Strike out Proceedings in UK Law

First, where Simon Brown LJ speaks in paragraph (2)(ii) of the conduct of the proceedings, this is not confined as Mr Price submitted, to the conduct of proceedings after the issue of the claim, but includes the initiation of the claim itself. Secondly, at the interlocutory stage the test is an objective one. Lord Denning MR dissented; he considered the action was brought for the collateral purpose of cutting off the channels of distribution of the defendant's paper 'Private Eye'.

The courts exist to enable parties to have their disputes resolved. To commence and to continue litigation which you have no intention to bring to conclusion can amount to an abuse of process. Where this is the situation the party against whom the proceedings is brought is entitled to apply to have the action struck out and if justice so requires (which will frequently be the case) the courts will dismiss the action.

The first principle is that once a cause of action has been held to exist or not to exist, that outcome may not be challenged by either party in subsequent proceedings. Fourth, there is the principle that even where the cause of action is not the same in the later action as it was in the earlier one, some issue which is necessarily common to both was decided on the earlier occasion and is binding on the parties: Duchess of Kingston's Case (1776) 20 St Tr 355.

The principle in Henderson v Henderson has always been thought to be directed against the abuse of process involved in seeking to raise in subsequent litigation points which could and should have been raised before. There was nothing controversial or new about this notion when it was expressed by Lord Kilbrandon in Yat Tung.

agreed, reflect a more robust approach to litigants whose conduct is liable to subvert the overall fairness of the proceedings. Moreover, Ward L.J. was at pains to emphasise that the principles embodied in the CPR may justify a more robust approach to litigants whose conduct is liable to have that effect.

It is accepted on behalf of the defendants, however, in this court (and, if I may say so, properly accepted) that, on the present state of the authorities, including authorities in this Court, these proceedings ought not to be struck out unless an unequivocal affirmative answer can be given to the question: is there a substantial risk that a fair trial is impossible?Tested by that criteria, the district judge's conclusion that there was considerable doubt about whether there could be a fair trial—or that it was unlikely that there could now be a fair trial—does not, in my view, justify a strike out.

Although the judge paid lip service to this principle in his judgment, he did not to my mind provide adequate reasons why the present case was "a rare case". It was unfortunate that he was apparently not referred to In re Norris. In my judgment not only was he wrong as a matter of principle but also, as Mr. Sheehan submitted, he took into account and gave undue weight toinappropriate factors.