Zoe Phillips v Isleworth Crown Court
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lady Justice Thirlwall,Mr Justice Jay |
| Judgment Date | 21 March 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWHC 617 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/3260/2022 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2023] EWHC 617 (Admin)
Lady Justice Thirlwall
Mr Justice Jay
Case No: CO/3260/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Appellant in Person
The First Respondent was neither present nor represented
Simon Sandford (instructed by CPS) for the Second Respondent
Hearing date: 8 th March 2023
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 21 March 2023 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal by way of case stated from the decision of the Crown Court sitting at Isleworth (HHJ Wood sitting with justices) given on 27 th May 2022, in essence refusing the application by Ms Zoe Phillips (“the Appellant”) to vacate her pleas of guilty entered at the Westminster Magistrates Court on 2 nd July 2020.
This case has a lengthy and complex background which is covered in much detail in the voluminous papers before us, all of which I have read. However, the case stated procedure does not permit the type of wide-ranging inquiry sought by the Appellant. The role of this Court is limited to an examination of the terms of the case stated and the full judgment of the Crown Court, and then to answer the question of law that has been posed. To the extent that the Appellant's case amounts to an assertion that the Crown Court's conclusions of fact were irrational, this Court will need to examine the key features of the evidence that was adduced, but by no means all of it, in order to determine whether her appeal is made out.
THE CASE STATED
I begin by setting out the terms of the case stated dated 30 th August 2022:
“1. On or before 25 th July 2020 a complaint was preferred by the Second Respondent (“the CPS”) against the Appellant that she had harassed her former partner Neil Cross and his new partner, Serena Williams.
2. On 2 nd July 2020 the Appellant pleaded guilty to the offences before justices sitting at the Westminster Magistrates Court and on 30 th July 2020 was sentenced by District Judge Rimmer to a Community Order together with restraining orders.
3. An appeal against the decision of the Justices was made by the Appellant to the Crown Court at Isleworth, which appeal was concluded on 27 th May 2022.
4. We found the following facts: see paragraphs 9–17 of the full Judgment dated 27 th July 2022 below.
5. It was contended by the Appellant that she had been unfairly pressurised into pleading guilty at the last minute by her then solicitor and barrister and that her pleas were equivocal.
6. It was contended by the Respondent that there was no unfair pressure by her lawyers and that her pleas were not equivocal.
7. We were referred to the following cases: P. Foster Haulage Ltd v Roberts [1978] 2 All ER 751.
8. We were of the opinion that she had not been unfairly forced into pleading guilty and that her pleas were not equivocal, and accordingly refused the appeal.
QUESTION
9. The question for the opinion of the High Court is: were we correct in law to refuse the application by the Appellant to vacate her pleas of guilty entered at Westminster Magistrates' Court on 2 nd July 2020?”
It was unnecessary for the case stated to record that the Appellant was sentenced to a community order in relation to the two harassment offences. Two restraining orders of unlimited duration were imposed. The sentence is not the subject of any appeal before this Court.
I do need to correct or clarify the case stated in four respects. First of all, the hearing on 2 nd July 2020 was not before Justices but District Judge Nicholas Rimmer, now HHJ Rimmer. That mistake is not material. Secondly, the date of the full judgment was not 27 th July but 7 th July. Thirdly, the Appellant was sentenced not by District Judge Rimmer on 30 th June but by a lay bench. Again, that mistake is immaterial. Fourthly, the procedural history is not entirely clear, but it appears that after District Judge Rimmer refused to re-open the Appellant's case under s. 142 of the MCA 1980 on 14 th May 2021, she filed an appeal against conviction and sentence; and that the primary ground of her conviction appeal was that her guilty pleas should be set aside. Her case came before the Crown Court for the hearing of the conviction appeal on 28 th April 2022. The case continued into a second day, 29 th April and there was a further hearing on 6 th May, at the conclusion of which the Crown Court reserved its judgment. What was described as a short judgment was handed down on 20 th May. On 27 th May the Crown Court heard the appeal against sentence. One way or another the main issue for the Crown Court on the hearing of the appeal was whether the Appellant should be permitted to vacate her guilty pleas on the grounds that I have summarised. The Crown Court examined that issue for itself rather than conducted a review of District Judge Rimmer's decision.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CROWN COURT
Following the provision of the short judgment and at the Appellant's request, on 7 th July HHJ Wood provided what he called a full judgment on the application to revoke pleas.
