Flavius-Florin Saptelei v Hunedoara Law Court of Romania

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMrs Justice McGowan DBE,Lord Justice Fulford V.P.
Judgment Date09 March 2021
Neutral Citation[2021] EWHC 506 (Admin)
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCase No: CO/1221/2020
Date09 March 2021

[2021] EWHC 506 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

DIVISIONAL COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

Lord Justice Fulford

Mrs Justice McGowan DBE

Case No: CO/1221/2020

Between:
Flavius-Florin Saptelei
Appellant
and
Hunedoara Law Court of Romania
Respondent

Mr David Josse QC & Mark Smith (instructed by Paytons Solicitors) for the Appellant

Mr Joel Smith & Ms Hannah Burton (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, on behalf of the Romanian Judicial Authority) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 17th February 2021

Approved Judgment

Lord Justice Fulford V.P.

Background

1

Romania seeks the extradition of Flavius Florin Saptelei (“the appellant”) to serve a combined sentence of 1 year 5 months' imprisonment in respect of two convictions for driving without being the holder of a driving licence.

2

The extradition of the appellant has been requested by the Hunedoara Court of First Instance via a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) dated 26 November 2018 pursuant to the European Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between member states (2002/584/JHA) (“the Framework Decision”). Romania is a designated Category 1 territory pursuant to section 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”), by the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 1 Territories) Order 2003 (SI 2003/3333), as amended by the Extradition Act 2003 (Amendment to Designations) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1898). Part 1 of the 2003 Act, as amended, applies in this case.

3

On 3 July 2015 in Calan, Romania, the appellant drove a car (a Lancia) without a licence. The appellant noticed that police officers were trying to stop him and drove away. He was subsequently found by the police. On 16 October 2015 the defendant again drove a car (a Citroen) in Calan without a licence. He was stopped by police officers. He was “ personally summoned” at his Calan residential address to stand trial. The district judge who considered the extradition request inferred that he had been notified by post at his last known registered address in Romania.

4

He did not attend his trial, but he was legally represented. He was convicted and sentenced in his absence on 11 September 2018. He was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment for the first offence and 1 year and 1 month's imprisonment for the second. These sentences have been amalgamated, resulting in a total sentence of 1 year and 5 months' imprisonment. The European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) was issued on 26 November 2018 and it was certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 28 December 2018. The sentence became final on 25 September 2018. For the purposes of the issues that arise on this appeal, it is important to bear in mind that the appellant had been convicted and sentenced.

5

If extradited, the appellant has an unfettered right to request a retrial pursuant to Article 466 of the Romanian Penal Procedure Code.

6

The appellant was arrested in this country on 21 November 2019. He was granted and has remained on conditional bail.

The Decision of the District Judge

7

The appellant's extradition hearing took place on 3 March 2020. The district judge delivered his ruling on 20 March 2020 and ordered the extradition of the appellant. The judge observed that the judicial authority did not appear to have been satisfied that the appellant had “ voluntarily absented himself from the trial process” and he concluded that it had not been established to the criminal standard that he should be regarded as a “ fugitive”. The appellant did not given evidence during the hearing, and he relied on an original and an addendum proof of evidence. He suggested in his original proof of evidence that he came to the UK from Romania in June 2016 for economic reasons. He has worked mainly as a cleaner but also in food distribution. He is a single man with no children. He gave contradictory accounts as to his personal relationships, indicating in the Personal Information form that as of 21 November 2019 he had been in a two-month relationship with Alexandra Danciu (see [19]), whereas in his signed proof of evidence dated 3 January 2020 he suggested he had been in a serious six-month relationship with Nubeillah Cassandra (see [20]). In the addendum proof of evidence, the appellant (unconvincingly, in the view of the judge) asserted that Alexandra Danciu and Nubeillah Cassandra were the same person (see [22]). The applicant failed to provide any explanation as to the different time periods he had provided for the length to the relationship (see [23]). As to the present criminal proceedings, the appellant asserted in his proof of evidence that he recalled being interviewed by the police at a police station when he was released “ without charge or ticket” (see [26]). There was, as the judge observed, no independent confirmation of his date of arrival in the UK, the work he has undertaken since then and his personal relationship. In those circumstances, the judge determined that the appellant's decision not to testify meant that “ the weight to be given to uncorroborated facts” set out in his proofs of evidence was “ considerably diminished” (see [27]).

