Coleman v Magnet Joinery Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD SALMON,LORD JUSTICE STEPHENSON |
| Judgment Date | 08 October 1974 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1974] EWCA Civ J1008-4 |
| Date | 08 October 1974 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[1974] EWCA Civ J1008-4
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
(Civil Division)
(Revised)
Lord Salmon
Lord Justice Stephenson and
Mr. Justice Mackenna
(From: National Industrial Relations Court)
The APPELLANTS (Mr. R. Stephenson and Mr. B. Coleman, Applicants) appeared in person.
MR. ALEXANDER IRVINE (instructed by Messrs. Freedman & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
The facts of this case fall within a very small compass. The two appellants were formerly employed by the respondents. They were skilled craftsmen. The respondents factory was at Keighley, in Yorkshire, and the workers in that factory were all members of the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians. For many years prior to 1971 a "closed shop" had been operated in that factory. After the industrial Relations Act, 1971, came into operation a closed shop could no longer be imposed. Nevertheless the relations between the employers on the one hand and the union and the workpeople on the other were quite excellent, and by mutual agreement the closed shop was continued.
The two appellants, Mr. Coleman and Mr. Stephenson, became very dissatisfied with the union's efforts on behalf of the workers. According to the evidence which the Tribunal accepted, the vast majority of the workmen were completely happy with their wages, their conditions of service, and their hours. So were the employers. So was the union. The appellants took the view - which, in a free country such as this, they were perfectly entitled to press upon their fellow-workers and their union - that they ought to be paid more for doing less work. They may or may not be right; I do not know; it is immaterial. But one thing is certain: neither the appellants nor indeed any other minority has the right to override the majority.
Having failed to persuade the union or their fellow-workers that either the pay or the hours of labour and productivity ought to be respectively increased and decreased, they showed their displeasure with the union by refusing to pay their dues. By March, 1973, they had become seriously in arrear. According to the findings of the Tribunal, this caused a great deal of dissatisfaction and unrest among their fellow-workers. These, perhaps not unnaturally, thoughtit was grossly unfair that they should go on paying their union dues and that the appellants should be allowed to pay nothing towards the union; and they expressed their displeasure very clearly. According to the evidence, there were discussions between the appellants and the union representative and the management in which the appellants made it quite plain that they had no intention of paying the union dues, but they did offer to pay a like amount towards a charity. They may well have thought that the union would accept this offer, or it may have occurred to them that there was very little likelihood of the offer being accepted. Again, that is quite immaterial.
This is not (as was pointed out below) a case of some workmen in a factory that Operated a closed shop having a conscientious objection against belonging to any union and saying to their fellow-workmen: "Well, we are not seeking any financial advantage over you: we will go on paying an amount equal to the amount of any dues you pay to the union: we, however, because we have a conscientious objection against belonging to a union, will pay the amount to a charity". That is quite fair; it often happens and is not infrequently accepted. The appellants' attitude was quite different. It was: "You, the union, will not pursue a policy which we advocate: therefore you are not going to have any dues from us but we say that we will pay them to a charity". This certainly was not acceptable to the union. The case for the appellants is that it would have been acceptable to the body of workmen on the shop floor; and this really is the principal issue on the facts in this case.
On the 20th March, 1973, matters came to such a pitch that a large number of men stopped work at 1 p.m. They said that they were not prepared to go on working unless something was done about Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Coleman; it was not fair that these two should "not be paying their dues when the other workmen were doing so. However, after a short time they were persuaded to go back to work; butthey gave an ultimatum to the employers that unless appropriate steps were taken in respect of Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Coleman everyone was coming out on strike at 4 o'clock that afternoon.
Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Coleman, who have presented their case with clarity and moderation in this Court, say that the Tribunal ought to have drawn the inference that if either the officers of the union or the representatives of the management had said to the workmen "It is quite all right: go back to work this afternoon because although Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Coleman refuse to pay their dues to the union they say they are going to pay them to a charity", there would not have been any strike and all the trouble could have been avoided.
The Tribunal, having heard the evidence, made no such finding. In my view there was no evidence before them on which they could possibly have done so. If Mr. Coleman and Mr. Stephenson are right, nothing would have been easier than to call some of their fellow-workers to support the contention which they are now making. It is to be observed that two of the shop stewards gave evidence before the Tribunal. They never said anything, in chief, which would have lent the slightest support to the submission which is now being made. Moreover, Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Coleman refrained - whether inadvertently or on purpose I do not know - from asking them in cross-examination whether the men would have been satisfied if they had paid their arrears and future dues to a charity.
The appellants told this Court that letters had been written to six of their fellow-workers with a view to their giving evidence on behalf of the appellants before the Tribunal but that none of them turned up at the hearing. They then considered whether they should ask for an adjournment to enable them to issue subpoenas. They were told by the Chairman of the Tribunal that it was for them to decide but that it would probably be very wise not to subpoena the workmenbecause the fact that they had not turned up strongly suggested that they were not prepared to say anything in support of the appellants and indeed there was a real risk that their evidence might be adverse to the appellants' case; and if the appellants called those witnesses they would be bound by their evidence. It is therefore quite impossible for the appellants to succeed in this Court on the basis which they put forward, namely, that the Tribunal ought to have found that the workmen in the factory would have been perfectly prepared to call off the threatened strike if Mr. Coleman and Mr. Stephenson had said they would pay to a charity rather than to the union.
I confess I am not altogether surprised that no one was called to support the proposition which is now being put forward, because I should imagine that the fellow-workmen might have said: "Well, we are now paying our dues to the union: why should we not, instead, support our own pet charities rather than the union, if the appellants are allowed to do so?". If all the workmen did what the appellants proposed, the union would not have received any of its dues and would not be able to carry on; and the overwhelming majority of the workmen thought that the union was doing a very good job on their behalf and it was important that it should carry on.
In these circumstances, the respondents dismissed the appellants before 4 o'clock on the 20th March. Had they not done so, it is quite obvious, so the Tribunal have found, that there would have been a strike. That dismissal has been found by the Tribunal to have "been an "unfair dismissal", and there is no issue about that. It clearly was an "unfair dismissal"...
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... ... ) 3 April 2009, EAT Clancy v Cannock Chase Technical College [ 2001 ] IRLR 331 , EAT Coleman v Magnet Joinery Ltd [ 1975 ] ICR 46 , CA McBride v Scottish Police Authority [2016] UKSC ... ...
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PGA European Tour v Mr Scott Kelly
...not merely “possible”, but “capable of being carried into effect with success”, which can be traced to Coleman v Magnet Joinery Limited [1975] ICR 46 at 52B and C, has carried down through the authorities over the years since, and cannot be improved upon. 66. The word “provisional” to descr......
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Mr Scott Kelly v PGA European Tour
...not merely “possible”, but “capable of being carried into effect with success”, which can be traced to Coleman v Magnet Joinery Limited [1975] ICR 46 at 52B and C, has carried down through the authorities over the years since, and cannot be improved upon. 66. The word “provisional” to descr......
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