Barron MP and Others v Collins MEP

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Warby
Judgment Date16 May 2016
Neutral Citation[2016] EWHC 1166 (QB)
CourtQueen's Bench Division
Docket NumberCase No: HQ14D04882
Date16 May 2016

[2016] EWHC 1166 (QB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Mr Justice Warby

Case No: HQ14D04882

Between:
(1) Sir Kevin Barron MP
(2) Rt Hon John Healey MP
(3) Sarah Champion
Claimants
and
Jane Collins Mep
Defendant

Gavin Millar QC and Sara Mansoori (instructed by Steel & Shamash) for the Claimants

The Defendant in person, assisted by Mr Mullen as "McKenzie" Friend

Hearing date: 16 May 2016

Mr Justice Warby

Introduction

1

Listed for hearing before me today are two applications in this action for damages for slander and libel. However, the defendant has recently applied to stay further proceedings against her until after the European Parliament has expressed an opinion on whether the proceedings violate the immunities enjoyed by the defendant in her capacity as a Member of the European Parliament. It is clear that where a request for the Parliament to defend an MEP's immunity is made by the MEP, and the court is notified that the procedure to defend immunity is under way the Court is bound to stay its own process. In this case the grant of such a stay would risk a considerable waste of time and costs. That would not deter me from carrying out the duty imposed by European law, if I was convinced that it applied on the facts of the case. After argument however I have concluded, for the reasons which follow, that the point has not yet been reached at which I am duty bound to grant such a stay.

The factual and procedural background

2

The claimants are all Labour Party MPs for constituencies in the Rotherham area. The defendant is the MEP for Rotherham, a member of the UK Independence Party. The claim arises from a speech the defendant made at the UKIP Conference on 26 September 2014. The speech was broadcast live on the BBC Parliament channel, and republished in whole or in part on the UKIP website, Twitter, and the Press Association Mediapoint wire service.

3

The main theme of the speech was the then notorious sexual exploitation of children in the Rotherham area. The speech focused on the role of the Labour Party and referred to "the three Labour MPs for the Rotherham area".

4

On 20 April 2015 I tried two preliminary issues in the action: the meaning of the words complained of and whether they were a statement of fact, or an expression of opinion. At that time the defendant was represented by solicitors, RMPI LLP ("RMPI"), and Counsel, Ms Kate Wilson. I gave judgment on those issues on 29 April 2015: [2015] EWHC 1125 (QB). I held that the words bore three defamatory meanings about each of the claimants:

(1) That they knew many of the details of the scandalous child sexual exploitation that took place in Rotherham over a period of sixteen years, in the course of which an estimated 1,400 children were raped, beaten, plied with alcohol and drugs, and threatened with violence by men of Asian origin, yet deliberately chose not to intervene but to allow the abuse to continue. I held this to be an allegation of fact.

(2) That they acted in this way for motives of political correctness, political cowardice, or political selfishness. I held this to be an expression of opinion.

(3) That each was thereby guilty of misconduct so grave that it was or should be criminal, as it aided and abetted the perpetrators and made the Claimants just as culpable as the perpetrators. This too I held to be an expression of opinion.

5

The claimant made no application for permission to appeal against these conclusions.

6

On 26 May 2015 RMPI wrote to the claimants' solicitors in the following terms:

"OFFER TO MAKE AMENDS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH S 2 OF THE DEFAMATION ACT 1996

Dear Sirs

Barron and others v Jane Collins

The Defendant has instructed us to make an unqualified offer to make amends under section 2 of the Defamation Act 1996 to each of the Claimants.

The Defendant offers to

a) Make a suitable correction of the statement complained of and a sufficient apology to the Claimants

b) Publish the correction and apology in a manner that is reasonable and practicable in the circumstances and

c) Pay to the Claimants damages and their reasonable legal costs to be assessed if not agreed.

The Defendant intends to rely upon this offer in the event she needs to file and serve a defence."

7

This is a standard form of offer of amends. Section 3 of the Defamation Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act") sets out the consequences of accepting such an offer. In summary, no proceedings can be brought or continued by the claimant other than for the purposes of enforcing the offer of amends. For that purpose, if the parties cannot agree, the claimant can apply to the court for the determination of what sums should be paid by way of compensation and costs. The assessment is made on the same principles as the assessment of damages and costs in a defamation action.

8

By s 4 of the 1996 Act, an offer of amends is a defence to a defamation claim, if it is not accepted by the claimant, unless the claimant proves that the defendant "knew or had good reason to believe that the statement complained of" referred to the claimant, defamed him, and was false. These provisions have been held to impose, in substance, a requirement to prove malice. Claimants rarely decline an offer of amends.

9

On 27 May 2015 RMPI filed and served a Defence, settled by Ms Wilson. This relied on the offer of amends as a defence, asserting that it had been made and not withdrawn. At paragraph 9 it stated that "It is accepted that the claimants and each of them are entitled to compensation pursuant to the above offer of amends."

