‘D’ v Persons Unknown
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Tipples DBE |
| Judgment Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 157 (QB) |
| Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Claim Nos: (1) QB-2019-001107 & (2) QB-2019-001092 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
[2021] EWHC 157 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE HONOURABLE Mrs Justice Tipples
Claim Nos: (1) QB-2019-001107 & (2) QB-2019-001092
Mr Edward Fitzgerald QC and Mr Jonathan Price (instructed by Just for Kids Law Ltd (D) & Bhatt Murphy Solicitors (F)) for ‘D’ and ‘F’
Mr Sam Tobin, a journalist, for the Press Association
Hearing dates: 21 st and 22 nd October 2020
Approved Judgment
Introduction
The claimants seek a lifelong anonymity injunction to prevent them from being identified as the murderers of Angela Wrightson. They were children when they were convicted of this crime and are now adults. The claimants are referred to as “D” and “F” and, by one order or another, their anonymity has been maintained ever since 11 December 2014.
The issue I have to decide is whether this is an exceptional case in which the Venables jurisdiction should be exercised in favour of the claimants.
The claimants maintain that this is such a case and the permanent injunctions they seek should be granted. The Press Association (“ the PA”) maintain this is not an exceptional case, and the granting of the injunctions would substantially erode the open justice principle and represent a significant extension to the Venables jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the PA accept that the positions of D and F are sufficiently intertwined that, if an injunction is granted in respect of one of D or F, then in order for that injunction to be effective, an injunction must be granted in respect of the other one as well.
Background
On 8 December 2014 Angela Wrightson was murdered at her home in Stephen Street, Hartlepool. Ms Wrightson was a vulnerable adult and was the victim of a sustained and brutal assault. She had over 100 injuries which were the result of being struck in 12 separate locations with a number of different objects. In the time that the claimants were at Ms Wrightson's home, they took pictures of themselves and posted them on social media. On 6 April 2016, at the Crown Court sitting at Leeds, the claimants were convicted of her murder. D committed this offence when she was 13 years-old, F was 14 years-old.
The case attracted extensive local and national media attention, with the claimants being referred to as the “Snapchat killers”. The case has resulted in public outrage and revulsion, together with public concern about how these two young girls could commit such a brutal murder.
On 7 April 2016 the claimants were sentenced to life imprisonment by Globe J with a minimum term of 15 years. The minimum term expires in December 2029, and the claimants will then be eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board.
This was the second trial. The sequence of events which led to the second trial, and the reporting restrictions in place were as follows.
On 11 December 2014, shortly after the claimants had been arrested, the court made a direction under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 prohibiting the press from reporting the claimants' identities (“ the section 39 order”).
The first trial commenced at Teesside Crown Court on 1 July 2015. The opening of the case was accompanied by “a blitz of extreme and disturbing comments posted on Facebook by members of the public” (per DCI Hunt, quoted by Globe J in his sentencing remarks).
On 3 July 2015 Globe J made a reporting restrictions order (under section 45(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981) addressed to all media organisations reporting on the trial in order to deter such social media activity in so far as it was caused or encouraged by the media organisations reporting on the trial (“ the section 45(4) order”). The section 45(4) order directed the media organisations to disable comments on sites reporting on the trial, to stop linking from or to such sites, including social media sites, and to refrain from tweeting about the trial.
Nevertheless, the social media activity by members of the public became so intense and extreme that on 6 July 2015 a joint application was made by the prosecution and defence to discharge the jury on the basis that the claimants could no longer have a fair trial. The judge granted the application. However, before the jury were discharged, the judge dealt with a challenge from the media to the section 45(4) order, which he then revoked and replaced with an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (“ section 4(2) order”). The section 4(2) order postponed the publication of any report of the proceedings, other than that the proceedings had been halted and the jury discharged, until the return of verdicts in relation to both claimants or further order of the court. The jury were then formally discharged on 9 July 2015.
There was then further argument in relation to the section 4(2) order on 20 October 2015. On 9 November 2015 Globe J decided to maintain the order, but he granted the media leave to appeal. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 26 January 2016, and judgment handed down on 11 February 2016: see R v F and D ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation and eight other media organisations [2016] EWCA Crim 12. The Court of Appeal discharged the section 4(2) order and restored the section 45(4) order, but subject to a number of modifications. That order was then in place throughout the second trial. The Court of Appeal directed that the appeal proceedings, and the judgment, could not be published until after the return of verdicts in the criminal trial or any further order of the trial judge.
When the claimants were sentenced on 7 April 2016, the media applied to discharge the section 39 order. The application was opposed by Hartlepool Borough Council (the local authority who had parental responsibility for the claimants), the police and the claimants. Globe J refused the media's application. Having identified the relevant statutory provisions, and case law, the judge provided the following reasons for doing so, which I should set out in full:
“[55.] The application by the press includes the following three factors that support no anonymity: (1) the exceptionally grave nature of the crimes committed and the legitimate public interest in discussion of the background to these crimes; (2) the deterrent effect of naming the defendants; (3) the ages of the defendants who are now 15 and 14. Neither is particularly young. The orders will expire upon their 18 th birthdays in any event.
[56.] The first point is particularly strong. Its weakness lies in the fact that the full facts have been able to be reported and a debate about the background to the crimes remains possible without knowing the precise identities of the defendants.
[57.] The second point is a reasonable point, but it is less strong. This type of offence is extremely rare and it is arguable that no further deterrence is necessary or, if it is, the naming of the individuals will add little to the fact that those responsible have been brought to justice, been convicted and been sentenced.
[58.] The third point is also a reasonable point, but requires consideration of the value of the anonymity continuing for the next few years.
[59.] In a detailed letter to me by the Senior Investigating Officer, DCI Hunt, emphasis is placed on the wider issues of what is likely to happen if anonymity is lifted. “I am reminded of events following the opening of the case at Teesside last summer when there was a blitz of extreme and disturbing comments posted on Facebook by members of the public. The effect of a similar blitz upon anonymity being lifted is likely to result in the identification of juvenile witnesses, the families of both defendants, their carers and their schools. In turn, that could detrimentally affect the lives of both defendants, who remain in fragile and vulnerable emotional states.” DCI Hunt concludes his letter to me by stating that the verdict has already been widely reported both locally and nationally in a controlled and sensible manner and there are no obvious benefits that arise from disclosing the names of the defendants other than to further sensationalise the case.
[60.] Mr Hill and Mr Elvidge reflect the concern of the police. They emphasise the fact that each defendant poses a risk of self-harm. In one case, it is a real and present danger. Removing anonymity is likely to exacerbate what is already a dangerous situation.
[61.] The Chief Solicitor for Hartlepool Borough Council makes reference in a letter dated 4 April to the possibility of collateral damage to the defendants' siblings if the defendants' identities are made known. However, the real thrust of his letter is focussed upon the effect that identifying the defendants would have on themselves. Mr Wise QC, counsel acting for the council, in a written and oral submission made to me this morning, reinforces the psychological vulnerability of both of you. Reference is made to recent suicide attempts by both of you, not just you F.
[62.] That is also my real concern. It is conceded by the press that they have not seen evidence relating to the welfare of either of you. I have not only seen that material and had the advantage of observing you coming and going and giving evidence, but have also been receiving reports about how you have been conducting yourselves within the court precincts. I have received one first-hand report from a member of the court staff who I am...
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