Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London v Channel 4 Television Corpn and another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE HON. MR JUSTICE EADY,The Hon. Mr Justice Eady
Judgment Date31 October 2007
Neutral Citation[2007] EWHC 2513 (QB)
Date31 October 2007
CourtQueen's Bench Division
Docket NumberCase No: HQ/07/922

[2007] EWHC 2513 (QB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN's BENCH DIVISION

Before

The Hon. Mr Justice Eady

Case No: HQ/07/922

Between
The Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London
Applicant
and
Channel 4 Television Corporation
Respondent
The Ritz Hotel Ltd
Interested Party

Jonathan Hough (instructed by the Solicitor to the Inquests) for the Applicant

Heather Rogers QC and Anthony Hudson (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton) for the Respondent

Thomas de la Mare (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the Interested Party

Hearing date: 26 October 2007

Approved Judgment

I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

THE HON. MR JUSTICE EADY The Hon. Mr Justice Eady
1

This application is made by Scott Baker LJ in his capacity as HM Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner West London (“the Coroner”). He is currently conducting inquests into the deaths of the late Diana, Princess of Wales, and Mr Dodi Al Fayed in the early hours of 31 August 1997. He seeks a witness summons against Channel 4 Television Corporation under CPR 34.4 to produce documents which he believes will shed light on the circumstances surrounding those deaths. The application was made on behalf of the Coroner by Mr Hough and supported by Mr de la Mare on behalf of an interested party, namely the Ritz Hotel.

2

Ms Rogers QC, appearing on behalf of Channel 4, has carefully set out the extent to which Channel 4 opposes the order. It is right to record that there have been continuing and constructive discussions between the Corporation's lawyers and those representing the Coroner. I was able to make an order on 19 October covering some of the material sought, in respect of which there was no dispute. The issues were further narrowed and on 26 October, after further refinement of the draft order in the course of the day, I was called upon to resolve the outstanding issues. I am grateful to counsel for the clarity of their submissions.

3

Before defining the extent of the dispute, I should refer to the terms of CPR 34.4. This provides the only means whereby the Coroner can obtain documents for the purposes of the inquests. Although the government is contemplating changes to the Coronial jurisdiction, which would include granting the power to obtain documents directly, for the moment a court order is required. CPR 34.4 embodies the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a witness summons in aid of an inferior court or of a tribunal. Counsel have all referred to the decision of Gross J in South Tyneside Borough Council v Wickes Building Supplies [2004] EWHC 2428, where the applicable principles (in the context of witness summonses relating to civil litigation) are summarised to broadly the following effect:

i) The object is to obtain specified documents, and a summons should not be used to obtain disclosure; nor should it be of a “fishing” or speculative nature.

ii) The production of the documents must be necessary for the fair disposal of the “matter” or to save costs.

iii) The fact that documents are relevant is not to be decisive.

iv) The fact that the specified documents may contain confidential information is not an absolute bar to production (although it is plainly a factor which must be taken into account).

4

Subsequently, other decisions have thrown further light on the matter. For example, in Tajik Plant v Hydro Aluminium AS [2006] 1 WLR 767 at [29] the degree of specificity was addressed in the Court of Appeal. The documents, or class of documents, must be sufficiently identified to leave no real doubt in the mind of the person to whom the summons is directed. Any doubts as to the adequacy of the description must be resolved in that person's favour.

5

I shall turn to the description in the present case shortly. It has, as I have said, been significantly narrowed in the course of discussions between counsel.

6

Meanwhile, however, I need to focus upon the distinctive nature of a coroner's inquest, which differs in fundamental respects from that of civil litigation of the kind which has been considered in the recent judicial observations to which I have referred. As with disclosure of documents, so with a witness summons directed to third parties, it is possible in the context of civil litigation to define both relevance and (to an extent) “necessity” by reference to the statements of case, where the issues are identified. There is nothing closely comparable in relation to a coroner's inquest, which is inquisitorial in nature. It is appropriate to have in mind the statement of the law contained in the Court of Appeal's judgment in R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 at p26:

“(14) It is the duty of the coroner as the public official responsible for the conduct of inquests, whether he is sitting with a jury or without, to ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated. He is bound to recognise the acute public concern rightly aroused where deaths occur in custody. He must ensure that the relevant facts are exposed to public scrutiny, particularly if there is evidence of foul play, abuse or inhumanity. He fails in his duty if his investigation is superficial, slipshod or perfunctory. But the responsibility is his. He must set the bounds of the inquiry. He must rule on the procedure to be followed. His decisions, like those of any other judicial officer, must be respected unless and until they are varied or overruled.”

7

In the case of the present inquests, the Coroner has clearly “set the bounds of his inquiry”, as is well known. He has set them widely and identified some 20 issues for consideration by the jury in due course. Moreover, he has especially in mind the legitimate purpose of allaying, or confirming, rumour and suspicion. This was recognised as an appropriate function of a coroner's inquest in, for example, R v HM Coroner for Western District of East Sussex, ex parte Homberg (1994) 158 JP 357, at 380–381. That is a major consideration for this Coroner and it is reflected in a number of issues he has already identified. It is common knowledge that some of the matters the Coroner wishes to explore, as exhaustively as possible, include whether there was any kind of conspiracy to murder or harm the Princess of Wales and/or Mr Al Fayed, and also whether security services were involved in any improper or unlawful activity in connection with the deaths. It goes without saying, not least because there have already been several inquiries into these matters, that any lingering concerns among sections of the public about such matters would only be confirmed or allayed following the most rigorous scrutiny.

8

Likewise with another factor to which the Divisional Court attached importance, in this very case, namely the need to address means by which lessons may be learned for the greater protection of the public in future: R (on the application of Paul and others) v Deputy Coroner of the Queen's Household and Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey [2007] EWHC 408 (Admin) at [37]-[40]. The particular matter under consideration was addressed at [39]:

“It is likely that there will be a recurrence of the type of event in which the paparazzi on wheels pursued the Princess and Dodi Al Fayed. It is not only members of the Royal Family and their friends who receive this unwelcome attention; any celebrity is vulnerable. Not only is the safety of the person pursued potentially put at risk but there may well be risk to bystanders. In our view, occurrences such as this are prejudicial to the safety of a section of the public. It is possible that this danger could be prevented by legislation or other means.”

I also take into account the issues discussed in R v Inner West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 3 All ER 139, 155, 164.

9

Factors of this kind illustrate, very clearly, why it is that the courts should be wary of trying slavishly to fit a coroner's inquest into the template of civil litigation, merely because it is in that context that the provisions of CPR 34.4 have so far been considered.

10

It may be that the overriding objective of the CPR requires economy and selectivity as to the deployment of even relevant issues and evidence, but that has little direct bearing on the Coroner's declared objective of obtaining an exhaustive picture of what happened on 30 and 31 August 1997, and of the surrounding circumstances, as well as the aftermath. An unduly selective or narrow approach to the evidence may hinder his task of allaying suspicions and/or of making any recommendation for the future.

11

Despite the close attention paid to these events over the years, there are significant gaps in the information available to the Coroner. There is, for example, little evidence, and no photographs, covering the journey between the Ritz and the Alma tunnel. Also, as to two of the paparazzi, none of their photographs has been obtained. Another subject to be addressed is whether a burglary at the premises of a M. Cherruault or a disturbance at the Big Pictures agency might have significance, as showing that someone was trying to get hold of the pictures to conceal what happened or for some other reason.

12

Thus it is that one finds the Coroner's questions tailored to far reaching considerations of this kind. It is not necessary for me to set them all out, but some are of particular relevance:

“… (iv) Whether the actions of the...

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