Ann Power v HM Senior Coroner for Inner North London The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and Another (Interested Parties)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Nicola Davies,Lord Justice Lindblom |
| Judgment Date | 05 December 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] EWHC 3117 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/1364/2017,CO/1364/2017 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 05 December 2017 |
[2017] EWHC 3117 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE RT. HON. Lord Justice Lindblom
THE HON. Mrs Justice Nicola Davies DBE
Case No: CO/1364/2017
and
Mr Leslie Thomas QC (instructed by Hickman & Rose Solicitors) for the Claimant
Mr Paul Stagg (instructed by Directorate of Legal Service Metropolitan Police Service) for the First Interested Party
No representation or appearance by the Defendant or Second Interested Party
Hearing date: 21 November 2017
Judgment Approved
On 16 March 2017 the claimant issued proceedings pursuant to section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") seeking an order:
i) That the inquest touching upon the death of her husband, Mr Onese Power, be quashed; and
ii) A direction that a fresh inquest be held.
A Fiat was granted by the Attorney General's office on 7 February 2017 authorising the claimant to make the application.
The deceased, Onese Power, was born on 2 May 1946. He was married to the claimant and they had three sons. On 6 June 1997 the deceased was disqualified from driving for six months. At approximately 10:45 on 17 August 1997 the deceased was driving a Kawasaki motorcycle along Camden Road, NW1. He was travelling at an estimated speed of 60mph along a road with a speed limit of 30mph. He was observed by PC Collier, who was driving a liveried Vauxhall Cavalier, registration number N49 OUW and PC Heatley, who was the operating officer in the car. PC Collier and Heatley made efforts to stop the deceased. The Court was informed that the trigger for their efforts was the excessive speed of the motorcycle. A pursuit ensued over a distance of approximately three miles, which lasted approximately three minutes. At a left hand bend where Royal College Street, NW1, meets St Pancras Way and Farrier Street, the deceased's motorcycle left the carriageway and struck a bollard in the central reservation, as a result of which the deceased sustained fatal injuries. It is the claimant's case that the central issue is whether there was contact between the police car and the motorcycle prior to the collision with the bollard.
The inquest into the death of the deceased was held at St Pancras Coroners' Court on 18 February 1998 before a jury who returned an open verdict. The claimant was not legally represented at the inquest.
The claimant submits that a new inquest should be ordered on three grounds:
i) Irregularity of proceedings
The claimant did not receive disclosure of witness statements prior to the inquest despite a request for the same. Neither the claimant nor the jury were aware that PC Collier and PC Heatley had given identical statements five days following the fatal incident. A relevant witness was unable to attend due to ill health;
ii) Insufficiency of inquiry
There were failures:
a) to test the police vehicle at the speed at which it was travelling at the time of death in order to replicate the tyre marks found at the scene;
b) to forensically examine the damage to the police vehicle which could have been caused by contact with the motorcycle driven by the deceased.
iii) New evidence has become available which was not known at the time of the original inquest.
The defendant and the first interested party have filed Acknowledgements of Service and have indicated that they take a neutral stance in respect of this application. The second interested party has informed the solicitor of the first interested party that he is not seeking separate representation for the purpose of this hearing. At the hearing the first interested party provided written and oral observations upon the application but maintained the stance of neutrality. Two witness statements were submitted, one from DS Tina McLeod dated 6 November 2017 which records that the motorcycle was exported on 7 August 2009 and the police vehicle was stolen on 22 October 1998. A statement from Detective Chief Superintendent Paul Rickett provided updated information in respect of the Metropolitan Police Service Pursuit Policy first published in 1997.
In written submissions the claimant and the first interested party had raised the issue of the applicability of Article 2 ECHR. At the hearing both parties agreed that section 13 of the 1988 Act provided the relevant relief, so the arguments in respect of Article 2 were not pursued.
The law
The Coroners Act 1988:
"13 Order to hold investigation.