In the full judgment the Crown Court explained that it had heard evidence from Stephen Bennett and Aneurin Brewer, the solicitor and the barrister who represented the Appellant below, and from the Appellant and a witness called on her behalf, Colonel Dr Godbold who had attended the hearing below. There was also evidence from DC Ali although we were told that she remembered very little of what happened in Court on 2 nd July 2020. There was a mass of documentary material some of which the Crown Court summarised. The full judgment noted that the governing law was not in dispute. There were two situations where a plea might be vacated. The first was where it was equivocal, “where a defendant pleads guilty but it is clear that he/she should not be doing so because, for example, there is an available defence. It can be described as a “guilty but … plea”.” The judgment further explained, with reference to a passage in Blackstone at D12.99–102 and a further passage in Archbold at 2–146, that the equivocality or ambiguity derives from the words used by the defendant in court. The second is where there is improper pressure from the defendant's legal representative. Here, the judgment explained that counsel has a duty to advise, if necessary in forceful terms, on the strength of the evidence and advantages of guilty pleas as regards sentence. However, and by way of paraphrase, there is a distinction between a reluctant plea on the one hand and an involuntary plea on the other, where the advice “was so very forceful as to take away the defendant's free choice” (this was a direct citation from para D12.102 of Blackstone, summarising Peace, noted in [1976] Crim LR 119). Again, the judgment referred to the relevant passage in Archbold.
As I have said, the trial of the harassment allegations was fixed for 2 nd July 2020 after an earlier hearing was vacated. Mr Bennett was instructed on 29 th June and the papers were sent to counsel. There was a lengthy conference which took place remotely on 30 th June. I will be examining the documentary materials in due course, but it seems clear that whereas at the start of the conference the Appellant was intending to continue to plead not guilty, by the end she appears to have come round to the view that, subject to the outcome of an application to adjourn the hearing, she should plead guilty.
The Crown Court's interpretation of the documentary evidence, mostly in the form of emails, was that in the undoubtedly pressurised period leading up to the hearing the Appellant was reluctantly agreeing to plead guilty, at least subject to a satisfactory basis of plea being agreed with the prosecution. It was only on the morning of the hearing that the basis of plea was agreed. The Appellant was aware of its terms.
After the basis of plea had been resolved and the case was called on, there was a conflict of evidence before the Crown Court as to what occurred. The Appellant's evidence was that when the charges were put again, she said: “Sorry, apparently guilty”. Colonel Dr Godbold's recollection was that she said to one charge only, “Presumably guilty”. Counsel's evidence was that he could not recall what was said although he heard nothing untoward. His oral evidence before the Crown Court was that if the experienced district judge had heard anything which might undermine or qualify the guilty pleas, he would have intervened. The Crown Court had been sent notes of the proceedings below (in the circumstances I will be coming to explain) but these did not assist. The Crown Court's conclusion was:
“Nobody in Court appears to have reacted when she was re-arraigned. Even if something of the sort was said in addition to “guilty” we find that it could not amount to an equivocal plea. In our view, the answers to the three questions posed in Foster Haulage (supra) are in the negative.”
The Crown Court observed that after the hearing it was clear that the Appellant was bitterly disappointed at what had happened in Court and wanted to revoke her pleas. The full judgment indicates that the Appellant may not have understood the difference between a basis of plea and a plea in mitigation.
The Crown Court's overall conclusion was that the evidence of the lawyers was to be preferred over the Appellant's. In short:
“We found Stephen Bennett and Aneurin Brewer to be honest, competent lawyers who had tried their best for the Appellant without time on their side. There was undoubtedly pressure of time throughout those few days. We find no professional criticism of either of them....
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