly six months before his custodial sentence came to an end, the Claimant was attended by an immigration officer, an appropriate adult and his caseworker. The Secretary of State's CID records confirm that the deportation criteria were discussed and understood.

10

It was noted on 22 May 2018 that the Defendant reviewed the case and considered deportation was “justifiable and proportionate under the EEA Regulations”. This was before any invitation for representations by the Claimant.

11

On 10 July 2018, Ruth James from the Youth...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Selevicius v SSHD
    • United Kingdom
    • King's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 28 November 2022
    ...related to a future decision that might be taken. (See paragraph [127].) 53 Griffiths J distinguished the case of R (Mendes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ( AIRE Centre intervening) [2021] EWHC 115 (Admin). In that case Mr Justice Freedman concluded that a DLN is never “ a m......
  • The Queen (on the application of Marius-Costel Costea) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 24 June 2021
    ...of State, Home Office.” 24 This was a standard form; identical (I am told) to the DLN considered by Freedman J in R (Mendes) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 115 (Admin). (2) Part 2 – One-Stop Notice 25 The next document in the pack was a One-Stop Notice, which stat......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT