Sir Kevin Barron MP and Another v Caven Vines
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Warby |
| Judgment Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ15D00433 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
[2016] EWHC 1226 (QB)
Mr Justice Warby
Case No: HQ15D00433
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Gavin Millar QC and Sara Mansoori (instructed by Steel and Shamash) for the Claimants
The Defendant in person
My task in this judgment is to assess damages for a libel of the claimants published by the defendant via a broadcast TV interview in January 2015.
The claim
The claimants, Sir Kevin Barron and the Rt Hon John Healey, are Labour MPs for constituencies in the Rotherham area. The defendant, Caven Vines, was the leader of the UKIP group on Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council (RMBC).
As is well-known, Rotherham was at the centre of a child sexual exploitation scandal which came to prominence on the publication in August 2014 of a report commissioned by RMBC from Professor Alexis Jay. She concluded that over a sixteen year period some 1,400 children had been abused by Asian men. The first public accounts of the scandal emerged in September 2012, in articles by Andrew Norfolk published in The Times.
At lunchtime on 5 January 2015 Mr Vines gave a broadcast interview to Kay Burley on Sky TV. He was accompanied by the third Labour MP for the Rotherham area, Sarah Champion. She had been elected at a by-election in November 2012, as successor to Dennis MacShane. Mr Vines was challenged by Ms Burley about a UKIP campaign poster for the then current elections for Police and Crime Commissioner. It is what Mr Vines said in reply that has led to this libel action. The relevant parts of the interview were as follows:
"[Kay Burley] It was particularly unimpressive that UKIP used the fourteen hundred kids that had been abused over sixteen years for party political favour and actually put a poster together saying "1,400 reasons not to vote Labour". Haven't those kids suffered enough? Was that really appropriate?
[Caven Vines] The kids have suffered enough and whether it was appropriate or not I mean they did appalling …
[Kay Burley] Was it or not?
[Caven Vines] Well, I thought it was appropriate, yes. People need reminding. Those fourteen hundred kids had been abused and been let go by the Labour Council and the Labour MPs. They knew what were going off, most … not Sarah, because she's only the new girl on the block. But certainly the other two, not telling me they did not know. In fact MacShane in his book has openly said so. So yes people need reminding. We cannot forget that they let the kids down and they're still letting them down. There's still no arrests, what's going on? Nothing has altered so we need to get in there and blow it open. This has got to be done.
[Kay Burley] I don't know if Dennis MacShane said that in his book, I'll take your word for it but I haven't read it.
…
[Kay Burley] How are you going to change things for the better?
[Caven Vines] We've got this CSE problem. We've got to help these girls. We've got to rid the streets of these perpetrators …"
Judgment on meaning and liability
On 29 April 2015 I gave judgment on an application by the claimants for summary judgment for damages to be assessed: [2015] EWHC 1161 (QB). At paragraph [47] I determined the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of.
"… In my judgment the ordinary reasonable viewer of Sky News who saw and heard the Defendant's interview will have understood him to be saying (1) that the claimants knew for years most of what was going on by way of large-scale sexual abuse of children in Rotherham, and let it go on despite such knowledge; (2) that they thereby let down the children; and (3) that they were still failing to ensure that the perpetrators were brought to justice. Applying the principles I have identified, there can in my opinion be no doubt that these meanings are defamatory."
I held that the first meaning was factual, and the other two were expressions of opinion. I went on to consider whether to grant summary judgment, taking particular care in view of the fact that Mr Vines then, as now, was representing himself. I concluded that there was no defence to the claim with a realistic prospect of success. In relation to the points raised by Mr Vines I said this:-
54. The Defence contains nothing that could support a defence of truth to the first, factual defamatory meaning I have identified. The matters which the Defendant has put forward since the service of his Defence as supporting a defence of truth could not in my judgment begin to establish the substantial truth of that meaning. Mr Millar was justified in characterising the Defendant's criticisms of both Claimants as quite different in kind from the imputations conveyed by his words in the interview.
