AGC Chemicals Europe Ltd v Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr D Pittaway QC |
| Judgment Date | 10 June 2010 |
| Neutral Citation | [2010] EWHC 3674 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: IHQ/10/0327 |
| Date | 10 June 2010 |
[2010] EWHC 3674 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MR D Pittaway QC
Case No: IHQ/10/0327
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
This is an application for a final order in proceedings brought by the claimants for injunctive relief under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 against the defendants. The claimants are five Japanese companies whose business is in the pharmaceutical or chemical industries. The defendants are animal rights activists. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty ("SHAC") and Animal Liberation Front ("ALF") are unincorporated associations and are represented by nominated representatives under CPR 19.6. Dr Gastone and Mr Webb were added as representatives, respectively for SHAC and ALF, by orders made by Irwin J on 17 December 2007 in these proceedings. The background to these proceedings is fully set out in the judgment which I handed down on 16 th March 2010 which I do not propose to repeat.
At the outset of the hearing Mr Lawson-Cruttenden applied for three of the individual claimants to be substituted to replace employees who had retired or were now working for the corporate bodies in a different capacity. I granted the applications to substitute Anne Harkin in AGC Chemicals, Folke KindI in Eisai and Dr Hirokawa in the Daichi cases. Written confirmation has been obtained in each of those cases from the individuals concerned that they are willing to be substituted as claimants for the outgoing employees.
I was informed by Mr Lawson-Cruttenden that Dr Gastone is unwell and has indicated by an e-mail on 25 May 2010 that he wishes to take no further part in the proceedings or to be considered a suitable representative for SHAC. Mr Lawson-Cruttenden has produced the correspondence between his firm and Dr Gastone since the hearing at which I entered summary judgment. Dr Gastone has not raised any matters relating to the proposed draft orders in the 5 cases following the directions I gave on 16 March 2010. Mr Lawson-Cruttenden informs me that Dr Gastone did appear at the hearing before HH Judge Seymour on 24 March 2010 of the final order in Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v SHAC but withdrew at lunchtime because of ill-health. On 2 June 2010 Dr Gastone sent a witness statement to Mr Lawson-Crittenden which repeats his position that he wishes to take no further part in the proceedings or to be considered a suitable representative for SHAC. No formal application has been made by him under CPR 19.6.3 to be removed as the nominated representative for SHAC.
It seems to me that Dr Gastone remains the nominated representative of SHAC for the purposes of these proceedings until such time as an application made by him under CPR 19.6.3 has been determined in his favour to remove him as a representative. Of course if he remains a representative it remains open to him to apply to vary or discharge the order. Before he had heard from Dr Gastone, Mr Lawson-Cruttenden wrote to the address on the court record for substituted service, which is also the address on the SHAC website, informing SHAC that Dr Gastone had not replied to correspondence following the judgment on 16 March 2010 and asking for information about future representation. No response has been received from SHAC.
The position of Mr Webb falls into a different category in that prior to the hearing on 9 February 2010 he had indicated by letter on 22 December 2009 that he would submit to an order in each case in a similar form to that made in the case of SmithKline Beecham PLC & Others v Greg Avery & Others [2009] EWHC 1488 (QB) made by Jack J on 26 June 2009. After the judgment I gave on 16 March 2010 there has been further correspondence between Mr Lawson-Cruttenden and Mr Webb relating to amendments to the draft order prepared by Mr Lawson-Cruttenden which are now agreed. Mr Webb was away on holiday until 25 May 2010 when he was written to and asked to confirm the content of the draft orders. No response has been received from Mr Webb.
Following their conviction for criminal offences at the Winchester Crown Court on 21 January 2009, Mr and Mrs Avery and Ms Nicholson are serving long sentences of imprisonment and have taken no further part in these proceedings. They were served with application notices and the witness evidence in support by letter dated 18 December 2009. Mrs Avery and Ms Nicholson have both indicated in writing to Mr Lawson-Cruttenden's firm that they do not wish to receive any further correspondence relating to these matters. No response has been received from Mr Avery.
I am asked on behalf of the claimants to make final orders in each of the claimants' actions against SHAC, Mr and Mrs Avery and Ms Nicholson. The draft orders are in substantially the same terms as the orders that have been previously made in SmithKline Beecham PLC & Others v Greg Avery & Others [2009] EWHC 1488 (QB) made by Jack J on 26 June 2009 and in Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v SHAC made by HH Judge Seymour QC on 24 March 2010. However, Mr Lawson-Cruttenden has drawn my attention to a number of matters where there are differences.
The only matter which requires consideration in this judgment relates to paragraph 4.2 of the proposed order which provides that the definition of defendant for the purposes of section 3(6) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 includes protestors. I am informed by Mr Lawson-Cruttenden that at the time the interim orders began to be granted in these cases, in particular substantive interim injunctions granted by Owen J on 13 October 2003, there was doubt that the provisions of the Act applied to corporate bodies who sought to bring proceedings on behalf of employees against animal rights organisations. The position was altered by an amendment to the Act contained in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 which came into force on 1 July 2005. Notwithstanding the amendment the interim injunctions granted by Owen J continued in the same form in these cases with only minor amendments.
The amendment to the Act in 2005 was explained by Jack J in his judgment in SmithKline Beecham PLC v Greg Avery which I adopted in paragraph 16 of the judgment I handed down on 16 March 2010 and, for convenience, repeat here:
"40. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 as from 1 July 2005. The scheme of the Act prior to amendment had been construed to provide protection from harassment for individuals only. I refer to DPP v Dziurzynski [2002] EWHC 1380 at paragraph 33 , and Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 at paragraph 19. It ivas submitted on behalf of the corporate claimants that the amendments permitted them to seek an order under the Act. This was denied on behalf of Mr Webb and Dr Gastone.
41. The scheme of the Act in relation to England prior to the amendment was that section 1(1) provided that a person must not pursue a course of conduct amounting to harassment of another, and which he knew or ought to have known would do so. By section 2(1) pursuing a course of conduct in breach of section 1(1) was made a criminal offence. Section 3(1) provided that a breach or apprehended breach of section 1(1) might be the subject of a civil claim by the victim. Section 3(2) referred to damages. By section 3(3), where an injunction had been granted and the 'plaintiff considers that the defendant has done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction', he might 'apply for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant'. Section 3(6) made breach of an injunction a criminal offence. Section 7(1) provided that reference to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress. Harassment is not otherwise defined.
42. The amendments to the Act are as follows. A new section 1(1A) provides that a person must not pursue a course of conduct which involves the harassment of two or more people, which he knows or ought to know would do so, and: "(c) by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned above)—(i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or (ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do." Section 2 was amended to make breach of section 1(1A) an offence. A new section 3A was inserted to enable any victim of an actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1A) by any person, or any person falling with section 1(1A)(c), to apply for an injunction restraining that person from harassing 'any person or persons mentioned or described in the injunction'. Importantly, a new section 7(5) was added as follows: "?(5) References to a person, in the context of the harassment of a person, are references to a person who is an individual." A new section 7(3A) provides that, if a person's conduct is aided, abetted, counselled or procured by another, that conduct shall additionally be taken to be the conduct of the other.
43. By section 5 and schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978, in a statute, unless a contrary intention appears, "Person" includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporated. 'That is the context in which section 7(5) is to he understood. Section 7(5) is necessary because otherwise there is the possibility that the sections of the Act including the...
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