(1) This section applies where, on an application by or under the authority of the Attorney-General, the High Court is satisfied as respects a coroner ("the coroner concerned") either—
… (b) where an inquest or an investigation has been held by him, that (whether by reason of fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise) it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that an investigation (or as the case may by, another investigation) should be held."
The duty of a coroner was identified by Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe (ex parte Jamieson) [1995] QB 1 at 26:
"It is the duty of the coroner as the public official responsible for the conduct of inquests, whether he is sitting with a jury or without, to ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated. He is bound to recognise the acute public concern rightly aroused where deaths occur in custody. He must ensure that the relevant facts are exposed to public scrutiny, particularly if there is evidence of foul play, abuse or inhumanity. He fails in his duty if his investigation is superficial, slipshod or perfunctory. But the responsibility is his. He must set the bounds of the inquiry. He must rule on the procedure to be followed. His decisions, like those of any other judicial officer, must be respected unless and until they are varied or overruled."
The power contained in section 13(1)(b) is stated to be in very broad terms. A fresh inquest may be ordered where there is a possibility of a different verdict. In R (on the application of Sutovic) v HM Coroner for North London [2006] EWHC 1095 (Admin) per Moses LJ at [54–55]:
"54. The power contained in section 13(1)(b) is stated in very broad terms. The necessity or desirability of another inquest may arise by reason of one of the listed matters 'or otherwise'. Notwithstanding the width of the statutory words, its exercise by courts shows that the factors of central importance are an assessment of the possibility (as opposed to the probability) of a different verdict, the number of shortcomings in the original inquest, and the need to investigate matters raised by new evidence which had not been investigated at the inquest: see Re Rapier [1988] 1 QB 26, 34–35, 37H–38A, 39 per Woolf LJ and Simon Brown J; R v HM Coroner, Lincoln, ex p Hay 19 February 1987; R v HM Coroner, Coventry, ex p O'Reilly Times Law Reports 3 April 1996; and Re v Assistant Deputy Coroner for the Northern District of London ex. p Bloom [2004] EWHC 3071 (Admin). …
55. … In cases in which the court is satisfied that a different verdict is not possible or doubts that it would be, the fact that the deceased died in custody may be 'a compelling additional factor' ( R v West Sussex Coroner, ex p Homberg (1994) 158 JP 357, per Simon Brown LJ Transcript 26 January 1994, page 37) in concluding that a further inquest is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. This is because of the need (see paragraph [37] above) in such cases for an investigatory regime which will not only expose past violations of obligations under Article 2 but also promote measures to prevent or minimise the risk of future violations. The lapse of time since the death is a factor that has generally been seen as a factor against ordering a further inquest (see ex p Homberg and Re Tabarn 20 January 1998 (Div Court), per Simon Brown LJ Transcript page 10) but this is not always so: see Nicholls v HM Coroner for the City of Liverpool [2001] EWHC (Admin) 922, paragraphs 49–50, 59 per Sullivan J. In R v West Sussex Coroner ex p Edwards [1991] 156 JP 186, 190 it was stated that a new inquest may be ordered even if there is a high probability that the verdict would be the same."
The principles identified in the authorities, identified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, are of general application and are not confined to particular types of fatalities e.g. deaths in police custody.
Insufficiency of inquiry includes a failure by the Coroner properly and adequately to explore the circumstances surrounding the death and a failure to call sufficient evidence about the cause of the death, Howlett v HM Coroner for Devon [2006] EWHC 2570 at [17–20].
The scope of the investigation is not limited to a simple factual question as to the cause of death. There is a broader public duty to seek out and record as many facts concerning the death as the public interest requires, R v South London Coroner ex parte Thompson [1982] 126 SJ 625, and to assuage public anxiety, Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London v Channel 4 Television Group [2008] 1 WLR 945 at [7–9].
The issue is whether the interests of justice make a further inquest either necessary or desirable. HM Attorney General v HM Coroner of South Yorkshire (West) & Anor [2012] EWHC 3783 (Admin) per Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice at [10]:
"The single question is whether the interests of justice make a further inquest either necessary or desirable. The interests of justice, as they arise in the coronial process, are undefined, but,...
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