Security for Costs Appeal in UK Law

It would be both discriminatory and unjustifiable if the mere fact of residence outside any Brussels/Lugano member state could justify the exercise of discretion to make orders for security for costs with the purpose or effect of protecting defendants or respondents to appeals against risks, to which they would equally be subject and in relation to which they would have no protection if the claim or appeal were being brought by a resident of a Brussels or Lugano state.

Returning to Part 25.15(1) and 25.13(1) and (2)(a) and (b), if the discretion to order security is to be exercised, it should therefore be on objectively justified grounds relating to obstacles to or the burden of enforcement in the context of the particular foreign claimant or country concerned. Insolvent or impecunious companies present a different situation, since the power under CPR Part 25.13(2)(c) applies to companies wherever incorporated and resident, and is not discriminatory.

It is not, however, sufficient to render a director liable for costs that he was a director of the company and caused it to bring or defend proceedings which he funded and which ultimately failed. Where such proceedings are bought bona fide and for the benefit of the company, the company is the real plaintiff.

12 but whether the evidence is sufficient in any particular case to satisfy the judge that there is a real risk of serious obstacles to enforcement, will depend on the circumstances of the case.

This is that a defendant should be entitled to security if there is reason to believe that, in the event of his succeeding and being awarded the costs of the action, he will have real difficulty in enforcing that order.

Alternatively, if the funds brought into court are to continue to be treated as those of the third party, there is no point in the exercise at all, because it will not benefit the respondent/judgment creditor.

First Mr Shuck had financed the whole of the trial process or been a party to the financing. Second this is a case in which a section 51 application must stand a considerable prospect of success. Their position is that when Mr Shuck has financed the trial and is financing the appeal, there is no reason why he should be allowed to conduct that appeal on a heads he wins and a tails they lose basis.