8

He bore in mind that the aim of the Framework Decision was to facilitate and hasten the extradition process of those persons wanted either to stand trial and/or to serve a sentence of imprisonment/detention previously imposed in the requesting State (see [28]). The judge highlighted Norris v Government of the United States of America (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9; [2010] 2 WLR 572 had decided that the public interest in upholding bilateral extradition treaties would be significantly damaged if those who faced serious offences were not extradited, even if there were consequences for the individual's close family ties and dependents (see [31]). He reminded himself that the court needed to embark upon a careful balancing exercise in weighing the matters raised in favour of, as well as against, ordering extradition in an Article 8 context (see [35]), bearing in mind the approach approved in Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski & Others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin); [2016] 1 WLR 551, which for completeness is as follows:

“15. […] it is important in our view that judges hearing cases where reliance is placed on article 8 adopt an approach which clearly sets out an analysis of the facts as found and contains in succinct and clear terms adequate reasoning for the conclusion arrived at by balancing the necessary considerations.

16. The approach should be one where the judge, after finding the facts, ordinarily sets out each of the “pros” and “cons” in what has aptly been described as a “balance sheet” in some of the cases concerning issues of article 8 which have arisen in the context of care order or adoption: see the cases cited at paras 30–44 of In re B-S (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2014] 1 WLR 563. The judge should then, having set out the “pros” and “cons” in the “balance sheet” approach, set out his reasoned conclusions as to why extradition should be ordered or the defendant discharged.

17. We would therefore hope that the judge would list the factors that favoured extradition and then the factors that militated against extradition. The judge would then, on the basis of the identification of the relevant factors, set out his/her conclusion as the result of balancing those factors with reasoning to support that conclusion. As appeals in these cases are, for the reasons we shall examine, common, such an approach is of the greatest assistance to an appellate court.”

9

I note at this stage that it is suggested by the appellant that the judge inappropriately focussed on two passages in Celinski that referred to the position of fugitives, and particularly the public interest in discouraging the perception that the UK is a state willing to accept fugitives from justice (at [36] and [39]). Nothing of substance turns on this point, given the judge clearly approached the case on the basis of the UK's broad international extradition obligations as regards persons “ unlawfully at large” rather than narrowly focussing on whether he was, strictly speaking, to be considered to be a “ fugitive”.

10

The judge reminded himself that the public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured is “ very high” and that the member state making a request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect (see [37]). He referred to the fact that it will rarely be appropriate for the court in this country to consider whether the sentence imposed was very significantly different from the sentence which would have been imposed in England and Wales (see [38]). The judge carried out the balance sheet approach (at [43] and [44]). He had in mind in favour of granting extradition, first, that there is a strong and continuing important public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations and, second, the seriousness of the offences in respect of which the appellant was convicted and sentenced. In favour of refusing extradition, there was the fact that he had been settled in the UK since 2016, he maintained he had been working, had fixed accommodation and is in a stable relationship, he would not have received a prison sentence in the UK and more generally he has led a law-abiding life since settling in this country. We interpolate to observe that the judge erred in favour of the appellant in taking into account, as just set out, that the criminal conduct could not result in a prison sentence if committed in the UK (see [44 (b) (ii)]). However, in other passages the judge clearly adopted the correct approach to this issue (see [38] and [46]).

11

The judge concluded that extradition would not be a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Lucian Florin Badea v Romanian Judicial Authority
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 4 Mayo 2022
    ...15 months' custody. All 15 months remain to be served. The facts therefore bear some similarity to the facts in Saptelei v Romania [2021] EWHC 506 (Admin) [2021] RTR 484. In that case there was a “merged” Romanian sentence of 17 months custody (see §§3–4) arising out of two offences involv......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT