Alex Foster Taylor v The Prosecutor General's Office of Florence
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Lane,Lord Justice Hamblen |
| Judgment Date | 06 November 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] EWHC 2938 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/293/2019 |
| Date | 06 November 2019 |
[2019] EWHC 2938 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Hamblen
Mr Justice Lane
CO/293/2019
CO/299/2019
Jonathan Hall QC, Benjamin Seifert and Emily Wilsdon (instructed by Lansbury Worthington Solicitors) for the Appellants
Hannah Hinton (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 17 October 2019
Approved Judgment
A. INTRODUCTION
The first appellant, Alex Foster Taylor, previously known as Pasquale Di Noto, and the second appellant, Victoria Foster Taylor, previously known as Catia Cannarozzo, appeal against the decision of District Judge Grant, sitting at Westminster Magistrates' Court who, on 17 January 2019, ordered the extradition of the appellants to Italy, pursuant to three European arrest warrants (EAW1, 2 and 3). EAW1 and EAW3 concern both of the appellants, whereas EAW2 concerns only the first appellant. Since EAW2 is not the subject of challenge in this court, the first appellant will, in any event, be extradited under it, in order to serve a sentence of imprisonment.
Permission to appeal was granted by Andrews J on 15 April 2019 in respect of two of the three grounds advanced by the appellants. On 8 October 2019, Sir Wyn Williams, sitting as a High Court Judge, ordered the application for renewal in respect of ground 1 (on which permission had been refused by Andrews J), to be “heard before the same court as considers the substantive appeal and, if permission is granted, the appeal shall be heard on all grounds”. In the event, the appellants did not seek to pursue before us the application in respect of ground 1.
EAW2 relates to the first appellant's conviction for offences which fell to be categorised as “swindling”, “racketeering and extortion” and “forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein”. In short, the first appellant created a false British Hong Kong passport and false British Hong Kong driver's licence; he defrauded the members of a musical band; and he extorted money from individuals by making threats of violence.
EAW1 and EAW3 relate to convictions of both of the appellants in respect of offences committed in 2008 and 2009. EAW1 concerns the bringing of a female victim “into a state of continual subjection, forcing her to perform (even illegal) activities entailing her exploitation”. The appellants took advantage of the victim's “particular credulity and psychological acquiescence” by, amongst other things, forcing her to have sex under the pretence that they were testing the victim's “physical and psychological resistance during the kind of training aimed at recruiting her as a secret service agent” (page 3 of the District Judge's decision). EAW3 concerns further offences committed against the victim, including forcing her to set up a sham company to cover the unlawful activity of the appellants; forcing the victim to commit multiple frauds; and submitting her to beatings, cigarette burns and other physical abuses.
The first instance court, the Assize Court of Florence, had acquitted the appellants in respect of certain offences relating to the victim, because that Court took an adverse view of the victim's credibility. On appeal to the Assize Court of Appeal, however, the Appeal Court took a different view of the victim's credibility and, as a result, convicted the appellants of offences in respect of which they had been acquitted by the first instance court.
The appellants then appealed to the Court of Cassation in Rome. In its judgment of 18 July 2017, the Court of Cassation found no error in the Appeal Court's assessment of the victim's credibility. The Court of Cassation did, however, find that the judgment of the Appeal Court regarding the offence of abduction of the victim fell to be set aside since, on the facts found by the Appeal Court, the victim could not be said to have been deprived of her physical freedom by actions attributable to the appellants (Cassation judgment, paragraph 5).
Criminal offences in Italy may be subject to limitation periods. In the present case, it is common ground that relevant limitation periods would continue to run, up to the time of the judgment of the Court of Cassation, notwithstanding the earlier convictions, provided that the grounds of challenge thereto were not found to be manifestly unfounded. This serves to explain the last part of the judgment of the Court of Cassation, which was as follows:-
“7. The fact that some of the proposed grounds are not manifestly unfounded means that the offences of fraud, personal injury, violence or threats to compel the commission of crimes and slander are now time-barred, and therefore, also with regard to them, but only to their criminal effects, the judgment must be set aside without delay in the aforementioned case. The remaining complaints must be dismissed, while in the light of the annulment granted the penalty imposed by the contested judgment must be re-calculated, without the need to refer the matter back to the court. In fact, the punishment for the relevant offences was calculated as an increase in its continuation. Therefore, the sentence for [the first appellant] must be re-calculated to eleven years and nine months of imprisonment while for [the second appellant] to five years and nine months of imprisonment.
FOR THESE REASONS
The contested judgment is set aside without delay only for the offences of fraud, personal injury, violence or threats to compel the commission of crimes and slander, as they are time-barred, and for the offence of abduction on the ground that there is no case to answer. The complaints regarding the civil effects in relation to the time-barred offences are dismissed.
The remaining complaints are dismissed and the sentences are re-calculated as follows:-
Eleven years and nine months of imprisonment for [the first appellant]; five years and nine months of imprisonment for [the second appellant.
So order, 18 July 2017.”
B. LEGISLATION
Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (case where a person has been convicted) provides as follows:-
“(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11) he must decide whether the person was convicted in his presence.
(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(3) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must decide whether the person deliberately absented himself from his trial.
(4) If the judge decides the question in subsection (3) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(5) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must decide whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial.
(6) If the judge decides the question in subsection (5) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(7) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must order the person's discharge.
(8) The judge must not decide the question in subsection (5) in the affirmative unless, in any proceedings that it is alleged would constitute a retrial or a review amounting to a retrial, the person would have these rights—
(a) the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he had not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so required;
(b) the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”
Section 21 of the 2003 Act (human rights) provides as follows:-
“(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11 or 20) he must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).
(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person's discharge.
(3) If the judge decides that question in the affirmative he must order the person to be extradited to the category 1 territory in which the warrant was issued.
(4) If the judge makes an order under subsection (3) he must remand the person in custody or on bail to wait for his extradition to the category 1 territory.
(5) If the person is remanded in custody, the appropriate judge may later grant bail.”
(2) The Framework Decision
The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, defines the European arrest warrant and the obligation to execute it as follows:-
“Article 1
…
1. The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.
2. A Member State shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.
3. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation in respect of fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.”
The Framework Decision 2009/299/HA of 26 February 2009 amended the 2002 Framework Decision in respect of decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at their trial. The following recitals are noteworthy for our purposes:-
“(1) The right of an accused person to appear in person...
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