…
56. The Defendant has no need of an answer to the second meaning I have found, as it is one of which the Claimants do not complain. It does not seem to me, however, that it could be defended. The Defendant does not assert the existence of a sufficient factual foundation for that comment. As to my third meaning, that the Claimants were still failing to act, this is not materially different from the last part of the Claimants' meaning. It is essentially the suggestion for which the Defendant has apologised, and which he retracted, in paragraph 5 of his Defence. The Defendant has not sought to defend anything of that nature at the hearing of the applications.
…
57. In summary, therefore, the words complained of bore a defamatory factual meaning about both claimants which the Defendant says he did not intend to convey, which he does not seek to defend as true, and which in my judgment he plainly cannot defend as true on the basis of any facts that he has put forward. The words also conveyed a defamatory meaning which is or may be an expression of opinion about the claimants' alleged conduct, but is one of which the claimants do not complain. Thirdly, the words conveyed a defamatory opinion about the claimants' current conduct which the Defendant does not now seek to defend, but has withdrawn and apologised for. Thus far the case would appear to be one where the Defendant has no answer on liability even if he may have points to make in mitigation of damages."
I should perhaps add that Dennis MacShane's book ("Prison Diaries") did not "openly say" that the claimants had known of the CSE, or anything close to that.
In my April 2015 judgment I went on to consider whether, although he had not raised it, the defence of publication on a matter of public interest under s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 might be available to Mr Vines. It was obvious that the first of the two requirements of that defence was satisfied: the statement complained of was "on a matter of public interest". But the public interest defence is only available if the defendant shows that a second requirement is met: that he "reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest": s 4(1)(b). Whether that requirement might be established was a great deal less clear. I offered the Mer Vines an adjournment to take advice. But after taking time to consider the position he declined. I concluded I should grant summary judgment for damages to be assessed. Mr Vines did not resist that and indicated that he did not wish to appeal: see [69–70].
Mr Vines' second thoughts
Since then, however, Mr Vines has had second thoughts.
(1) In October 2015 he applied to Master Leslie for an order setting aside my judgment and order. He put forward a draft Amended Defence prepared by Counsel, advancing a public interest defence. That application was refused.
(2) In February 2016 Mr Vines made a similar application to Sir David Eady, this time asserting truth. Sir David dismissed the application, pointing out that the jurisdiction to re-hear a case which has been the subject of a final judgment is exercised only in exceptional circumstances, and that the proper route was to seek permission to appeal out of time: [2016] EWHC 605 (QB) [13–17].
(3) Undeterred, Mr Vines made a third attempt to set aside judgment at the outset of this hearing. Without issuing an application notice, and relying on a witness statement served the previous Friday, 13 May, he asked me to dismiss the claim and to award him damages. I dismissed that application for much the same reasons as Sir David Eady had dismissed the previous one. I pointed out that I had no power to grant an extension of time for appealing, even if there was a basis for doing so. Only the appeal court has that power: CPR 52.6(1). The claim for damages was of course misconceived.
It is not only procedurally abusive for a defendant in Mr Vines' position to accept the court's judgment and then to make repeated, procedurally misconceived, attempts to challenge it, it is also unreasonable and unfair to the claimants. Moreover, although this is not a question that arises at this hearing, it is fair to say that I did not detect in any of Mr Vines' documentation any basis for doubting that my decision on the summary judgment application was correct.
The Collins case
The assessment of damages in this action was to have taken place immediately after a hearing to assess the compensation due to these claimants and Sarah Champion MP, in a companion case, Barron & Others v Collins ("the Collins case"). In the Collins case the three Labour MPs have sued Jane Collins MEP for slander and libel in a speech ("the Collins speech") at the UKIP conference in September 2014. The Collins speech made similar defamatory allegations against the MPs, as...
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