10

A number of points were made in the Defence relation to the assessment of compensation. Paragraph 11 asserted in mitigation of damages that most of the publishees were political opponents of the claimants, whose standing in their eyes was of little importance to the claimants. It was said that the publication complained of "did little damage to [the claimants'] reputations in the eyes of the public at large."

11

The Defence contained a statement of truth signed by Ms Rowland, solicitor for the defendant, as follows: "The defendant believes that the facts stated in the Defence are true. I am duly authorised by the defendant to sign this statement of truth."

12

By letter dated 28 May 2015 the claimants' solicitors wrote to RMPI stating that "our three clients accept your offer to make amends". They asked for proposals as to the steps to be taken by way of correction, apology and publication and sought "a realistic offer of compensation."

13

The parties did not agree on the amount to be paid by way of compensation. On 9 September 2015, therefore, the Claimants issued an application for the court to assess what was due ("the Assessment Application"). Statements from each claimant, made on 14 and 18 September 2015, were served in support of their damages claims. A hearing was listed for 18 December 2015. On 27 November 2015 the defendant made three witness statements in response, one in respect of each claimant. By this time the defendant had parted company with her solicitors and was acting as a litigant in person.

14

By letter dated 9 December 2015 the defendant made an application to "vacate the offer of amends" ("the Application to Vacate"). She stated that she had not instructed her solicitors to make any offer of amends; and that it was only after becoming a litigant in person that she had realised the effect of an offer of amends. She asked for her application to be dealt with on paper, without a hearing. On 15 December, however, Dingemans J directed that her application be listed for hearing on 18 December, before the Assessment Application.

15

On 16 December 2015 the defendant's PA emailed the claimant's solicitors to state that the Defendant was unwell and would not be able to attend the hearing. She then applied for an adjournment. On 18 December 2015, in the defendant's absence, HHJ Moloney QC granted her application to adjourn. He did so on conditions relating to service of medical reports. He also gave directions for the service by her of evidence in support of the Application to Vacate, and required her to give instructions to her former lawyers, waiving privilege in respect of the advice they gave her about the offer of amends and its consequences.

16

On 6 January 2016 the defendant made a witness statement in support of the Application to Vacate. In it she mentioned a number of defences which she stated would have been available to her had she contested the proceedings. One of these was immunity, on which she said this at [23–24]:

"23. The protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities 8 April 1965 Article 9 makes provision that "members of the Assembly shall not be subject to any form of inquiry, detention, or legal proceedings in respect of opinions expressed or votes cast by them in the performance of their duties." At all times the claimants have acknowledged that I was speaking in a political forum and in my capacity as an MEP. It is abundantly clear that I was acting in accordance with my duties as an elected representative for the people of Rotherham, which falls within my constituency. The trafficking and abuse of children has been debated by the Assembly and the rights of the child are enshrined throughout the European Union under Article 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon [2012]. As an MEP for Yorkshire and the Humber it remains my duty to demonstrate leadership within my constituency. To actively promote the welfare and interests of all my constituents, to scrutinise the performance of all those holding public office in my constituency and to challenge the poor behaviour...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Sir Kevin Barron MP and Another v Caven Vines
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • June 1, 2016
    ...I reserved judgment on that application. These events are explained in more detail in my judgment on Ms Collins' stay application, [2016] EWHC 1166 (QB). 14 This assessment hearing has therefore gone ahead without any prior examination of the impact of the Collins speech. But it is obvious......
  • Sir Kevin Barron MP and Others v Jane Collins Mep
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • February 6, 2017
    ...have just summarised and the reasons for the decisions to which I have referred are set out in detail in my judgments of 16 May 2016, [2016] EWHC 1166 (QB), 20 December 2016 (extempore, no neutral citation), 22 December 2016, [2016] EWHC 3350 (QB), and 27 January 2017 (written reasons att......
  • (1) Sir Kevin Barron MP v (1) Jane Collins MEP
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • February 15, 2018
    ...are readily available to the public: those given on 20 April 2015 (see [2015] EWHC 1125 (QB), (the Meaning Judgment)), 16 May 2016 ( [2016] EWHC 1166 (QB), (the Stay Judgment)), 22 December 2016 ( [2016] EWHC 3350 (QB), (the Application to Vacate Judgment)), and 6 February 2017 ( [2017]......
  • Sir Kevin Barron MP and Others v Jane Collins MEP
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • December 22, 2016
    ...immunity provided for by European law. My reasons for declining a stay at that point are set out in my judgment of 16 May 2016: [2016] EWHC 1166 (QB) ("my May judgment"). 4 On the morning of 17 May 2016, however, I was informed in writing by the Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee of t......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT