Culla Park Ltd v Richards

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EADY
Judgment Date31 July 2007
Neutral Citation[2007] EWHC 1850 (QB),[2007] EWHC 1687 (QB)
Docket NumberCase No: HQ05X02121,Case No: HQ05X0212
CourtQueen's Bench Division
Date31 July 2007
Between
1. Culla Park Ltd
2. David Lowes-Bird
3. Yvonne Lowes-Bird
4. Joshua Lowes-Bird
Claimants
and
1. David Richards
2. Phyllis Thomas (Aka Richards)
3. Karl Kristaps
4. Angela Kristaps
Defendants

[2007] EWHC 1687 (QB)

Before

The Honourable Mr Justice Eady

Case No: HQ05X0212

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN's BENCH DIVISION

Lorna Skinner (instructed by Douglas Jones & Mercer) for the Claimants

The First and Third Defendants appeared in person (also representing respectively the Second and Fourth Defendants)

Hearing date: 4 July 2007

Approved Judgment

I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EADY

The Hon. Mr Justice Eady:

1

This claim, founded on defamation and in the alternative injurious falsehood, is due to be tried with a jury on Monday, 16 July, with an estimate of 10 days. If that is accurate, the close of the trial would come perilously close to the end of term. Unfortunately, at the moment, I do not have much confidence in the time estimate for reasons which will shortly appear. At this stage I am required to resolve two fundamental applications which came before me less than two weeks before the appointed trial date. One is a claim for summary judgment by the Claimants in respect of the defamation claims (only) and the other relates to mode of trial. The Claimants now seek an order, assuming that I reject the application for summary judgment, that the libel claims (as well as those based on injurious falsehood) be tried by judge alone.

2

It is unfortunate that I was unable to give ex tempore judgments in respect of these important matters, as I would have wished to do. There were two boxes of lever arch files intended to reach me the day before the hearing. One was sent to the Central Criminal Court and only reached me an hour before the hearing. The second was delivered to the Queen's Bench listing office the day after the hearing. Thus it became necessary to reserve judgment and to determine the outcome at the eleventh hour.

3

The First Claimant in these proceedings is Culla Park Ltd which carried on business at Culla House, Culla Road, Trimsaran, Carmarthenshire, which is also the home of the Second to Fourth Claimants. The second and third Claimants are Mr David Lowes-Bird and his wife Yvonne. The Fourth Claimant is their son Joshua. Business was carried on by them between 1998 and the summer of 2004. This included running a paint balling and outdoor adventure site. There was also a restaurant called Burdies at Home. The four Defendants occupy sites adjacent to that of the Claimants. The first two Defendants are David Richards and Phyllis Thomas (who is also known as Mrs Richards). The Third and Fourth Defendants are Carl and Angela Kristaps. The First and Second Defendants occupy a property known as Fourwinds, Concrete Road, Trimsaran, Llanelli and the Third and Fourth Defendants occupy land at Ffos Las Farm, Culla Road, Trimsaran, Kidwelly.

4

It is alleged that the Defendants began a joint campaign against the Claimants which involved the display of various hand-painted signs. These made a number of allegations, including in particular that the Claimants were permitting toxic waste or refuse to be tipped on their land. The claim is that such signs were displayed by Mr and Mrs Richards at various points on their land on dates between 24 June 2004 and 5 February 2005. It is also alleged that Mr and Mrs Kristaps displayed signs on their land between 24 June 2004 and the date when these proceedings commenced.

5

The proceedings were issued on 25 July 2005 and served at some point after 16 November of that year. As I have said, with one exception, the claims are founded upon defamation and injurious falsehood. The exception relates to the Second Claimant, Mr Lowes-Bird, who is an undischarged bankrupt and therefore unable to sue in injurious falsehood. His claim is confined to defamation.

6

The corporate Claimant, Culla Park Ltd, also claims special damages in the sum of £71,083 plus interest.

7

It will be apparent that some of the claims relate to publications alleged to have taken place more than 12 months prior to 25 July 2005. I ruled at the hearing on 4 July 2007 that, in so far as some of the signs were displayed prior to 26 July 2004 (only for a period of approximately one month), the 12 month limitation period should be disapplied in accordance with s.32A of the Limitation Act 1980 (as amended by the Defamation Act 1996).

8

There are nine instances of defamatory publication complained of. It is alleged that some of the words complained of were published only for a few days, but in other cases the display of the defamatory words is said to have continued for some months. At this stage I need to focus upon the nature of the Claimants' complaint and, in particular, the natural and ordinary meanings relied upon.

9

So far as the publications against Mr and Mrs Richards are concerned, it is said that the words meant “… that the Claimants and each of them had been knowingly dumping, or had knowingly been causing or allowing others to dump waste at Culla Park”. As to Mr and Mrs Kristaps, on the other hand, there is an additional meaning relied upon that “… the Claimants and each of them had been knowingly dumping, or had knowingly been causing or allowing others to dump refuse tip rubbish at Culla Park”.

10

The Defendants are adamant that they believe what they published to be true and say that they have genuine concerns for the local environment. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider how the statements of case currently stand in order to identify the outstanding issues in the case and, especially, in order to throw light upon the scope of inquiry at the trial and the need (if any) for “prolonged examination of documents”.

11

When I adjourned the trial on 1 December 2006, I ordered inter alia the defence of Mr and Mrs Kristaps be struck out unless they complied with certain outstanding costs orders. That order was not complied with and, accordingly, Ms Skinner's primary submission is that the defence was automatically struck out. On 16 February 2007 (which was, incidentally, the first hearing in the action which any of the Defendants had attended), I declined to enter judgment against the Kristaps upon the condition that the unpaid costs order was complied with within seven days. Since, finally, the costs were paid within the time specified, Mr Kristaps submits that the defence was reinstated. There is, of course, a difference between striking out a defence and entering judgment. Although I did not allow a judgment to be entered, the defence remained struck out as a result of the earlier unless order.

12

This means that the Claimants will still need to establish their case in relation to each pleaded publication and to adduce evidence in relation to such matters as aggravated and special damages. The plea of aggravated damages in this case largely overlaps with the plea of malice which is an essential ingredient in support of the claim for injurious falsehood. Even though some defences have been struck out, it seems to me that the Defendants would be entitled to test the case in relation to such matters and, in particular, to resist allegations of dishonesty introduced in support of the pleas of malice. This allows in evidence as to their respective states of mind at various points over a considerable period of time.

13

Another characteristic of injurious falsehood is that the burden of proving falsity rests (unlike in defamation cases) upon the Claimants. That burden cannot be taken as having been discharged merely by virtue of the defence having been struck out pursuant to the unless order. It appears, therefore, that the issues not only of malice, but also of truth or falsity, will have to be explored to some extent even in the absence of a substantive defence.

14

So far as Mr Richards is concerned, his defence remains in place. On the other hand, Mrs Richards also had an unless order made against her with which she has not so far complied. This was made on 16 February 2007 but there was for several months an application for permission to appeal pending before the single Lord Justice. On 2 July she was notified that this application had been rejected, but she wishes to make a renewed application orally. Since it would not be right for me to pre-empt that outcome, her defence remains for the moment in limbo.

15

No jury bundle has been agreed, partly because of difficulties of communication with the Defendants and partly because it seems impossible to agree any matters at all. The prospect would, therefore, loom of the trial judge having to rule, in the absence of the jury, upon virtually every document which either side sought to rely upon or put to a witness. It appears at the moment that there are over 20 witnesses altogether and Mr Richards has indicated that there are two video tapes and one DVD which he would wish to take the court through. This might take a day or two in itself as he would be stopping the machine and commenting to the court on what could be seen. When asked about documents, he and Mr Kristaps indicated that they wished to rely on about 200 documents. These are some of the reasons why I doubted the time estimate of ten days.

16

There are obviously difficulties in doing so, but I now propose to address the two applications advanced by Ms Skinner on behalf of the Claimants. She found it convenient to begin with the issue of mode of trial.

17

It is not entirely easy to identify the scope of documentation in this case. The fact that there are two boxes of lever arch files does not, of course, mean that all of these require prolonged...

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    ...I have had regard to these principles, relevant factors, and general considerations, to the extent relevant to this case. 31 In Culla Park Ltd v Richards [2007] EWHC 1850 (QB) at [23], Eady J made clear that, in a case involving more than one defamatory publication, it is not necessary to ......
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    ...apportionment between the Defendants and to ensure that the overall award is proportionate to the entirety of the publications: Culla Park Ltd v Richards [2007] EWHC 1850 (QB) [23]–[24] per Eady J, and see also Hourani v Thomson [2017] EWHC 432 (QB) [238], [240] per Warby 211 Finally, as ......
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